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The promise of scalable quantum technology appears more realistic, after recent
advances in both theory and experiment. Assuming a quantum computer is developed,
the task of verifying the correctness of its outcome becomes crucial. Unfortunately, for
a system that involves many particles, predicting its evolution via classical simulation
becomes intractable. Moreover, verification of the outcome by computational methods,
i.e. involving a classical witness, is believed inefficient for the hardest problems solvable
by a quantum computer. A feasible alternative to verify quantum computation is via
cryptographic methods, where an untrusted prover has to convince a weak verifier for
the correctness of his outcome. This is the approach we take in this thesis.
In the most standard configuration the prover is capable of computing all polynomial-
time quantum circuits and the verifier is restricted to classical with very modest quantum
power. The goal of existing verification protocols is to reduce the quantum requirements
for the verifier - ideally making it purely classical - and reduce the communication
complexity. In Part II we propose a composition of two existing verification protocols
[Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012], [Aharonov et al., 2010] that achieves quadratic im-
provement in communication complexity, while keeping the quantum requirements for
the verifier modest. Along this result, several new techniques are proposed, including
the generalization of [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] to prime dimensions.
In Part III we discuss the idea of model-specific quantum verification, where the
prover is restricted to intermediate quantum power, i.e. between full-fledged quantum
and purely classical, thus more feasible experimentally. As a proof of principle we
propose a verification protocol for the One-Pure-Qubit computer [Knill and Laflamme,
1998], which tolerates noise and is capable of computing hard problems such as large
matrix trace estimation. The verification protocol is an adaptation of [Fitzsimons and
Kashefi, 2012] running on Measurement-Based Quantum Computing with newly proved
properties of the underlying resources.
Connections of quantum verification to other security primitives are considered in
Part IV. Authenticated quantum communication has been already proved to relate to
quantum verification. We expand this by proposing a quantum authentication protocol
derived from [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] and discuss implications to verification
with purely classical verifier.
Connections between quantum security primitives, namely blindness - prover does
not learn the computation -, and classical security are considered in Part V. We intro-
duce a protocol where a client with restricted classical resources computes blindly a
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universal classical gate with the help of an untrusted server, by adding modest quantum
capabilities to both client and server. This example of quantum-enhanced classical
security we prove to be a task classically impossible.
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Lay Summary
‘Quantum computers’ are an emerging technology aiming to extend the capabilities
of the current ‘classical’ computers. Instead of ‘bits’, which can be in the classical state
0 or 1, quantum computers manipulate ‘qubits’, quantum states that can be in 0 and 1
at the same time (called a ‘superposition’ of the two states). Only when we measure
the output of a quantum computer the state takes a definite classical value 0 or 1. In
general, a quantum computer consisting of N qubits will be internally in a superposition
of all the possible combinations of values for the N bits: there is a vast number of such
configurations, growing exponentially with N. This explains why it is difficult to mimic
(or ‘simulate’) the behaviour of a quantum computer with a classical computer.
We are concerned with the question that follows: If one cannot use a classical
computer or a small quantum computer to predict the behaviour of a large quantum
computer, how he will ever be sure that the large quantum computer is producing
the correct answers. For some problems, verifying the correctness of the outcome is
easy. For example, a task that a quantum computer can solve, as opposed to a classical
computer, is factoring big numbers. When we get the factors of a number as the output
of a quantum computer, we can check their correctness by simply multiplying them
together. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to verify the result of a complicated
quantum computation. A known technique to build a ‘verification protocol’, where
a device called the ‘verifier’ can verify the correct operation of a device called the
‘prover’, is by secretly interspersing small questions in the normal computation we
send to the quantum computer. These questions produce an easy to predict result and
therefore are used as traps to check the honesty of the quantum computer.
Our first contribution is to reduce the requirements for the verifier (the amount of
communication between her and the prover and the size of her quantum device), by
combining two existing protocols in a constructive composition that improves over
both and produces a series of side results. The second contribution is to propose a
verification protocol for a version of the quantum computer, called the one-pure-qubit
quantum computer, believed to be easier to build because it tolerates a significant
amount of noise. Inspired by the verification protocol, we propose a protocol for the
‘authentication’ of a quantum state when transmitted over an untrusted channel. Finally,
inspired by the techniques of hiding information inside a computation, we propose a
protocol to securely delegate a classical computation in a scenario that we prove would
be impossible classically, but becomes possible using a small quantum enhancement.
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Quantum technology has recently seen a surge in development, both theoretically and
experimentally, and the promise of scalable quantum devices appears more realistic
than it was thought before. To provide a small sample, important developments in the
theoretical field include the introduction of efficient quantum surface codes [Fowler
et al., 2012], the demonstration of supremacy over classical of simple optical quantum
simulators [Aaronson and Arkhipov, 2011] and the advent of quantum machine learning
[Lloyd et al., 2014]. In the experimental field, among many recent exciting results
there is a multiple qubit superconducting computer [Kelly et al., 2015], a commercial
quantum processor which demonstrates quantum entanglement [Lanting et al., 2014]
and integrated photonic simulators [Spring et al., 2013].
An important challenge that arises when we increase the size of a quantum computer
is that it becomes hard to predict its correct outcome. Indeed, classical simulation of an
arbitrary quantum computer that runs in polynomial time requires classical exponential
time. If one cannot directly predict the outcome of a quantum computation, alternative
methods need to be considered. In classical complexity theory there exists an important
class of problems, Non-deterministic Polynomial time or NP, containing all the problems
that can be verified using a polynomial size classical string, usually called the witness,
by a classical computer running in polynomial time. Factoring is a problem that belongs
in this class, the witness being the factors themselves, and therefore one can verify
classically the correctness of a quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm [Shor,
1997]. However, the most common belief is that the class of problems, named Bounded-
error Quantum Polynomial time or BQP, that contains all problems decidable with
bounded error by a polynomial time quantum computer is not contained in NP (Figure
1.1). In other words, there exist problems in BQP, including the hardest problems of
3
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Figure 1.1: Suspected relations between some well-known classical and quantum
complexity classes. It is believed that problems solvable by a quantum computer (class
BQP) is not contained in the class NP of classically efficiently verifiable problems and
also NP is not believed to be contained in BQP.
the class, that are believed not to be classically efficiently verifiable using a classical
witness. An example of such a problem is approximating a knot invariant called the
Jones polynomial, which has many applications, from DNA folding to Topological
Quantum Field Theory (TQFT). Other problems that are candidates to demonstrate
quantum supremacy by a medium-size quantum computer and do not have known
generic verification techniques are quantum sampling problems, such as the scattering
of identical bosons through a linear optical network [Aaronson and Arkhipov, 2011].
In order to verify problems outside NP one can give up on determinism and apply
techniques of cryptography to get cryptographic verifiability. The basic setting in this
approach is that of a trusted and weak computationally verifier delegating a quantum
computation to an untrusted but powerful prover. The verifier is using a classical secret
key to encrypt her interaction with the prover and should be able to decide whether or
not the prover is returning the correct outcomes. More specifically, as depicted in Figure
1.2, the verifier (Alice) sends messages through a quantum and a classical channel to
the prover (Bob). These messages may contain an encryption of the input state and
an encryption of the description of the unitary to be applied to this input. Bob sends
messages to Alice which contain the outcomes of the computation, which Alice can
decrypt using her private key (or an update of her original private key). Alice accepts
or rejects the outcome depending on the outcomes of her tests. Assuming that Bob’s
deviation is within the laws of quantum mechanics, the verification protocol ensures
with high confidence that Alice will not accept an incorrect outcome. This problem is
also studied within the context of interactive proof systems, where one ideally would
like to have a purely classical verifier to verify a fully quantum prover. In Part I an
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Figure 1.2: In delegated computation Alice (the verifier) has the task to compute the
output of unitary U applied on input |ψ〉 but not enough power to run the computation
herself, so she uses the services of untrusted but powerful Bob (the prover). Alice uses
a secret key k to encode the input |ψ〉 and the description of the unitary U so that she is
able to run secret tests on the prover and eventually decide on whether she accepts (A)
or rejects (R) his returned outcome.
overview of the definitions and the existing architectures used in verification will be
given.
The usual setting for quantum verification in the literature is with a prover capable
of computing any polynomial size quantum circuit (computational complexity class
BQP) and a verifier being universal classical but quantum restricted. Several verification
protocols have been proposed, with different requirements for the verifier - all aiming to
minimize the quantum preparation or quantum measurement requirements of the verifier
and the communication rounds between the prover and verifier. In this setting, it is still
open whether or not there exists a quantum verification protocol where the verifier is
purely classical. Two prominent and efficient protocols are the protocol proposed by
Fitzsimons and Kashefi (will be referred to as the FK protocol) [Fitzsimons and Kashefi,
2012], which benefits from the requirement of single state preparation for the verifier,
and the protocol proposed by Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban (will be referred to as the
ABE protocol) [Aharonov et al., 2010], which benefits from linear round complexity. In
this thesis, we introduce a composite protocol, which includes elements of both the FK
and ABE protocols, that benefits from the single state preparation of the FK protocol
and the linear round complexity of the ABE protocol (as opposed to quadratic of the
FK). Therefore, this protocol is more efficient than each of its components when taken
as standalone protocols. This result is accompanied by a few side-results: techniques
that relate to the implementability and the composability of the original protocols. One
contribution is a new proof of verifiability of the FK protocol which demonstrates the
function of the protocol from a different viewpoint and is helpful when we consider both
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serial and parallel compositions of the protocol with itself or other protocols. Another
technique is the introduction of a gadget for the FK protocol that localizes the final
output of the computation to a fixed position at the prover’s side and thus is useful
again in the context of composition with a different (or the same) protocol. A final
contribution is the generalization of the FK protocol from 2n-dimensional systems to
dn-dimensional systems where d is an odd prime, which might be useful for future
implementations of the FK protocol, especially when novel techniques of d-level fault
tolerance are employed. Part II of the thesis contains these results that all relate to a
single universal quantum prover. These results have been published, as an extended
abstract and oral presentation, in 15th Asian Quantum Information Science Conference,
Seoul, 2015 [Kapourniotis et al., 2015].
Given the hardness of the engineering problem of building a fully-fledged quantum
computer, some intermediate steps are worth exploring. Quantum intermediate models
have been proposed, which drop some of the requirements of universal quantum compu-
tation, such as having pure quantum input, and are still interesting from a computational
perspective, being able to compute answers to problems considered hard classically.
In this thesis, we examine the applicability of the universal quantum verification tech-
niques in those models. The prover will be restricted to quantum intermediate power,
i.e. having characteristics that classify him between fully quantum and purely classical
and the verifier wants to delegate a classically hard problem which is not able to solve
by herself. A specific example of intermediate quantum power is the One-Pure-Qubit
(OPQ) model that solves the problem of estimating the trace of a large matrix when
given in a suitable polynomial representation [Knill and Laflamme, 1998] [Shepherd,
2006]. This model assumes that only one qubit of the input is prepared in a pure state
and the rest is maximally mixed. The OPQ computer will then be able to apply coher-
ently a polynomial-time quantum circuit. We propose a verification protocol for a OPQ
prover, where a restricted verifier, being able to prepare single qubits one by one and
send them to the prover, can verify the correctness of all outputs of OPQ computations.
Since all the known verification techniques are based on Measurement-Based models
of Quantum Computing (MBQC) and these models require, apart from the input, the
supply of auxiliary pure states to implement the gates, we slightly modify the definition
of OPQ to admit auxiliary states but keep the principle of limited purity over time.
A constructive proof is provided for the availability of resource states for MBQC in
this model of limited purity, which allows for the direct adaptation of the existing
techniques used in verification, which in this case are implemented in a serial fashion.
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Part III of the thesis contains these results on intermediate quantum verification which
have been presented orally in Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and
Cryptography, Singapore 2014 and published in its proceedings [Kapourniotis et al.,
2014].
Quantum verification appears to have some deep connections with other security
primitives, such as quantum blindness - the property of the prover not learning the input
and description of the computation [Broadbent et al., 2009]. Moreover, the property
of authenticated quantum communication, has already appeared in literature to be con-
nected to verification [Aharonov et al., 2010]. Authenticated quantum communication
has been proven to require quantum encryption - the property of the eavesdropper in a
quantum channel not learning the transmitted quantum message [Barnum et al., 2002].
We reinforce these connections by proposing a quantum authentication protocol that is
based on techniques used in quantum verification of [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]
with the viewpoint that these connections might provide an indication on how to resolve
of the (im)possibility problem for classical verifier quantum verification. Part IV is
dedicated to these results.
On the other hand, a connection is established between quantum blindness and
classical security, in the case a classically restricted client wants to delegate a universal
gate to a classically unrestricted server and the server must not learn the input. We prove
this task to be classically unobtainable and propose a protocol that achieves it by having
on both client and sever a very modest quantum capability - preparation or measurement
of single qubit states. This demonstrates, in the context of quantum-enhanced classical
computation, that quantum techniques might be exploitable for the sake of classical
security. Part V is dedicated to these results which have been published in the Journal
of Quantum Information and Computation [Dunjko et al., 2016].
The rest of Part I is an introduction to the basic elements needed for understanding
the rest of the thesis. In Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.3 we establish the basic notation for
quantum computation in both the circuit and the measurement-based model. In Section
1.1.4 a minimal necessary exposition to computational complexity theory is given. We
proceed by introducing formally, in Section 1.2, quantum delegated computation and
verification. Section 1.3 contains an overview of the existing verification techniques
and protocols in literature, that will serve as a reference point to our techniques.
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1.1 General Preliminaries
Here are presented briefly some basic elements of quantum computation and quantum
information that will be useful for the rest of the thesis.
1.1.1 Quantum Computing and Density Operators
The state of a quantum system is represented by |ψ〉 ∈H , where H is a Hilbert space
and |||ψ〉||= 1. In this thesis we consider only systems of finite dimension N and, using
the standard convention, we fix the computational basis to be {| j〉}N−1j=0 . Also, when N
is a power of 2 and j is in the binary representation, we speak about qubit systems.
Density operators is an alternative formalism to represent quantum systems, espe-
cially those whose state is not completely known. Suppose that a system is in one of the
states |ψi〉 ∈H , with index i, with probability pi. The corresponding density operator




There exists a simple test in order to find if an operator is a density operator [Nielsen
and Chuang, 2010]:
Lemma 1. An operator ρ in Hilbert space H is a density operator iff:
1. ρ has trace equal to one
2. ρ is a positive operator
A two dimensional density operator can be expressed in the standard basis of identity



















(I + r1X + r2Y + r3Z) (1.2)
where r ∈ R3. From positivity of ρ, r forms a unit sphere, called the Bloch sphere,
where all the pure states reside in the boundary, where ||r||= 1.
The basic principles of quantum mechanics can be expressed in the formalism of
density operators. If a system, originally in state described by density operator ρ, evolves
according to unitary transformation U , the final state of the system can be written as:
UρU†. Measurements of quantum systems can be represented in this formalism in the
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following way: If we perform a measurement described by measurement operators Mm




Another important operator used in describing composite quantum systems is the
reduced density operator. First we define the partial trace operation: Suppose we have
systems A and B. The partial trace over system B, denoted by trB is defined by:
trB(|a1〉〈a2|⊗ |b1〉〈b2|) = |a1〉〈a2|tr(|b1〉〈b2|) (1.3)
where |a1〉 and |a2〉 and |b1〉 and |b2〉 are any vectors in space of system A and B
respectively.
Then, the reduced density operator for system A is:
ρ
A = trB(ρAB) (1.4)
The reasoning behind using the reduced density operator for system A is that it
provides the correct measurement statistics for the measurements made on system A.
In the formalism of density matrices the most general quantum channel can be
described as a map E ∈ L(H )→ L(H ) that is:
• linear
• complete positive, which means that it is positive and also all extensions E ⊗ I ,
where I is the identity map of arbitrary dimension, are positive
• trace preserving
Thus, a quantum channel is often described as a completely-positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) map. More information on quantum computing can be found in [Nielsen and
Chuang, 2010] and [Heinosaari and Ziman, 2008].
1.1.2 Circuit Model
In the circuit model the computation is described as a sequence of unitary transforma-
tions, which are the quantum analogues of classical logic gates. Measurements are
only taken at the end of the computation. Here, we represent unitary transformations as
matrices with respect to the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}.
An important set of unitary transformations are the Pauli matrices. The set of Pauli
matrices together with multiplicative factors ±1, ±i, that is: {±I,±iI, ±X ,±iX ,±Y ,
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±iY,±Z,±iZ}, forms a group under matrix multiplication. The general Pauli group Pn
is defined to be the set of all the n-fold tensor products of the Pauli matrices together
with multiplicative factors ±1, ±i under the operation of matrix multiplication.
Another important group of unitary operators is the, so called, Clifford group ∗. The
general Clifford group Cn is defined to be the group that maps the general Pauli group
Pn to itself under algebraic conjugation: Cn ≡ {U |U†PnU ⊆ Pn}. Some important
members of the Clifford group are: the Hadamard gate H, the controlled-NOT or cX









1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1







Families of quantum gates that can be used to construct circuits that implement
any arbitrary unitary operator of any size exactly are said to be universal for quantum
computation. For example, the set that contains the cX gate and all single qubit gates is
universal for quantum computation. For practical reasons, however, we need to consider
discrete sets of gates. Therefore, we restrict our interest to families of gates that can be
used to construct circuits that approximate any arbitrary unitary operator. Those families
of quantum gates are said to be approximately universal for quantum computation.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume a quantum circuit to apply on a tensor product
of computational |0〉 states, also called the blank states. In the case of blank state input,
a circuit that consists of elements of the Pauli group and the the Clifford group followed
by measurements on the computational basis is not capable of performing universal
quantum computation. In fact, this circuit can be efficiently simulated by a classical
computer (Gottesman-Knill theorem, see [Nielsen and Chuang, 2010]). We introduce
two more gates, the phase π/8 gate T and the Toffoli gate, each of them being able to
supplement the Clifford group into constructing a universal set of gates:
∗defined in [Gottesman, 1998] and not related to the theory of Clifford algebras








1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

(1.6)






. Another useful gate is the SWAP≡

1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
.
A universal set is composed by the gates: {H,T,cX ,S}. Note that phase gate S can
be constructed by π/8 gates, although it is usually contained in the set for convenience.
This is usually referred as the standard set of universal gates. An alternative is the set
composed of the gates: {H,Toffoli,cX ,S}. Note that cNOT gate can be constructed by
Toffoli gates, although it is usually contained in the set for convenience.
1.1.3 Measurement Based Quantum Computing
Another popular model for describing quantum computing is the Measurement-based
Quantum Computing (MBQC) or one-way quantum computer [R.Raussendorf and
H.J.Briegel, 2001]. This model is based on applying a sequence of measurement
operators on a sufficiently large quantum resource (which can be represented by a graph,
with qubits residing on the vertices), where each measurement can be adapted depending
on results of previous measurements. There are different (equivalent) formalisms to
describe MBQC operations. Here, we adapt the notation from [Danos et al., 2007].
A generic computation consists of a sequence of commands acting on qubits:
• Ni(|q〉): Prepare the single auxiliary qubit i in the state |q〉;
• Ei, j: Apply entangling operator cZ to qubits i and j;






by trace out the measured qubit. The result of measurement of qubit i is called
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result and is denoted by si;
• X s ji ,Z
s j
i : Apply a Pauli X or Z correction on qubit i depending on the result s j of
the measurement on the j-th qubit.
The corrections could be combined with measurements to perform ‘adaptive measure-
ments’ denoted as sz[Mαi ]
sx = M(−1)
sx α+szπ
i . A computation is formally defined by the
choice of a finite set V of qubits, two not necessarily disjoint sets the input and the out-
put, I ⊂V and O⊂V determining the pattern inputs and outputs, and a finite sequence
of commands acting on V .
Definition 1. [Danos and Kashefi, 2006] A pattern is said to be runnable if
(R0) no command depends on an outcome not yet measured;
(R1) no command (except the preparation) acts on a measured or not yet prepared
qubit;
(R2) a qubit is measured (prepared) if and only if it is not an output (input).
The entangling commands Ei, j define an undirected graph over V referred to as
(G, I,O). Along with the pattern we define a partial order of measurements and a depen-
dency function D which is a partial function from OC to P IC , where P denotes the power
set. Then, j ∈ Dxi if j gets a Pauli X correction depending on the measurement outcome
of i and j ∈ Dzi if j gets a Pauli Z correction depending on the measurement outcome
of i. In what follows, we will focus on patterns that realise (strongly) deterministic
computation, which means that the pattern implements a unitary on the input up to a
global phase. A sufficient condition on the geometry of the graph state to allow unitary
computation is given in [Danos and Kashefi, 2006],[Browne et al., 2007] and will be
used later in this thesis. In what follows, x∼ y denotes that x is adjacent to y in G.
Definition 2. [Danos and Kashefi, 2006] A flow ( f ,) for a geometry (G, I,O) consists
of a map f : Oc 7→ Ic and a partial order  over V such that for all x ∈ Oc
(F0) x∼ f (x);
(F1) x f (x);
(F2) for all x,y : y 6= x,y∼ f (x) we have x y .
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Figure 1.3: Brickwork state: A universal resource state for Measurement Based Quantum
Computing with xy-plane measurements
An example of an open graph with a flow is given in Figure 1.3. In this graph,
the subset of vertices of the first column correspond to the input qubits I and the
subset of vertices of the final column correspond to the output qubits O. This graph
state has flow function f ((i, j)) = (i, j+1) and the following partial order for measur-
ing the qubits: {(1,1),(2,1), . . . ,(w,1)} ≺ {(1,2),(2,2), . . . ,(w,2)} ≺ . . . ≺ {(1,d−
1),(2,d−1), . . . ,(w,d−1)}, where w is the width and d is the depth of the graph. The
dependency functions for the corrections are: Dx(i, j) = (i, j−1) for j > 1, else D
x
(i,1) = /0
and Dz(i, j) = {(k, l− 1) : (k, l) ∼ (i, j), l ≤ j} for j > 2, else D
z
(i, j) = /0. This graph
state, named the brickwork state, since it is composed of repetitions of the same ’brick’
element, has some very useful properties, such as universality for MBQC computation
with only xy-plane measurements in the Bloch sphere, that will be presented later in
this thesis.
1.1.4 Computational Complexity Classes
We also need to introduce some definitions from both classical and quantum complexity
theory. First, we define the classical complexity class BPP (Bounded-error Probabilistic
Polynomial time):
Definition 3. A language L is in BPP if and only if there exists a probabilistic Turing
machine M, such that
1. M runs for polynomial time on all inputs.
2. For all x ∈ L, M accepts with probability ≥ 2/3.
3. For all x /∈ L, M accepts with probability ≤ 1/3.
Next, we define the quantum complexity class BQP (Bounded-error Quantum
Polynomial time):
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Definition 4. A language L is in BQP if and only if there exists a polynomial-time
uniform family of quantum circuits {Qn|n ∈ N}, such that
1. For all n ∈ N, Qn takes n qubits as input and outputs 1 bit
2. For all x ∈ L, Pr(Q|x|(x) = 1)≥ 2/3
3. For all x /∈ L, Pr(Q|x|(x) = 0)≥ 2/3
Finally, the classical complexity class NP (Non-deterministic Polynomial time) is
the set of decision problems solvable by a non-deterministic Turing machine that runs
in polynomial time, which means that there is an accepting computation path if a word
is in the language. Equivalently, it can be defined in the verifier model:
Definition 5. A language L is in NP if and only if there exist polynomials p and q, and
a deterministic Turing machine M (verifier), such that
1. For all x and y, the machine M runs in time p(|x|) on input (x,y).
2. For all x in L, there exists a string y (witness) of length q(|x|) such that M(x,y) =
1.
3. For all x not in L and all strings y of length q(|x|), M(x,y) = 0.
1.2 Security Definitions
In this thesis we consider verification in the context of delegated quantum computation.
There are three components in the model of delegated quantum computation: a compu-
tationally weak (compared to BQP) trusted verifier, a computationally powerful (but
quantum realistic, i.e. no more powerful than BQP) and untrusted quantum prover and a
secure channel, capable of establishing two-way quantum and classical communication
between the verifier and the prover. When an alternative model is considered (e.g.
multiple provers, see Section 1.3) this will be made explicit. The verifier is assigned
the task to run a quantum computation that is incapable to run on her own due to the
computational restrictions and therefore has to collaborate with the prover to get the
final output, which can be in general a quantum state (classical output can be seen as
a sub-case). Moreover, the verifier has access to a source of perfectly random binary
strings. The strategy for the verifier is to send to the prover an encrypted version of the
input and description of the computation, on which the prover will apply its operations
1.2. Security Definitions 15
and produce an encrypted version of the outcome. The verifier must be able to decide,
through a series of tests on the returned states, if she accepts or rejects these outcomes.
A security property that is defined in the delegated computing scenario and used
as a stepping stone in the construction of some verification protocols (e.g. [Fitzsimons
and Kashefi, 2012]) is blindness [Broadbent et al., 2009]. The verifier (Alice) wants
to delegate a computation to the prover (Bob) while hiding both the input and the
computation. Bob’s possible deviation is not constrained in any way.
Definition 6 (Perfect Blindness). Let P be a protocol for delegated computation: Alice’s
input is a description of a computation on a quantum input, which she needs to perform
with the aid of Bob and return the correct quantum output. Let ρAB denote the joint
initial state of Alice and Bob and σAB their joint state after the execution of the protocol,
when Bob is allowed to do any deviation from the correct operation during the execution
of P, averaged over all possible choices of random parameters by Alice. The protocol P
is perfectly blind if
∀ρAB ∈ L(HAB),∃E : L(HB)→ L(HB), s.t. TrA(σAB) = E(TrA(ρAB)) (1.7)
Intuitively this means that at the end Bob will get a system that depends only on his
private system and the choice of a deviation map that is independent of the input to the
protocol. We can also extend this to allow some information to leak (e.g. the size of the
computation) by making Bob’s deviation explicitly dependent on this information.
In the verification cryptographic setting Alice wants to delegate a quantum com-
putation to Bob and accept or reject the result depending on whether she thinks the
returned outcome is correct (in the quantum output case, it has high fidelity to the
correct output), or Bob has deviated †. This definition only concerns pure state inputs
and unitary computations. Also, Bob’s deviation is constrained only by the framework
of quantum mechanics. For a delegated computation protocol to be ε-secure, it has to
be correct and ε-verifiable. Correct means that when the deviation of Bob is the identity
operator, the protocol should produce the correct output and accept with probability 1.
ε-verifiable means that the probability of Alice accepting and the result being incorrect
is bounded by a small ε, more formally:
†In this work we will assume that the apparatuses of Alice and Bob are perfect. Without this
assumption on Bob, the protocol will also detect any errors which may stem from Bob’s faulty devices.
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Definition 7 (Verifiability). A protocol for delegated computation, which admits as
input |ψ〉 from a set of allowed quantum states and a polynomial description of a unitary
U from a set of allowed computations, is ε-verifiable (0≤ ε < 1) if for any choice of
Bob’s strategy j, it holds that for any allowed input:
Tr(∑
ν
p(ν)PνincorrectB j(ν))≤ ε (1.8)
where B j(ν) is the state of Alice’s system A at the end of the run of the protocol, for
choice of Alice’s random parameters ν and Bob’s strategy j. If Bob is honest we denote
this state by B0(ν). Let P⊥ be the projection onto the orthogonal complement of the the
correct quantum output U |ψ〉. Then,
Pνincorrect = P⊥⊗|ACC〉〈ACC| (1.9)
where |ACC〉 is the accept state for the indicator that Alice sets at the end of the protocol.
In the case that U are selected from all possible computations in BQP, we call
this property universal verifiability. Typically, we can set the input state to the blank
state |0〉⊗n as we can use the first part of the computation to prepare the desired input.
Generalizations for mixed input exist, but one needs to be careful who is in possession
of the purification of the state. We will come back to this point in Part III.
1.2.1 Interactive Proofs
The concept of efficient verifiability can also be viewed from a complexity theoretical
perspective though the formalism of Interactive Proof (IP) systems. These are systems
consisting of a trusted verifier and an untrusted prover, which are allowed to interact, and
were first defined in the context of the computational complexity class IP ([Goldwasser
et al., 1985], [Babai, 1985]). We briefly make the connection to this formalism in this
section, but we keep the rest of the thesis within the context of computer security in
order to keep it as general as possible, e.g. to be able to discuss about scenarios, such
as the quantum output case, which are not directly translatable as classical complexity
classes. We begin we the definition of class IP, which was introduced as an extension of
the complexity class NP.
Definition 8. A language L is in IP if there is an Interactive Proof system, consisting
of a polynomial probabilistic verifier A and an unbounded prover B which allowed to
interact, such that
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1. For all x ∈ L given as input to (A,B), and for a certain (honest) B, A halts and
accepts with probability at least c = 2/3. (completeness)
2. For all x not in L given as input to (A,B), and any B, A accepts with probability
at most s = 1/3. (soundness)
By standard classical amplification techniques, the class will not be changed if we
replace the requirement by c− s≥ 1nk for some k and sufficiently large n.
Since it is believed that there are problems in BQP that are not in NP it makes sense
to define an interactive proof with classical interaction between the verifier and the
prover for proving BQP problems. From the known result PSPACE=IP [Shamir, 1992]
and since BQP ⊆ PSPACE it follows that, for an unbounded prover, BQP has an IP.
However, we concentrate on the more realistic case of a bounded prover, in particular a
prover that is a quantum computer (i.e. can solve BQP problems).
First, the class QPIP is defined ([Aharonov et al., 2010], [Aharonov and Vazirani,
2012]) as:
Definition 9. A language L is in QPIP if there is an Interactive Proof system, consisting
of a polynomial probabilistic (BPP) verifier A and an BQP prover B which allowed to
interact, such that the same conditions of completeness and soundness as on class IP
hold.
Unfortunately, there is no protocol to demonstrate that BQP is in QPIP (the opposite
is trivial). QPIP* ([Aharonov et al., 2010], [Aharonov and Vazirani, 2012] - star notation
differs in the different papers) is another class that comes from adding to the verifier the
ability to prepare quantum states and send them through a quantum channel. Providing
this quantum enhancement to the verifier appears to be crucial for the existence of
verification protocols as we will observe shortly. Then, using these protocols one can
prove the weaker result, that BQP=QPIP*.
To sum up, by working with a QPIP*, we have a mostly classical verifier (BPP+the
ability to prepare quantum states) and a full quantum prover and we want to verify all
polynomial size quantum computations. In order to prove that there is a QPIP* for BQP
we consider classical input classical output verification protocols and prove that the gap
between completeness (probability of accepting a YES instance with honest prover) and
soundness (accepting a NO instance with any prover) is ≥ 1poly(n) where n is the size
of the problem (the description of the computation in this case). Standard poly-time
classical amplification techniques involving repetition can be applied in the case Bob’s
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output is classical (Bob measures everything before sending the result to Alice so there
is no entanglement between the received systems of different rounds). In the case Bob’s
output is quantum, serial repetition is possible, because Alice can measure her system
before running the next round, but parallel repetition is not necessarily possible (in
some protocols, such as [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012], parallel repetition is possible
since the parallel runs will be proven later to be separable systems for any possible
deviation of Bob if we average over random parameters). In the case Alice’s output
is quantum, classical majority voting is not an option but one can apply alternative
techniques involving quantum encoding to amplify the error probability, as we will
explain later.
1.3 Overview of Existing Techniques
Having established the notion of quantum delegated computation and the property of
verifiability, we present a general overview of the existing approaches. We include the
protocols that are the most efficient and most representative of their own categories, and
have come to our attention until the moment of writing this thesis.
An important categorizing factor between the protocols is the basic configuration of
the system. Most of the protocols are based in the single-verifier/single-prover/quantum-
channel configuration outlined in the previous sections. The verifier is a classical
computer with a simple constant size device that is able to perform some elementary
quantum operations (preparation or single gates or measurement) and the prover is
usually universal for quantum computation. Ideally one wants to have a purely classical
verifier, without any extra capabilities, to verify a quantum computer but whether or not
this is possible without extra assumptions is a long-standing open question [Aaronson,
2007]. Its importance relates to the ability of using the scientific method of laying out
an experiment and classically predicting and verifying its outcome in the limit of the
high complexity of quantum mechanics, as discussed in [Aharonov and Vazirani, 2012].
There is a second configuration considered in literature, where a single verifier has to
verify multiple provers that share scalable initial entanglement. There are protocols
that achieve this goal using techniques for testing quantum correlations, such as CHSH
games or self-testing, and have the property that the verifier is purely classical. However,
these protocols impose a strong assumption, that of non-communication between
the different provers during the execution of the protocol. Also, the communication
complexity of these protocols is much higher, compared to the single verifier-single
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prover protocols.
In the protocols of the first category (single-verifier/single-prover) there are im-
portant differences in their approach to verification. We can separate to three broad
subcategories: the protocols based on some type of trapification of the delegated system
(e.g. [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]), the protocols that are based on some type of
quantum authentication scheme (e.g. [Aharonov et al., 2010]) and the protocols where
the verifier only tests quantum correlations on the states prepared by the prover (e.g.
[Hayashi and Morimae, 2015]). There also a difference in the use of hiding (encryption)
in each of these schemes. In Section 1.3.1, we present the basic approaches for the
single-verifier/single-prover category by outlining some representative protocols. These
protocols will be used as components to our optimized verification in Part II and will
also be relevant to the rest of the thesis. Later, in Section 1.3.2, we will give an overview
of the rest of the protocols, including the single-verifier/multiple-prover ones.
1.3.1 Three Roads to Verification
The first approach to verification is based on injecting and testing a subsystem of traps at
a random position among the qubits of the normal computation. The computation needs
to be hidden from the prover so that he cannot discover the position of the traps. The
second scheme is based on encoding the quantum input by a secretly randomized family
of error correcting codes with some covering properties (authentication schemes), and
checking if the system remains in the correct subspace after prover’s operation. The
hiding is on the input states so that the prover cannot retrieve the secret key used in
encoding. In this thesis we will focus more on these two approaches which, given the
differences in their structure, can be referred to as subsystem and subspace verification
correspondingly. The third scheme is based on the prover preparing of a large entangled
resource state and the verifier performing measurements on it to run the computation
and at the same time verify the resource by testing stabilizer correlations.
The three schemes have different assumptions of trust and different requirements
for the verifier and therefore are useful in different scenarios. In brief, the trap-based
verification and authentication-based verification are appropriate when we trust the
preparation devices, while the resource-testing is appropriate when we trust the mea-
surements. Between the first two, the existing trap-based protocols have the benefit
of having to prepare only single qubit states, while the existing authentication-based
protocols have the benefit of fewer rounds of communication between the verifier and
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the prover (number of rounds is equal to the Toffoli depth). In the next paragraphs we
overview a protocol from each scheme and give more details on the assumptions and
requirements.
1.3.1.1 Trap-based verification
Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computing (VUBQC) [Fitzsimons and Kashefi,
2012], or FK protocol from the names of the authors, is a trap-based protocol and will
be relevant to the optimizations we attempt in the next two parts of this thesis. It is
based on the pre-existing Universal Blind Quantum Computation protocol [Broadbent
et al., 2009]. The latter is a protocol for secure delegated quantum computation where
the server does not learn anything about the client’s input and computation (thus blind,
as defined earlier). The underlying model for both UBQC and VUBQC is a delegated
version of the Measurement-based quantum computing, where the verifier prepares
the single qubits composing the resource state and the measurement angles which
define the basis to measure, while the prover entangles and performs the measurements.
For blindness, verifier has to encrypt the quantum and classical states she sends to
the prover, with whom she has to interact during the execution of the computation to
be able to implement the adaptive measurements. For verification the verifier has to
add a trapification subsystem at a random position among the sent states, which gives
deterministic results for the measurements of the prover, thus can be checked to see if
the prover is honest. Since prover does not know when he measures the computation and
when he measures the trap he cannot cheat without getting caught with some probability.
A not very detailed description of the protocol is given here, while a formal protocol
with more explanation is given in Section 3.1, so that it can be used in our optimizations.
FK protocol (sketch) ‡
1. Alice has a description of a computation in the measurement-based quantum
computing (MBQC) model.
2. Alice embeds this MBQC computation in a different graph that has the following
property: A subsystem of isolated qubits (named traps) can be positioned uni-
formly at random between the normal computational qubits without corrupting
the flow. In order to isolate the traps, qubits in state |0〉 (named dummies) are
‡Protocol 8 in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]).
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placed as their neighbours and measured in the XY plane of the Bloch sphere so
that the effect of the entangling operations of Bob is cancelled.
3. Alice prepares all single qubits needed for the construction of the resource state
by Bob: Instead of preparing them as |+〉i qubits, she performs a random rotation
by angle θi ∈ A≡{0,π/4,2π/4, . . . ,7π/4} around Z axis. For the dummies Alice
instead applies a random X Pauli operation and a pre-rotation by Z on all their
neighbours to cancel this effect.
4. Bob receives the qubits one by one and entangles them (cZ) to construct the
entangled state, the structure of which is public.
5. Alice sends to Bob at each step i the measurement angle δi that encrypts the
computational angle φi (updated to φ′i based on the previous measurement re-
sults): δi = φ′i +θi + riπ. This effectively cancels the pre-rotation by θi (since it
commutes with cZ) and adds a bit flip on the outcome to hide the measurement
result.
6. Alice receives the measurement result and decrypts it by XOR-ing with ri.
7. For the isolated traps φi = 0 so that the measurement outcome depends only on ri
and is deterministic.
8. At the end Alice accepts the outcome returned by Bob if all traps give the correct
outcome.
9. To achieve exponentially small ε verifiability, Alice encodes the computation in
a fault tolerant MBQC pattern, using a QECC that detects log1/ε errors. This
procedure is explained in Section 3.1.1. The underlying idea is that, in order
to corrupt the computation, Bob has to corrupt at least log1/ε qubits, which
increases his probability of hitting a trap and get caught.
In order to pick a graph that has the desired property of hiding the trap without
interrupting the flow, the degree of each vertex becomes linear on the graph size.
The underlying graph state, named the dotted-complete graph and presented later, is
of quadratic size. Thus, the quantum requirement of Alice is to prepare and send
Õ(n2)×O(log(1/ε)) § single qubit states (the ε factor comes from the FT encoding)
§Notation Õ is a variant of O that ignores logarithmic factors, i.e. f (n) ∈ Õ(g(n)) means that
∃k : f (n) ∈ O(g(n) logk g(n)).
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and on-line classical communication of Õ(n2)×O(log(1/ε)), where n is the size of the
computation. The goal in Part II will be to reduce these requirements to linear on n
while keeping the modest requirements for the verifier preparation device.
1.3.1.2 Authentication-based verification
The second verification protocol, that will be used in our optimization in Part II, is the
Polynomial QAS-based verification [Aharonov et al., 2010] or ABE protocol from the
names of the authors. This protocol is based on the Quantum Authentication Schemes
(QAS) [Barnum et al., 2002] which are used to transmit quantum states through an
untrusted quantum channel and check the integrity of the received state (more on
authentication schemes in Part IV). The transmitter and receiver share a secret classical
key which is used for secret (encrypted) encoding and decoding of the quantum state.
The main idea of Polynomial QAS-based verification is that the quantum states sent
from the verifier to the prover in the delegated computation scenario are secretly encoded
by a polynomial QAS. A QAS uses a family of quantum codes, parametrised by a secret
key, that have the special covering property that any Pauli error on the state is detected
by all but an exponentially small number of members of the family. Then the prover
must apply the computation on the QAS-encoded state in a way that the output remains
in the valid subspace (up to an update on the secret key on the verifier side). The prover
cannot deviate and keep the state in the valid subspace if he does not know the secret key
of the QAS. An extra Pauli key is used to reduce all general attacks to Pauli operators.
Here, we give a short description of the protocol, while a more technical one is provided
in Section 2.2.3. It’s worthwhile to observe that this protocol, as it was the case in the
FK protocol, is defined in a model of computation that is based on measurement.
ABE protocol (sketch) ¶
1. Alice has a description of a computation in the Gate Teleportation model where the
non-Clifford operations, Toffoli gates in this case, are performed using auxiliary
states, Toffoli|++0〉 in this case (Toffoli states), computational basis measure-
ments and Clifford corrections depending on the measurement outcomes (the
principle is similar to MBQC, more details in Section 2.2.1). For the protocol to
work the computation must apply on qudits, i.e. d-level systems, where d is an
odd prime.
¶Protocol 4.2 in [Aharonov et al., 2010]
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2. She encodes the input (typically the blank state plus the magic states) using
a polynomial-QECC code where the encoded states are superpositions of all
polynomials (in point-value representation) of degree ≤ p. She also applies a
random sign on each polynomial value, and keeps this key secret from Bob.
3. She applies an independent random Pauli operator on each of the physical states
of the QAS state and sends it to Bob.
4. Bob performs the computation while classically communicating with Alice to
implement the corrections needed after each measurement step. Alice updates
her secret keys accordingly.
5. Alice receives the final output, undoes the Pauli rotations and the sign key and
checks if the resulting state is encoded by a polynomial code of low degree. If
not, she rejects otherwise she accepts. This gives an ε-verifiable protocol with ε
exponentially small on p.
The quantum requirement for the verifier, which comes from the need to prepare se-
cretly encoded states, is to be able (by means of a fixed size universal quantum computer)
to prepare and send O(n) states of O(1/log(ε)) entangled qudits of O(1/log(ε))-level,
where n is the size of the computation. The classical communication requirement is
O(n)×O(log(1/ε)) rounds during the execution of the computation. The goal in Part
II is to use the techniques of this protocol as part of a composite construction to take
advantage of the linear (on the input) communication complexity.
1.3.1.3 Resource testing verification
In [Hayashi and Morimae, 2015] an alternative approach is taken to verification, where
the verifier has a single state measuring device instead of a preparing device and uses
it to apply the measurements needed to implement an MBQC computation. On the
other hand, the prover is the one who prepares, entangles and stores the quantum states.
Alice verifies that Bob keeps the correct state by checking the correlations of stabilizer
measurements. It can be seen therefore as a protocol for state certification for large
graph states. Also, the protocol provides hiding of the computation, since the Bob never
learns the measurement angles by the non-signalling principle. In terms of resources
Bob has to prepare O(n) states and send them to Alice one by one. Alice should be
able to apply a universal set of single qubit measurements. Quantum communication
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is on-line. Therefore, it requires preserving long distance entanglement between the
verifier and the prover during the computation.
1.3.2 Other Protocols
In [Aharonov et al., 2010], another protocol was proposed based on the principle of
QAS-based verification, this time with a verifier able to apply one-qubit and two-qubit
gates. This protocol is based on a random Clifford applied on the input before sending
it to the prover. The prover is used as an untrusted quantum storage device between the
operations applied by the verifier. Every time she wants to apply a quantum gate, she
asks for the corresponding encoded qubits (constant size), decodes them by applying
the Hermitian conjugate of the secret Clifford and measures each of the appended qubits
in the computational basis and aborts if she gets a 1. After, she applies the gate and
encodes the output qubits again with new secret Clifford operators. This process is
repeated until all gates have been applied. In terms of resources, the verifier needs to
be constant size (O(log1
ε
)) universal quantum computer and the prover a polynomial
size quantum memory. The dimension of the single quantum systems is not dependent
on ε, as it was in the case for the ABE protocol. Also, the verifier needs to exchange
with the prover during the execution of the protocol O(n)×O(log 1
ε
) quantum states.
From the description of the protocol, also one understands that it requires preserving
long distance entanglement between the verifier and the prover during the computation.
In the recent work of [Kashefi and Wallden, 2015], a modification of the trap-based
verification of the FK protocol is presented. In particular, the underlying graph, used as
the resource for both the computation and the traps, is simplified over the original FK
protocol. The graph used, named the triple dotted graph, since it is made of components
that are bipartitions of three qubits with a vertex (dot) injected in each edge, has the
desired property of hiding the trap without interrupting the flow. But, this graph has
also linear size on the computation since the degree of each vertex is constant which is
an improvement of the FK protocol. The requirement for the verifier is to prepare single
qubit states as in the original protocol. This result is comparable to our work, especially
with the composite protocol presented in Part II, in terms of complexity but has some
differences in both the construction (type of the graphs) and the depth complexity that
will be progressively discussed through the thesis.
Another protocol with a verifier that prepares auxiliary states, appeared recently
in [Broadbent, 2015] and is also comparable in efficiency to our work in Part II. This
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protocol and the rest that follow in this section do not give an option to verify the
quantum output with exponentially low ε, as it was the case with the trap-based and
authentication-based protocols. The scope of this protocol and of the ones that follow is
to prove the existence of an interactive proof, therefore they are interested only in the
classical output. The main technique, here, is similar to trapification: in each run the
verifier chooses at random between running the actual computation or running a test to
detect the prover’s deviation. The protocol is such that the prover cannot distinguish
between the different cases and therefore cannot cheat without the risk of getting caught.
Alice has to prepare random state from the set A, same to the FK protocol, however she
needs a linear number of them. There is a constant size classical interaction for each
T or H gate therefore the overall classical communication is linear on n, where n is
the size of the computation. The prover should be able to perform universal Clifford
computation and Pauli measurements.
A different approach on verification is taken in [Reichardt et al., 2013], where a
purely classical verifier is able to verify two quantum provers which share entanglement
but are not allowed to communicate to each other. In this case the verifier, by being
able to interact only classically with the two computers, is able to verify whether or not
they share the correct initial state and they perform correctly the instructed operations
so that they jointly produce the correct outcome of the computation. Verifiability comes
from the fact that the verifier can perform CHSH games on the prover’s devices and
that the prover cannot have the incorrect state or perform the incorrect measurements
and win many games. The protocol is not practical because of the unrealistic number
of resources and rounds of communication needed (the number of states and rounds
of communication scale with O(nc), for some appropriate c ≥ 8192), however since
they are still polynomial it demonstrates the theoretical possibility of such a protocol to
exist. Also this result is a way to achieve device independence in quantum cryptography
(since the verifier is purely classical). Device independence is the concept that can be
attached to quantum security if the protocol remains secure even when the quantum
devices used are faulty. In the case of full device independence, the devices are totally
untrusted and can behave in any possible way. Moreover, the delegated computation
remains blind from the prover.
The protocol in [McKague, 2013] applies on a more distributed setting, where a
classical verifier delegates her computation to a polynomial number of untrusted quan-
tum devices. The assumptions are again that these quantum devices share entanglement
but are not allowed to communicate between them. During the protocol each quantum
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device is instructed to perform only one measurement and the correctness of the induced
states is checked by the verifier by a graph state self-test protocol. The authors prove a
tighter, compared to the existing, bound for the self-testing of graph states, where the
error scales polynomially on the number of test repetitions and therefore can be used
for a theoretically efficient protocol - the complexity is improved also compared to the
two prover protocol of [Reichardt et al., 2012], however it remains high (quantum states
and communication required is of O(n22)).
In [Gheorghiu et al., 2015] by combining techniques of the double-server verification
of [Reichardt et al., 2012] and the single-server trap-based verification of [Fitzsimons
and Kashefi, 2012] a composite protocol is presented which achieves device independent
verification with fewer resources. In particular, the verifier instructs an untrusted device
that is not allowed to communicate with the prover to prepare on the prover’s side the
quantum states needed for the execution of the single-server verification protocol. The
verifier is able to verify the final outcome of the two phases, without having to trust his
preparatory quantum device, thus achieves device independent verification. However,
since the full mechanism of the double-server verification protocol is not needed the
resources reduce significantly, yet still being high enough for a realistic implementation.
In [Hajdusek et al., 2015], simultaneously with [Gheorghiu et al., 2015], a similar
composition of the two mechanisms, of verified state preparation and trap-based verified
computation, is considered. Here the verified state preparation is achieved through
self-testing instead of state tomography. This achieves a device-independent protocol,
where the verifier has in his hands an untrusted quantum device that is teleporting states
to the prover but is not able to communicate with the prover directly so that it can
be tested by the self-testing procedure. The prover is able to run measurement-based
quantum computing in order to perform the trap-based protocol. This protocol gives
verifiability with resources reduced to O(n4).
A number of protocols exist that verify a state shared by many parties. E.g. in
[Pappa et al., 2012] a resource verification protocol is presented where GHZ states
are distributed to many parties by an untrusted device and the parties can verify the
existence of the GHZ state by trusting only their measurements.
Focusing on the blindness property only, several recent papers [Giovannetti et al.,
2013, Mantri et al., 2013, Perez-Delgado and Fitzsimons, 2014] have achieved better
than linear bound while compromising either unconditional security or the simplicity
of the verifier’s operation. We believe that it may be worthwhile to explore these new








The key element for constructing a practical verification protocol is to have a minimal
verifier, that will be easy to build and control. A practical verifier should have only very
limited quantum capabilities, in terms of the preparation, measurement or evolution
operations that she can apply, thus being far from a universal quantum computer. On
the other hand, such a protocol should be limited on the amount of classical and
quantum communication between verifier and prover, especially during runtime. These
requirements are important, not only from a theoretical viewpoint, as we will be
approaching the regime of a purely classical, non-interactive verifier, but also from a
practical viewpoint, since verifying the emerging quantum devices will be crucial for
the proof of their existence and potential. One can envision that, in the future, full scale
quantum computers will be available only in research institutes and thus the idea of
delegated quantum computing, or quantum cloud will become relevant.
There are two verification protocols, namely Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum
Computing (VUBQC) [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] and Polynomial QAS-based
verification [Aharonov et al., 2010], already outlined in the previous part, that have the
most modest, among the known protocols, requirements for the verifier. The first has
very modest preparation requirements, while the second has a lower communication
cost. In particular, as already stated in the previous part, in the FK protocol the verifier
is required to have the minimal quantum capacity of preparing single random qubits,
while due to the complexity of the underlying resource state necessary for the server’s
universal quantum computation, the communication overhead is quadratic in the input
size. In contrast, the ABE protocol enjoys only a linear overhead in the input size,
however, the cost is the verifier’s requirement of preparing highly entangled secretly
encoded states which scale with the security parameter. The main contribution of this
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part of the thesis is to show the best properties of the two approaches may be achieved,
by combining aspects of the two protocols. In doing so, we also prove several new
properties of these two protocols that could become useful for other purposes as well,
such as protocol implementability and composability.
The main idea is to use the verifiable computation of the FK protocol to prepare,
on the prover’s side, the inputs encoded by the randomized polynomial quantum error
correcting code (QECC) used in the quantum authentication scheme (QAS) of the ABE
protocol. In other words, the states the verifier would have to prepare and send in the
first step of the original ABE protocol. On these states the public logical circuit of
the ABE protocol is applied, and the output is tested to verify that it is in the correct
encoded subspace. If either the trapification (verification process of the FK protocol)
or decoding procedures (verification aspects of the ABE protocol) fails, the verifier
rejects. The partitioning of the underlying resource state used in the FK protocol into
smaller sub-states for each separable logical qudit leads to an improved communication
complexity of the composite protocol compared to the original FK protocol, while
maintaining the FK protocol’s preparation simplicity.
The main contributions of this part are:
• A refined modular proof of verification for the FK protocol, in which any deviation
of the prover can be written as a combination of the correct operation - that
disentangles the trap from the computational system - and a local attack on each
of the qubits of the held system, thus the system remains always disentangled
from the private system of the prover. This allows for both parallel and serial
composition of the FK protocol. Also, if we reduce our verification criterion to
have the correct output up to a CPTP map that is independent of the computation
- a scenario that arises in composite protocols such as ours - a modified version of
the FK protocol that uses an extra gadget graph, is proven suitable.
• An odd prime dimension adaptation of the FK protocol is presented, after building
odd prime dimension MBQC and MBQC blind protocol. A new bound on
verifiability is proven, which is better than the bound of 2-level systems.
• A composite FK-ABE verification protocol is given that reduces quantum and
classical communication complexity of FK from quadratic to linear, while keeping
modest quantum preparation requirement for the verifier. Also, an alternative
version of this protocol is proposed, when Toffoli states are available to the verifier,
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where the the delegated preparation of the encoded QAS states is a Clifford
computation and therefore can be done with one round of communication.
2.1 Main Results
A few results are proven prior to the construction of the composite protocol, which
might be useful in other contexts. We outline these results here, while a more detailed
presentation is given in the following chapters of this part of the thesis.
Since we use the FK protocol for the preparation of the QAS verifiable states, which
are quantum entangled states, the version of the FK protocol that is appropriate is the
one that admits quantum output. Moreover, we require an exponentially low probability
ε of failing to prepare a correct QAS verifiable state so that the composite protocol itself
has exponentially low failure probability. In the case of quantum output (as opposed to
classical output where on can apply classical amplification techniques, such as majority
vote) to amplify the probability we encode the computation using a quantum Fault
Tolerant (FT) scheme that forces the attacker to have a bigger footprint on his attack
and therefore increases his chances of getting caught by the trap (a technique described
in the original FK, see also Figure 2.1 and Section 3.1.1 for more details). In Chapter 3
we give an explicit description of an amplified FK protocol with quantum output, not
given in the original paper. Special care has been taken to provide a protocol where
Alice has the extra quantum requirement of applying Clifford gates for decoding the
final quantum output she receives from Bob. Crucially, in the composite protocol later,
this Clifford circuit can be delegated to Bob and therefore the requirement for Alice
will remain the single qubit preparation.
The verifiability of the amplified FK protocol with quantum output is also proven in
Chapter 3, formally stated as Theorem 1, the essence of which is given here:
Theorem 1. (sketch) FK protocol can be modified to admit quantum output and is
perfectly blind and ε-verifiable, where ε = 1cp1 , where p1 is a parameter of the FT
procedure and c a constant that depends on the graph used. The extra requirement
compared to the original FK protocol is the ability of Alice to apply a decoding Clifford
circuit and Pauli measurements.
To prove this theorem an alternative approach is taken, compared to the proof of
verifiability in the original paper. The new technique reduces first any attack from
Bob to a convex combination of Pauli operators, using some of the randomness of the
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Figure 2.1: FK protocol with quantum output and verifiability amplification to exponentially
small ε. Alice delegates to Bob the blind execution of an MBQC pattern that contains
both a fault tolerant implementation of the computation using a QECC that detects
log1/ε errors and a set of traps mixed within. In order to corrupt the computation, Bob
has to corrupt at least log1/ε qubits which amplifies his probability of hitting a trap. Alice
has to decode the MBQC output layer herself, otherwise Bob would increase his chances
of cheating by attacking the decoded output.
protocol, so that the analysis for the traps and the FT procedure applies only for Pauli
attacks. This technique is useful when we need to write the state of the system at any
point during the operation of the protocol, not only at the end, as it is the case with the
composite protocol where the output is not returned to Alice. Also, it makes easier to
prove the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For a parallel composition of FK protocols with quantum output, where
each protocol uses an independent set of random variables having ε-verifiability indi-
vidually, the final aggregate quantum output of all protocols will also be ε-verifiable
when averaged over all parameters.
Towards building a full composite protocol, a number of intermediary protocols, or
variations of the FK protocol, are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As mentioned before,
in the composite protocol the first phase is to prepare remotely on Bob’s side the state
needed for the execution of the ABE protocol. Bob then has to run a public logical
circuit on this state to perform the actual computation. Therefore, the output of the first
phase must be in a fixed position, known to Bob, and cannot contain any trap (in fact it
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could contain a trap, but revealing the position of it will make it useless for verification
purposes). In general, having the output at a fixed position will break the verifiability
property of the FK protocol, since it will reveal some information about the positions of
the traps in the previous layers. In Chapter 4, we give a version of the FK protocol that
uses a special output gadget to fix the output position without breaking verifiability, up
to a CPTP map on the output (since Bob can always replace the output with his private
system in this case). This property is stated in Theorem 2 in Chapter 4, a sketch of
which is given here:
Theorem 2. (sketch) The output of the FK protocol with the localising gadget after
decoding of the FT procedure and decrypting of the quantum one-time-pad and averaged
over all random parameters of Alice, is ε-verifiable equal to the correct output of the
computation |ψc〉 up to a CPTP-map where all Kraus operators are Pauli operators
and is independent of |ψc〉. Moreover, the output is at a fixed position on the graph,
independent of the random parameters.
If |ψc〉 is a QAS encoded state and is prepared by the localisation protocol as above
and then fed to the ABE protocol, the requirement that the deviation is independent
of the state (and therefore the secret parameters of the QAS) is enough to prove the
verifiability of the final output of the ABE protocol as we will see shortly.
Another variation of the FK protocol, presented in Chapter 5, is the d-level version
of the protocol, where d is an arbitrary odd prime dimension. This would be proven
useful for the composition of the FK protocol with d-level protocols, such as the ABE
protocol, but also can be useful in general for the implementability of the FK protocol,
especially with the appearance of more efficient d-level FT procedures [Watson et al.,
2015]. In Section 5.1 we present MBQC for d-level systems, using the same notation
of the FK protocol, blind MBQC for d-level systems and eventually a d-level of the FK
protocol, where Alice has to prepare single qudits and send them to Bob. A new bound,
that depends on d, is proven as Theorem 3 in Chapter 5 for the case of d-level systems.
It follows a sketch of this theorem.
Theorem 3. (sketch) There exists a d-level version of the FK protocol, up to the




graph parameter c′ < 1, FT parameter p and d odd prime.
For the d-level FK protocol with quantum output to exist, we conjecture the existence
of the qudit version of the fault tolerant QECC used in FK [Raussendorf et al., 2007] or
equivalent.
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We examined two different ways to build the composite protocol and found that
only the second is possible. Our first approach was to use 2-level (normal) FK protocol
to simulate the preparation of the d-level QAS verifiable state and translate the quantum
one-time-pad that comes naturally at the end of this phase (and we cannot reveal
it without breaking the FK protocol) to a d-level one-time-pad that will be used in
the ABE protocol phase. This translation we proved in Chapter 6 to be impossible
deterministically for d being an odd prime. Notice that the dimension d being a prime is
essential of the ABE protocol to get the field structure for the polynomials. The second
approach, which we followed, is to use the d-level FK protocol for the preparation of
the QAS verifiable state and directly use the output d-level one-time-pad as the Pauli
key of the ABE protocol.
The composite protocol is presented in Section 6.2, an outline of it given here:
FK-ABE composite protocol (sketch)
1. Alice and Bob execute a specified number of instances of the qudit analogue of
the FK protocol (that includes the localising gadget) to prepare in Bob’s system
each of the desired polynomial-QECC encoded state of the ABE protocol.
2. Bob applies the publicly known Clifford decoding circuit for the FT used in FK
protocol for probability amplification and Alice updates her one-time-pad keys.
3. Alice and Bob apply the polynomial-QECC logical circuit on the encoded states
following the steps of the ABE protocol. Alice updates her secret keys.
4. Bob sends the final measurement outcomes to Alice and Alice employs the
detection and decoding procedure of the randomised polynomial-QECC.
The composite protocol is proven to have the required properties of correctness and
verifiability, as described in Theorem 4 in Chapter 6 and sketched here.
Theorem 4. (sketch) The composite protocol is correct and ε-verifiable, with ε≤ ε1+ε2
where ε1 = 1cp1 , ε2 =
1
2p2 where p1 and p2 are the QECC distance parameters of the
FK and ABE phase and c > 1 is a parameter of the FK phase which depends on the
structure of the graph used.
In terms of preparation requirements, in the composite protocol Alice needs to
prepare random single O(1/log(ε))-dimensional qudit states. To put this into context,
we remind that in the FK protocol the quantum requirement of Alice is to prepare single
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qubit states and in ABE protocol the quantum requirement of Alice is to prepare states
of O(1/log(ε)) entangled qudits of O(1/log(ε))-level.
In terms of communication complexity, the composite protocol requires classical
and quantum (O(1/log(ε))-level) communication with number of rounds that scales
in O(nPolylog(1
ε
)), where n is the size of the computation. In the FK protocol the
classical and quantum (qubit) communication was Õ(n2)×O(log(1/ε)), therefore the
composite protocol gives a quadratic improvement over FK in its scaling with n. In
the ABE protocol the communication cost is in O(nlog(1/ε)) of classical and quantum
states.
An alternative version of the composite protocol is also given, that reduces the round
complexity, but assumes the availability of (unencoded) Toffoli states. This version is
described in Section 6.2.2 and its verifiability is proven as Theorem 5 and outlined here:
Theorem 5. (sketch) There exists an alternative composite protocol, with extra Toffoli
inputs (or the ability to prepare them) for Alice, and gives the same verifiability with
the first composite protocol and at the same time has round complexity equal to the
Toffoli-depth of the delegated computation, where Toffoli-depth is the depth of the
computation if we consider only the subset of Toffoli gates composing it.
2.2 Preliminaries
In Section 2.2.1 follows a short exposition to d-level quantum computation that is
relevant only to this part of the thesis. In Section 2.2.2 the quantum error correcting
codes used in the QAS of the ABE protocol are described. In Section 2.2.3 the
ABE protocol is presented more formally than previously, so that it can be used as a
component to the composite protocol.
2.2.1 d-level Quantum Operations
First we describe the d-level generalized gates that will be useful in the following
constructions. All additions and multiplications in these definitions are performed
modulo d, unless otherwise stated. The generalized Pauli operators over Fd are defined
as: X |a〉 ≡ |a+1〉, Z|a〉 ≡ ωad|a〉, where ωd = e
2πi/d is the primitive dth-root of unity.
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The cX is defined as: |a,b〉 7→ |a,a+b〉 and cZ as: |a,b〉 7→ ωabd |a,b〉. The general-





Another important family of Clifford gates are the permutations Sc, c ∈ Fd , defined
as:
|a〉 7→ |ca〉
The generalized Toffoli gate which complements the set of Clifford gates to provide
universality ([Howard and Vala, 2012], [Anwar, 2014]) is defined as: |a,b,c〉 7→ |a,b,c+
ab〉. An alternative to the Toffoli gate to complement Clifford gates for universality
is the family of ‘so-called’ generalized ‘π/8’ gates [Howard and Vala, 2012] one of
which, used in this paper, is defined as: T |a〉 ≡ ωa3d |a〉 with the exception of qutrits
where T3|a〉 ≡ ω
(a3 mod 9)
9 |a〉.
An explicit construction for a universal set of gates for arbitrary number of qudits of
odd prime dimension that we will use in this part is the following: {Z,F,S,T,cX}. Gate
Z is not necessary to complete the set, since we can generate it from S and F for odd
prime dimensions, but we include it for convenience. The fact that this set is universal
comes directly from the following: From [Clark, 2006] (Theorem 2.3) we have that the
Clifford group can be generated by {F,S,cX}. Finally, by [Howard and Vala, 2012] we
have to add the T gate to the Clifford computations to get universality.
2.2.1.1 d-level Gate teleportation
The model of computation used in the ABE protocol ([Aharonov et al., 2010]), some-
times called the gate teleportation model, all Clifford gates are performed by applying
unitary operators, while the non-Clifford gates are performed by entangling with magic
non-Clifford states (Toffoli states in this occasion), measuring in the computational
basis and performing Clifford correction operators on the remaining states. See Figure
2.2 for the circuit that implements the generalized Toffoli.
2.2.2 Polynomial Quantum Error Correcting Code
The class of quantum error correcting codes used in the ABE protocol, is based on
polynomial error-correcting codes [Aharonov and Ben-Or, 2008]. By randomizing
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Figure 2.2: Implementation of generalized Toffoli (adapting from the qubit Toffoli in
[Nielsen and Chuang, 2010]).
these codes using a secret sign key one can acquire a Quantum Authentication Scheme
(QAS) [Barnum et al., 2002], usable by two parties who want to authenticate a quantum
state exchanged through a malicious quantum channel. A QAS scheme can be used as a
component for a secure quantum multiparty computation [Ben-Or et al., 2006], where
the property of self-duality of the the signed polynomial error-correcting codes makes
the protocol simpler. The signed polynomial error-correcting codes are suitable in the
context of verification of a single quantum prover as demonstrated in the ABE protocol,
due to some useful properties discussed later.
Specifically, the code operates over the field Fd , where d is prime and represents the
dimension of the quantum system. The code uses polynomials f (·) with coefficients
from Fd and with a maximum degree of p, where p is a parameter of the code. These
polynomials are evaluated at m distinct non-zero points from Fd: {a1 . . .am}. To be
able to choose m distinct non-zero points from Fd we impose the restriction: m ≤ d.
Moreover, we set m = 2p+1. Finally, the code uses a secret sign key that is a uniformly
randomly chosen string k←{±1}m.
Given a quantum state |a〉, where a ∈ Fd , we can encode it using the signed polyno-
mial error-correcting code:
|a〉 → 1√
qp ∑{ f |deg( f )≤p, f (0)=a}
|(k1 f (a1), . . . ,km f (am)) mod d〉
where the mod d is taken element-wise in the label of the right-hand side ket.
To detect if there was any Pauli error in the transmitted codeword, the receiver
undoes the sign key (by applying a Clifford circuit), applies the syndrome measure-
ments and checks if the resulting string is the representation, at m distinct points, of
a polynomial of maximum degree p. If not, it aborts and declares the state invalid.
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The probability of accepting an incorrect state (when the channel applies an arbitrary
Pauli attack) is exponentially small on p. In order to acquire the same property for any
type of malicious attack, an extra quantum one-time-pad is added on top of the existing
randomization, as it is the case in the ABE protocol.
2.2.3 Polynomial Verified Quantum Computing
In the ABE protocol the input is encoded by Alice using the secretly randomised QAS
presented in Section 2.2.2 which has algebraic properties that allow for the secret
updating of the random key throughout the execution of the computation. Specifically,
all Clifford gates applied are transversal or semi-transversal which allows the sign key
on each qubit to remain the same. The non-Clifford gates are applied by state injection
and teleportation using Clifford gates and Pauli measurements. Since all gates are
Clifford the Pauli key commutes and is updated by the verifier who knows which gates
are applied. The QAS has also the covering properties that allow Alice to detect Bob
with high probability after decoding the final state. The computation performed on the
encoded input can be publicly announced without compromising the verifiability of the
protocol, thus the protocol does not provide blindness. A detailed description of the
protocol is given in Protocol 1.
Theorem 6. The ABE protocol is ε-verifiable where ε = 12p (based on Theorem 4.1
in [Aharonov et al., 2010] and ignoring the circuit error probability) where p is the
maximum degree of polynomials in the polynomial-QECC. The quantum requirement
of Alice is to prepare O(n) states of O(1/log(ε)) entangled qudits of O(1/log(ε))-
level and the communication requirement is O(n) states of O(log(1/ε)) entangled
qudits sent from Alice to Bob off-line and O(n)×O(log(1/ε)) bits of on-line classical
communication between Alice to Bob, where n is the size of the computation.
The degree p of polynomials used in the polynomial-QECC will be referred to as
the security parameter of the ABE protocol in the rest of this paper.
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Protocol 1 ABE protocol (Protocol 4.2 in [Aharonov et al., 2010])
Alice’s input. Description of a computation in the Gate Teleportation model based
on generalized Toffoli states of dimension d, an odd prime ≥ 2p+ 1, where p is a
parameter of the protocol that gives ε = 12p . The input is set to be the Fourier basis state
of n qudits: |+0〉⊗n, where |+0〉= 1√d ∑a |a〉 but can also be an arbitrary quantum input.
The total number of gates is denoted by N and let t be the number of Toffoli gates of
the circuit.
Alice’s output. The result of measurement of the quantum output of the circuit and a
bit indicating if the result is accepted or not.
The protocol
1. Alice has to prepare a number of generalized Toffoli states, equal to the number
of Toffoli gates of the circuit.
2. Alice chooses a single random sign key k← {±1}m (where m is the size of a
codeword) that will be applied on all encoded inputs (including Toffoli states).
3. Alice chooses a random Pauli key r←{0, . . . ,d−1}2(n+3t)m that will be applied
on the physical qudits of the encoded input.
4. Alice has to encode both the inputs and the Toffoli states according to the polyno-
mial QECC described in Section 2.2.2, with polynomials of maximum degree p
and parametrized by k. Alice also applies a random generalized Pauli rotation on
all (n+3t)m physical qudits parametrized by r.
5. Alice sends all the quantum states to Bob though the quantum channel.
6. Alice and Bob perform the logical operators that correspond to the desired
computation on the encoded state. For each application of logical Toffoli gate,
Bob sends measurement results to Alice and Alice calculates the actual correction
to be performed. She then sends this classical information to Bob who performs
the corresponding correction. For this we need a classical on-line channel.
7. Bob measures the output qudits in the computational basis and returns the mea-
surement results to Alice.
8. Alice undoes the Pauli rotation and applies the detection and decoding procedure
of the signed polynomial QECC, which checks if the measurement results cor-
respond to ≤ p degree polynomial, and sets an indicator bit accordingly, which
shows if she accepts or rejects the result.

Chapter 3
Revisiting Verifiable Blind Quantum
Computing
Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computing protocol or FK protocol is given in
Section 3.1 in full detail so that it can be used later in the context of the composite
protocol. Moreover, this presentation of the protocol intends to clarify some aspects
of the original protocol. In the original paper the protocol is presented (Protocol 8,
p.35 [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] - also outlined in Section 1.3.1 of this thesis)
with Bob at the end of the protocol measuring the final output of the computation and
returning the result to Alice. In our presentation we assume the more interesting case
of Bob returning to Alice the quantum output of the computation, which Alice has to
decrypt and decode applying a quantum operation. Therefore, we explicitly describe the
encryption and encoding that the final returned state has and what are the requirements
for Alice to decrypt and decode it. Our intention while constructing this slight variation
of the protocol was to minimize these requirements for Alice. This will be crucial for
the composite protocol since the state that ABE protocol requires is a quantum state.
A second aspect to be clarified is the underlying fault tolerant procedure that is used
in FK protocol to amplify the verification probability. We provide a description of the
protocol which abstracts the fault Tolerant procedure from the rest of the description
and is generic enough to admit any FT procedure that has some specific properties that
we define. This is similar to what is described in Theorem 7.1 of the original paper,
while giving explicitly the description of the protocol involved. A similar approach we
take to abstract from the particular graph used to hide the traps.
In Section 3.2 a proof of verifiability of our version of the FK protocol is given,
which, as discussed before, takes a different approach at some of the steps of the original
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proof and is used in the context of the composition of protocols later.
3.1 Verifiable Blind Quantum Computing with Quantum
Output
FK protocol with quantum output is given as Protocol 2. The difference from the
original (Protocol 8, p.35 [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]) is that we consider explicitly
the case of quantum output. The qubits that correspond to the output layer of the
MBQC pattern are denoted by the set O′ (prime here is used to differentiate between the
encoded output that Alice receives and the decoded output O that she produces). These
qubits are not measured by Bob; thus Alice never sends a measurement angle to Bob
that corresponds to these qubits. This makes the need for a pre-rotation in the XY plane
obsolete, at least for the needs of blindness. Let us consider each case separately. If the
output qubit is a dummy qubit then Alice prepares it in a random computational state
(and corrects its neighbours appropriately), as it was the case of the original protocol. If
the output qubit is a computational qubit (i.e. non-trap, non-dummy qubit), then it is
prepared in state |+θ〉 with θ = riπ for ri←R {0,1}. This is the minimal requirement
to maximally mix the state sent to Bob and therefore not reveal any information about
the quantum state sent. If the output qubit is a trap then Alice chooses θ = βi π2 + riπ
for ri,βi←R {0,1}. Effectively this is a |+〉 or a |+i〉 trap state, with extra Z Pauli that
maximally mixes it, as in the previous case. The need for the two different types of traps
will become evident in the course of the proof of verification, where we need to be able
to detect all Pauli attacks on the output, and therefore have a minimal selection of state
that will be affected by the attack and therefore detected. Note that we could choose the
output computational qubits and the traps to be of the set of 8 angles as it is the case
for the non-output qubits and still have the same properties (since our set of angles is a
sub-set of the 8 angles). But in this case, Alice would need to undo these pre-rotations
and to achieve this she would need operators that are outside of the Clifford group and
therefore considered harder to implement.
While each step of the Protocol 2 is expanded to all the technical detail, at the same
time we intentionally abstract from the specific FT procedure used for the amplification
of ε and from the specific graph used to get the uniform placement of the traps inside the
computation without interrupting the flow. In particular, for the FT procedure we ask to
be able to detect a fixed number of errors at any stage of the computation (including
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encoding, logical computation) and also to be compatible with the operations supported
by blindness (e.g. adaptive measurements only on the XY plane). For the graph we
require to have the property that we can divide its vertices to sets where each vertex
can be with equal probability a computational qubit or a trap. This implies that the
distribution of the traps is independent between the different sets. In fact, we can only
give graphs that approximate this behaviour, in the sense that we have this behaviour
only when we consider sub-graphs that are sufficient nevertheless for out attack analysis.
This complication together with the specific function of the dummies is discussed in
more detail in the Section 3.1.2 and in the proof of verifiability that follows in Section
3.2.
Protocol 2 Qubit Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computation (VUBQC) Protocol
with quantum output (FK protocol)
Alice’s input:
• Description of a unitary computation U in the MBQC model (or equivalent)
using a convenient underlying open graph state (G, I,O). The computation is
represented, for any vertex i ∈ G\O, as a measurement angle ϕi (together with
the set of X-dependences DXi and Z-dependences D
Z
i and a fixed partial order
of measuring depending on the graph structure). The input is set to the state of
n qubits: |+〉⊗n. Protocol can be extended to admit quantum input by applying
techniques described in the FK protocol.
Alice’s output:
• A system that contains the quantum output of the computation (U |+〉⊗n) and a
bit to indicate of Alice has accepted the output of the computation.
The protocol
1. Preprocessing 1: Alice translates the computation to a Fault Tolerant (FT) MBQC
pattern that can correct Pauli errors on p qubits. Let the updated open graph
be (G′, I′,O′), where |G| = m′ and |I′| = |O′| = n′. An example is the RHG
topological code of size m′=O(m log3 m)×O(log1/ε) where ε is the verification
error.
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2. Preprocessing 2: Alice embeds the encoded computation pattern into a suitable
graph which has the following property: There exist ordered X-Y plane measure-
ments that implement the encoded computation and each computational qubit
(including bridges) belongs to a constant size subset of qubits Si in which a trap
can be selected uniformly at any position. Break operations are implemented
by including computational basis qubits (dummies). The total number of qubits
of the final graph G′′ is N, with |I′′|= |O′′|= n′′ consisting of all Si that contain
qubits of the O′ system and the necessary traps/dummies. An example (up to the
independent errors assumption) is the dotted complete graph of size N = O(m′2).
3. Alice prepares the rotated qubits. For i = 1 to N:
(a) If qubit is a dummy: prepares |di〉, di←R {0,1}, otherwise:
(b) If qubit is not in O′′: prepares ∏ j∈NG(i)∩D Z
d j |+θi〉, where |+θi〉 ≡




2 , . . . ,
7π
4 }.
(c) If qubit is in O′′ and is not a trap: Same as previous step but with θi = riπ
for ri←R {0,1}.
(d) If qubit is in O′′ and is a trap: Same as previous step but with θ = βi π2 + riπ
for ri,βi←R {0,1}.
(e) She sends the qubit to Bob
4. Bob entangles the states according to the graph state by applying cZ gates.
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5. Bob performs the rest of the computation using classical help from Alice. For i
which ranges over all qubits (respecting the order given by the flow), except the
qubits belonging to O′′:
(a) Alice computes the actual measurement angle φ′i using the dependences and
the previous measurement results (φ′i = 0 for dummy qudits).
(b) Alice chooses ri←R {0,1} and computes δi = φ′i +θi + riπ (for the case of
dummies a random θi is chosen).
(c) Alice transmits δi to Bob.
(d) Bob performs measurement Mδii on qubit i. Measurements on measurement
angle δi correspond to projective measurements on basis {Z jRZ(δi) 1√2(|0〉+
|1〉)}1j=0.
(e) Bob transmits the result to Alice.
(f) Alice corrects the result by adding ri mod 2.
6. Bob returns the qubits of O′′ to Alice.
7. Alice measures traps and applies the final Pauli corrections on qubits of O′.
8. Alice applies the decoding procedure of the FT encoding to produce actual output
O.
9. Alice sets her indicator bit to accept if all trap tests where positive.
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In the following Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 we will give a specific example of
a FT procedure and graph to be used, which are the same used in the original FK:
Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal (RHG) topological FT [Raussendorf et al., 2007] and
dotted-complete graph introduced for the FK protocol. Specifically, without going into
the proof which is given in full in the original paper, we explain how the RHG code has
the required by the protocol properties. Also, we explain the independence property of
the trap placement in the case of the dotted complete and how this behaviour is only
achieved if the idea of independently detectable errors is introduced. In this way, we
aim to clarify the role of the specific parts of the original paper on VUBQC so that they
can be used without problem in the rest of this thesis.
3.1.1 The Role of Fault Tolerance
The condition, stated in the protocol, that is required from the fault tolerant procedure
for the probability amplification is that, if there is a Pauli operator attack on ≤ p qubits,
an error is detected during the detection/decoding procedure of Alice. For Bob to
succeed in his cheating, he has to attack on more than p positions in the graph, which
means that he is more likely to hit a trap, therefore the probability of corrupting the
computation and not getting caught becomes smaller (will be proven exponentially
small on p).
In the FK Protocol the FT procedure used is the topological encoding of Raussendorf-
Harrington-Goyal (RHG) proposed in [Raussendorf et al., 2007] (also explained in more
detail in [Fowler and Goyal, 2008]). The computation runs through a series of topologi-
cally protected cX , preparations and measurements in the X and Z eigenbasis together
with state distillation of XY -plane states |Y 〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉) and |A〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+e π4 i|1〉)
to complete a universal set of gates. The resource state is the 3-dimensional lattice state,
usually called RHG or Raussendorf lattice, depicted in figure 3.1.
In the original paper of the FK protocol, in Lemma 5, a particular selection of
parameters is given for the RHG FT procedure that the condition of the protocol
regarding FT is satisfied. Special care had to be taken that an error, in both the
topologically protected gates and during the distillation procedure of |Y 〉 and |A〉 states,
that is under the required threshold will be detected.
When writing the FT procedure as a MBQC pattern, special care has to be taken
so that we apply only operations allowed by MBQC. States |Y 〉 and |A〉 are handled
as quantum inputs (therefore a random rotation around the XY plane by θ is added for
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Figure 3.1: RHG prime and dual lattice (taken from [Fowler and Goyal, 2008]). The
second picture shows how the dual lattice is placed between 4 prime lattice blocks.
Logical qubits are represented by primal or dual defects (qubits measured in the Z basis).
Single qubit logical operations are chains connecting or rings encircling defects, while
cX can be produced by braiding primal and dual defects.
blindness) and their distillation circuit is part of the blind pattern that Bob executes.
Since all the qubits are sent from Alice to Bob at the beginning of the protocol the size
of the computation is fixed from the start. Distillation is a stochastic procedure and
therefore fixing the maximum size of operations allowed will have implications. In the
ideal case, when Alice prepares perfect states and Bob applies perfect operations the
correctness of the protocol will not be affected. In the ideal case again, soundness will
not be affected also: Since the only part of the distillation procedure used in this case
is the error detection procedure, when Bob corrupts the states the protocol will abort
immediately (except for the case Bob’s footprint is large enough which means that the
traps will be triggered with high probability). However, in a realistic noisy scenario the
correctness of the protocol will be affected, since there is a probability that after the
maximum allowed distillation rounds the state is still corrupted by noise. Soundness
will not be affected for the same reason as in the ideal case.
The RHG fault tolerant procedure requires Z measurements that are not allowed
in blind MBQC, but can be simulated by dummy qubits as explained in Section 1.3.1
and in more detail later in 3.1.2. The problem is that there are some Z measured
positions that are not known from the beginning of the protocol (when Alice creates the
pattern and sends the dummy qubits to Bob) but depend on measurements during Bob’s
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Figure 3.2: Implementation of Uz and Ux gates in the RHG scheme (taken from
[Raussendorf et al., 2007]). Uz(π/8), which is T gate in our context, consumes a
|A〉 state and Uz(π/4), which is S gate in our context, consumes a |Y 〉 state (a). Accord-
ingly Ux(π/4) is a rotation around the X axis (Clifford gate) which consumes a |Y 〉 state
(b). Then the circuits are translated to defect chains in the RHG lattice (c) and (d), which
are implemented blindly in FK. All operations depicted are up to Pauli corrections.
runtime. These adaptive Z measurements are needed, in particular, for the T gate (π/8)
(Section 3 in [Raussendorf et al., 2007], also Figure 3.2 here). T gate is implemented
by teleporting state |A〉 and, depending on the measurement outcome, might require
an extra S gate correction which, in turn, is implemented by measuring a |Y 〉 state in
the Z basis (and some Pauli corrections). To overcome this obstacle, the authors of the
original FK protocol propose a fixed correction step after each T gate. This is the circuit
of Figure 3.2 (a), which can selectively implement an S gate or an identity depending on
whether we inject state |Y 〉 or |+〉. The selection of the state can be seen as an update
on the θ angle that encrypts the corresponding MBQC input state, and can be done by
classical on-line computation on Alice’s side. An alternative to this approach, to tackle
the problem of adaptive Z measurements, is to use the decorated lattice proposed in
[Morimae and Fujii, 2012].
3.1.2 Dotted-Complete Graph and Trap Independence
The second requirement has to do with the selection of the graph state on which we
embed the computation. This graph needs to be generic so that it hides the underlying
computation (only leaking an upper bound on the size) and convenient for placing the
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Figure 3.3: Dotted-complete graph as an example of resource state (taken from [Fitzsi-
mons and Kashefi, 2012]). There are two types of vertices, the ones coming from a
complete graph, P(G), and the ones that are injected on the edges, A(G). By appropri-
ate measurements and dummy qubit injections we can carve a computational graph, a
P(G)-vertice graph and a A(G)-vertice graph.
traps at random positions without interrupting the flow. More specifically we ask that
each qubit of the computation belongs to a constant size subset of qubits Si (which we
can reveal to Bob without breaking the proof of verification) in which a trap can be at
any position with uniform probability. In the original paper the dotted-complete graph
is given to satisfy this condition (up to a subtlety that we will examine right after).
The dotted-complete graph, depicted in Figure 3.3, has two types of vertices: A(G),
with degree 2, and P(G), with degree n−1, where n is the size of the graph. This graph
has the proven (in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]) property that, if of large enough
dimension, by measuring the A(G) vertices we can produce a graph suitable for doing
universal measurement based quantum computation. At the same time we can get a
sub-graph of isolated traps on the P(G) vertices (called white traps). By measuring
qubits on P(G) vertices we can get isolated traps on the A(G) vertices (called black
traps).
To understand the procedure of carving out a sub-graph by XY plane measurements
we need to explain two types of operations. The first type is bridge operators: Y
basis measurements followed by a Pauli correction on neighbours depending on the
measurement result. In particular, in every vertex i of degree 2 that we want to remove
and join its neighbours by an new edge, we inject state |+θi〉, as it was the case for
the normal qubits, and measure them in the {|+π/2+θi+riπ〉, |−π/2+θi+riπ〉} basis (i.e.
φ = π/2 in this case and there are no corrections). Let si being the corrected outcome
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of this measurement. Depending on si, an extra S (si=0) or S† (si=1) correction has to
be applied in calculating the measurement angle of each of the neighbours of i. Note
that a Pauli attack on a bridging qubit will give a wrong correction to its neighbours and
this, being equivalent to an attack on the computational graph, will be detected by the
FT procedure, if the threshold of the total number of errors is low enough.
The second type is break operators (which have already been outlined in previous
sections): In every vertex i we want to remove (together with the entangling operation
with its neighbours), instead of injecting a |+θi〉 state in the graph at position i, as it was
the case for normal vertices, we inject dummy state |di〉 for di chosen independently and
uniformly at random from {0,1} and measure them in the {|+θi+riπ〉, |−θi+riπ〉} basis
(i.e. φ = 0 in this case and there are no corrections). Note that θi can be an arbitrary
angle since the measurement does not have any effect on the rest of the system and
the measurement outcome is discarded, but we choose θi to be uniform from the set
of eight angles so that we randomize δi (and therefore the position of the dummies).
Also, before sending each state to the prover, we apply on each of its neighbours Pauli
operation Zdi so that it will cancel the effect that the prover’s entangling operation will
have on that neighbour.
3.1.2.1 Independently detectable errors
The subtle point, when examining the possibilities for dividing all qubits in sets Si
and positioning a trap among the qubits that belong to each set, is that there will be
some dependence in the position of the trap between some particular sets. In particular,
selecting a P(G) qubit to be white trap, means that all its A(G) neighbours are excluded
from being black traps (they have to be dummies to isolate the white traps). Also, after
one fixes the positions of the computational qubits on the P(G) vertices, this fixes the
positions of the bridge and break qubits on the A(G) vertices that create the required
computational sub-graph, which means that these qubits cannot be black traps. A new
concept, the idea of independently detectable errors is introduced in the original FK
paper, to deal with this problem. In particular, one needs to consider not the whole graph
in the trap analysis, but only a subset of vertices that correspond to a set of errors that
are independently detected by the FT procedure. The independently detectable errors
are the Pauli errors that can corrupt the computation and each one has a distinct effect
on the syndrome measurements, as opposed to errors that are detected simultaneously
by the same error vector. A formal definition of independently detectable errors in
given in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012], Definition 7.5. In short these are the tensor
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products of Pauli operators that: (1) flip measurement results on the measured qubits
of corrupt output qubits and (2) for an attack on qubit i ∈ A(G) we map this attack as
two attacks on each of its P(G) neighbours j,k ∈ NG(i) and consider a subset of tensor
attack elements that (after doing this mapping) contains each P(G) vertex only once.
For the FT procedure used there is a bound on the number of independently errors that
can be perfectly corrected by the code, which is proven (in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi,
2012], Corollary 7.6) for the RHG encoding to be p′ = 2p/5 (the number is smaller
than p because some single qubit attacks effectively correspond to two qubit attacks as
we saw).
For example, when there is an error on qubit i ∈ A(G) and, at the same time, on its
two P(G) neighbours j,k ∈ NG(i), we will consider in our independently detectable
attacks qubit i or qubits j,k but not both. The interesting property of tensor products of
attacks that cause independently detectable errors is that the probability of coinciding
with a trap is independent in each position (in our example we avoid considering the
probabilities of having traps in position i, j,k which will be dependent on each other).
Note that this analysis for the attacks is done for the whole graph G and before we
partition it into the computational, dummy and trap sub-graphs. If we can detect a
certain number of independently detectable attacks in total, we can certainly detect the
smaller number of attacks that occur on the computational sub-graph. We should keep
this intuition of the corresponding part of the verification proof.
3.2 A Refined Proof of Verifiability
A proof of verification is given here, that differs from the original proof in certain
aspects, the importance of which will be progressively understood in the sections to
follow. The main extra property of this proof is that we are able to write the state even
if we interrupt the protocol at some specific intermediate stages and ask Bob to return
the output of the computation, excluding traps and dummies, and have Alice decrypt
and decode this output. In the context of the composite protocol this property is crucial
since the circuit of ABE protocol has to apply on the computational qubits, while Alice
has no access to any output traps. Our proof is also more modular than the original one.
Also from our proof we get that the parallel composition of FK protocols is possible
as a corollary. Finally, since we show that the trap qubit remains disentangled for any
possible deviation of Bob, we provide intuition on the concept of independent security
[Dunjko et al., 2014], where the detection procedure (that depends only on the trap
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system) is independent on the particular computation that is delegated.
Let us restate the main theorem, which we will prove in this section:
Theorem 1. Protocol 2 is perfectly blind and ε-verifiable where ε = 1cp1 where p1
is the number of errors detectable by the QECC used for amplification and some
constant c > 1. The quantum requirement of Alice is to prepare and send single qubit
states and apply the Clifford decoding circuit for the QECC used, together with Pauli
measurements. The communication requirement is Õ(n2)×O(log(1/ε)) separable
single qubit states sent from Alice to Bob off-line and Õ(n2)×O(log(1/ε)) bits of
on-line classical communication between Alice to Bob, where n is the size of the
computation.
Proof of blindness is the same as the proof of Theorem 12 in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi,
2012]. The proof of verifiability (originally the proof of Theorem 13 in [Fitzsimons and
Kashefi, 2012], but re-proven here using the rewritten version of the protocol and the
new proof technique) will roughly follow the following steps:
• Express the state at the end of the protocol as a function of the correct operation
and the most generic attack.
• Decompose the attack to the Pauli basis.
• Average over the random parameters of the Pauli encoding to reduce the attack to
a convex combination of Pauli attacks.
• Break the sum over the Pauli attacks to those who are detected by the FT procedure
and those who are not detected and for the latter calculate the probability of not
hitting a trap, averaging over all trap positions.
The third step is the main difference from the original proof and is the one that
allows us to study the attack on the computational output separately from the attack on
the output traps. The technique we use to reduce the attack to a convex combination of
Pauli operators by averaging over the quantum one-time-pad is often called the Pauli
twirl. It is useful in the context of unitary t-designs [Dankert et al., 2009] and in other
verification proofs [Aharonov et al., 2010]. In our case we average over the Pauli Z
rotation that comes from the random r parameters of the protocol and commutes with
the honest computation, to twirl the attack operator (a random Pauli X rotation is not
needed in the protocol because of the special structure of the MBQC graph state, as we
see in the proof).
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Also, in the fourth step we clarify the role of Alice’s decoding of the returned state
at the end of the protocol.
This proof has also the structure that helps proving Corollary 1 that states that
the parallel composition of ε-verifiable FK protocols with quantum output is also an
ε-verifiable protocol. Proof intuition can be gained from observing Equation 3.20 later
in this proof and the fact that we can write the attack as a conjugation by a tensor
product of local operators (Pauli+identity). The full proof is part of the proof of the
composite protocol, where many runs of the FK protocol are run in parallel to verifiably
prepare the encoded states needed for the ABE verification.
3.2.1 Expanding the Prover’s Operation
Single index notation is followed to enumerate the qubits participating in the graph
where N is the total number of qubits. Also, remember that n′′ is the number of qubits
that are returned from Bob to Alice at his last step in the protocol.
To represent the state of the protocol it is convenient to introduce first some extra
notation. Vector ν is used to represent all random secret parameters chosen by Alice
throughout the execution of protocol, including β = {βi}, r = {ri}, θ = {θi}, d = {di}
and positions of traps t = {ti}. Parameter p(ν) gives the probability of a particular
choice of random secret parameters. Summing over a vector (e.g. ∑r) means that we
sum over all possible choices for the elements of that vector (e.g. all possible bit-strings
of size N for r).
For convenience we name the subsystems of the joint Alice-Bob system:
• System M is the union of qubits G′ \O′ and the necessary bridge qubits which
are introduced when embedding G′ in G′′ (and are also measured by Bob). This
system will be called the system of the measured computational qubits.
• System D contains all dummy qubits.
• System T contains all trap qubits.
• System O′′ is the quantum system returned by Bob to Alice.
• System ∆ is the system of the measurement angles send by Alice to Bob, where
each angle is represented by three qubits in the computational basis.
• System B is Bob’s private system, assumed to be initially in the blank state.
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Each measurement performed at Step 5d of the protocol is mathematically de-
composed into a unitary part and a Pauli Z projective measurement. Without loss of
generality we can represent any dishonest behaviour of Bob at any step as applying the
correct unitary operator and then an arbitrary unitary attack operator that applies on all
the states received up to this step and his own private subsystem.
The output of Alice after all steps of the protocol are applied, averaged over all
















• |M(θ,d, t)〉 is the state that Bob receives after Step 3 of the protocol (input,
auxiliary qubits, dummy qubits).
• EG is the global entangling operator that Bob applies at Step 4 of the protocol.
• |δi(θ,r,b)〉〈δi(θ,r,b)| is the density matrix of the measurement angle that Alice
sends to Bob at iteration i of Step 5 of the protocol, which is composed of three
computational basis states (δi(θi,r,b) can take 8 possible values). These states
will be used by Bob to control his rotations on the graph state. In the calculation
of δ’s by Alice there is an implicit error correction procedure that comes from the
FT encoding of the computation (this will be used as an extra property at a later
stage of the proof).
• Ri(δi) is a controlled unitary rotation of qubit i around z-axis by angle δi.
• Hi is a Hadamard gate applied on qubit i.
• Ui is the unitary attack of Bob with index i and applies on qubits ≥ i, private
Bob’s system and all measurement angles.
• C(r,b) includes the Pauli correction CO′ that Alice performs to system O′ ac-
cording to the flow dependences and the post-processing on the trap system:
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Figure 3.4: Analysis of attacks in the qubit VUBQC with quantum output protocol. Part
inside dashed box is applied by Alice. Dummy qubits and trap qubits on returned system





ti and a Pauli Z measurement for output traps ti and correc-
tions Z
rti
ti for measurement results sent from Bob for non-output traps ti.
• D is a CPTP-map that represents the decoding procedure of Alice for the quantum
output system O′.
We commute to the left (right) all projectors |bi〉〈bi| of the left (right) hand side of
|M〉〈M| by observing that the operators they commute with do not apply on the same
qubits. We commute to the left (right), and just before the |bi〉〈bi|’s, all attack unitary
operators Ui of the left (right) hand side of |M〉〈M| by observing that the measurement
angle density matrices |δ j〉〈δ j| that they commute with have indices j ≥ i and therefore
the attack does not apply on them. The commutation of the attack operators with
the rest of the operators will change the attack operators to different ones but these
crucially do not depend on any of the protocol parameters. We merge all commuted
and updated attack operators into a new unitary U that applies on the whole of the
system just before the measurements. We commute to the right (left) all measurement
angle density matrices |δi〉〈δi| of the left (right) hand side of |M〉〈M| by observing that
the only operators that apply on the measurement angles are the controlled rotation
operators R j but always have index j ≤ i. We get (see also Figure 3.4):
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p(ν)D(C|b〉〈b|U(HN−n′′RN−n′′(.) . . .H1R1(.)EG(
|M〉〈M|⊗ |δ〉〈δ|)EGR1(.)†H1 . . .RN−n′′(.)†HN−n′′⊗|0〉〈0|⊗B)U†|b〉〈b|C†)) (3.2)
where U is a unitary attack operator that is chosen by Bob and applies on all graph
qubits, private Bob’s system and all measurement angles.
The trap system is not entangled with the rest when the honest computation is
applied. We can separate the terms that apply on the trap system. Applying the
entangling operators between the traps and their neighbours, which are always dummy
qubits does not have any effect on the trap other than undoing the pre-rotation of the
trap (in the case that the dummy is selected to be |1〉). Moreover, applying HtiRti(δti) on
each of the traps at positions ti that belong to the measured system, where δti = θti +rtiπ,
results in getting states |rti〉.
Therefore, it holds:





• |ηti〉 ≡ |rti〉 if ti points to a trap measured by Bob and is ZriSβi|+ti〉 if ti points to
a trap measured by Alice.
• P = HN−n′RN−n′(.) . . .HtiRti(.) . . .H1R1(.)EG is the correct unitary operation in
Figure 3.4.
• P ′ = HN−n′RN−n′(.) . . .H1R1(.)E ′G, which is produced from P by omitting all
operations applied on traps (E ′G is produced from EG by omitting all entangling
operators between traps and their neighbours)
• |M′〉 is produced from |M〉 by omitting the trap qubits.
3.2.2 Decomposing the Attack
In the next step we express the output state with Bob’s private system traced out and his
attack decomposed to the Pauli basis. We use the following general property:
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• ak,u are complex numbers, with ∑k,u |ak,u|2 = 1.
• Pu (and Pu′) ranges over all possible tensor products of Pauli+Identity operators
(Pauli basis) on n qubits.
One way to prove the above expression is the following: by tracing out B, the effect
of unitary U is a CPTP-map on the remaining system. This CPTP-map is decomposed
into a sum of conjugations by (Kraus) operators Ek. Each operator Ek and its Hermitian
conjugate E†k are decomposed into the Pauli basis. The equation ∑k,u |ak,u|
2 = 1 derives
from the completeness relation between the operators: ∑k E
†
k Ek = I.
In the following we apply Equation 3.4 in order to trace out B from the state in
Equation 3.2 and at the same time apply Equation 3.3 to separate the traps from the rest
of the system. We use notation Pu|i to point to the i-th tensor element (single qubit Pauli
operator or identity) of the operator Pu (tensor product of Pauli or identity operators).















• ak,u are complex numbers, with ∑k,u |ak,u|2 = 1.
• Pu (and Pu′) ranges over all possible tensor products of Pauli+Identity operators
(Pauli basis) applying on the resource state G′′ and measurement angle system ∆.
• b′ is the vector that is generated from b by removing elements {bti}.
• Qti ≡ X
rti
ti |bti〉〈bti| if ti /∈ O




ti if ti ∈ O
′′, represents
the measurements and corrections on the trap.
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3.2.3 Reducing the Attacks to Pauli
In this part of the proof the attack of Bob will be reduced to a convex combination of
Pauli+identity operators, by summing over all random parameters except the random
trap positions. This means cancelling the cross terms in Equation 3.6: each term of the
sum containing Pu and Pu′ where u 6= u′ has to be eliminated so that only terms with
Pu = Pu′ = P†u remain - a mixture of conjugations by Pauli+identity operators, each
with real coefficient ak,ua∗k,u = |ak,u|2, where ∑k,u |ak,u|2 = 1. Note that in the original
proof of the FK protocol they also eliminate the cross attack terms at some stage, but
to achieve this they reduce the state of Alice (except the trap) to identity, which is
undesired here - the reasons will be made clear later.
The process of eliminating the cross terms will take a few steps in which the
following lemma, proven in [Dankert et al., 2009], will be useful:
Lemma 2. (Operator Pauli Twirling)
∑
i
PiQPiρPiQ′Pi = 0, if Q 6= Q′ (3.7)
where ρ is a matrix, Q, Q′ are two arbitrary tensor products of Pauli+identity oper-
ators of the same dimension, and {Pi} is the set of all tensor products of Pauli+identity
operators of dimension same as Q and Q′.
Eliminating cross-terms on system ∆: By observing that Ri(.)(|δi〉⊗ |ψ〉i), where
Ri is controlled by the three qubit state |δi〉 and applies on state |ψ〉i, is equivalent
mathematically to |δi〉⊗Ri(δi)|ψ〉, where Ri(δi) is a single qubit gate (since |δi〉 is by
definition always a classical state), we can rewrite operator P ′ as:
P ′ = HN−n′′RN−n′′(δN−n′′) . . .H1R1(δ1)E ′G




N−n′′+θN−n′′+ rN−n′′π) . . .H1R1(φ
′










RN−n′′(θN−n′′) . . .RN−n′′(θi)
≡ P ′′RN−n′′(θN−n′′) . . .RN−n′′(θi) (3.8)
Operations RN−n′′(θN−n′′) . . .RN−n′′(θi) applied to state |M′〉 cancel the pre-rotations
by the θ’s (or have no effect in the case of dummies) and the state is updated to a state
which does not depend on θ, which we will denote by |M′′〉.
Now that we have eliminated all dependences on θ except from system ∆ (states
|δ〉), we can sum over θ to get the maximally mixed state for system ∆ and in Equation
3.6 the terms Pu|∆ 12|∆| IPu′|∆. Remember that the ∆ system is traced out. Terms where
Pu|∆ = Pu′|∆ have trace 1 and where Pu|∆ 6= Pu′|∆ have trace 0, since all Pauli operators
except identity are traceless. Therefore, we can ignore the attack cross terms applied on
the system which holds the measurement angles.
Eliminating cross-terms on dummy system D: Part of the entangling E ′G is applied
between the dummy qubits and their computational neighbours with the effect of
cancelling the pre-rotation of the latter when di = 1 (the dummy is in state |1〉). Let
us denote E ′′G the remaining entangling operators. The remaining unitary part of the
protocol applied on the dummy system is single qubit unitary operators applied on each







Again, Tr(Pu|D 12|D| IPu′|D) is 1 for Pu|D = Pu′|D and 0 for Pu|D 6= Pu′|D so we can
ignore the cross terms of the attack applying on the dummy qubits. Let |M(3)〉 denote
state |M′′〉 after the entangling between dummies and their computational neighbours is
applied and omitting the dummy qubits.
Eliminating the cross-terms on computational system M ×O′: The next step is an
iteration over all qubits i of the computational graph (G′+bridges) and using summation
over each ri to twirl the attack operator on qubit f (i) respectively, where f is the flow
function. We begin from qubits of system O′ and follow the reverse measuring order.
For the qubits of G′ we distinguish between three types of qubits depending on their
position and we apply a different technique for each one:
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• Qubit i ∈ O′: We assume that E ′′G does contain entangling operators among the
output qubits in our computational graph (e.g. take G′ to be the brickwork graph).




i from our graph E
′′
G|M(3)〉. This cancels de-
pendence on r f−1(i) on the protocol unitary operation applied on qubit f
−1(i)
(changing it from H f−1(i)R f−1(i)(φ
′
f−1(i)+ r f−1(i)π) to H f−1(i)R f−1(i)(φ
′
f−1(i))) and

























b f−1( j∼i)+r f−1( j∼i)
i = 0 if Pu|i 6= Pu′|i(3.10)
where |M(4)〉 comes from |M(3)〉 by extracting Zrii from the output states.
Note that for the terms that remain (Pu|i =Pu′|i) operations that depend on r f−1(i),ri
can be eliminated by looking at their commutation properties with Pu|i thus
eliminating all dependences from r f−1(i),ri in the formula. However, operations
Z
r f−1( j∼i)
i and all the b corrections remain.






j∼i, j 6= f−1(i) from graph
state E ′′G|M(4)〉. This cancels dependence on r f−1(i) on the unitary operation
applied on qubit f−1(i) and on the unitary operation applied on qubits { j ∼ i, j 6=
f−1(i)} (in case { j∼ i, j 6= f−1(i)} are output qubits their attack cross terms have
already been cancelled and therefore terms Z
r f−1(i)
j∼i, j 6= f−1(i) commute with the attack
and cancel with the final corrections - this is why following reverse measuring














where φ′i = (−1)





i+ riπ) and Hi and also extract a Z
r f−1(i)
i from both
〈bi| and |bi〉 without affecting the state:















where φ′′i = (−1)
b f−1(i)φi +(b f−1( j∼i, j 6= f (i))+ r f−1( j∼i, j 6= f (i)))π.
To apply Lemma 2 we also need the random X elements. These are acquired







j∼ f (i), j 6=i for
r′i←R {0,1} from graph state E ′′G|M(4)〉 and at the same time changing variable
b̂i ← bi + r′i everywhere. The new terms cancel everywhere (again following























r′i |b̂i〉= 0 if Pu|i 6= Pu′|i (3.13)
• Qubit i ∈ I: We assume that E ′′G does not contain entangling operators be-
tween the input qubits (e.g. brickwork graph). Let us employ the follow-
ing mathematical trick to generate the random Z elements: Extract stabilizer
X zii Z
zi
f (i) from graph E
′′
G|M(4)〉, where zi←R {0,1}. Commuting with the rotation




i Ri((−1)ziφi), up to a phase which gets cancelled
when you commute on both sides. On system f (i): R f (i)((−1)biφ f (i))Z
zi
f (i) =
R f (i)((−1)bi(φ f (i)+ ziπ)). For any choice of attack Pu|i (Pu′|i) from Bob, it imple-
ments operation J(φ f (i)+ ziπ)J((−1)ziφi)|+〉i (〈+|iJ((−1)ziφi)†J(φ f (i)+ ziπ)†),
up to a sign flip of φ f (i) depending on the attack, which is equivalent up to a
global phase to operation J(φ f (i))J(φi)|+〉i(〈+|iJ(φi)†J(φ f (i))†), up to the same
sign flip on φ f (i), so that we can replace the angles with the latter. Also, we can
extract Zzi from 〈bi| and from |bi〉.
Let us also employ the same trick for generating the random X elements as we





E ′′G(|M(4)〉〈M(4)|)E ′′GRi(φi)†HiXxiZziPu′|iZziXxi|bi〉= 0 if Pu|i 6= Pu′|i (3.14)
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There are also the qubits of the computational system that are bridges:
• Qubit i is a bridge: E ′′G entangles i with two qubits from G′, j : ( j, i) ∈ G′′.




i ∏ j Z
r′i
j from graph state E
′′
G|M(4)〉. Commuting with the rotations: For sys-












i +πri), up to a phase which gets can-





j = R j(φ
(3)





b f−1( j)φ j +
b f−1(k∼ j,k 6= f ( j))π. For any choice of attack Pu|i (Pu′|i) from Bob, the operation
applied is equivalent to replacing the rotation of i with Ri(π/2+πri) and of neigh-
bours j with R j(φ
(3)
j +π/2+π(bi + ri)), thus eliminating all other dependences
on r′i except on the generated Pauli element. Also, we can extract Z
r′i from 〈bi|
and from |bi〉.
To generate the random X elements we extract a Zri from Ri(π/2+πri) and also
change variable b̂← bi + ri to cancel any dependence on ri on neighbours j, thus







E ′′G(|M(4)〉〈M(4)|)E ′′GRi(π/2)†HiX riZr
′
iPu′|iZ
r′iX ri|b̂i〉= 0 if Pu|i 6= Pu′|i (3.15)
Eliminating the cross-terms on system T : For the trap qubits we have two cases
depending on their position:
• For positions ti in the measured system we have states:
∑
rti ,bti
|bti + rti〉〈bti|Pu|ti|rti〉〈rti|Pu′|ti|bti〉〈bti + rti| (3.16)





















= 0 if Pu|ti 6= Pu′|ti (3.17)
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rti Sβti |+ti〉〈+ti|S†βti Zrti Pu′|tiZ
rti Sβti H|bti〉〈bti| (3.18)
Let Pu|ti = X
uxZuz and Pu′|ti = X
u′xZu
′





Zi = 0, if q 6= q′ (3.19)
where ρ is a 2×2 matrix, q, q′, i are bits. Therefore, applying Equation 3.19 on
state in 3.18 it becomes:
= ∑
bti
|bti〉〈bti|HS†βti XuxZuzSβti |+ti〉〈+ti|S†βti Zu
′
zXuxSβti H|bti〉〈bti|
Notice that index ux on the attack is the same on both sides.
Similarly to the previous cases, we add an extra random operation which does





































Using a similarly simplified version of Lemma 2 as in Equation 3.19 but for the
case of Pauli X twirl:














XuxZβtiuxH|bti〉〈bti|= 0 if uz 6= u′z
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Eventually, tackling every case separately, we have managed to eliminate all terms




















• |M(4)〉 is the tensor product of |+〉 for all qubits of system M ×O′.
• P (3) is the unitary that contains E ′′G for M ×O′ and HiRi((−1)
b f−1(i)φi
+b f−1( j∼i, j 6= f (i))π) operators for all qubits of system M .
• C′ are the remaining Pauli corrections on the output system O′ (after eliminating
the r’s) and depend only on b.
• |η′ti〉 is |0ti〉 if ti points to a trap measured by Bob (ti ≤ N−n
′′) and is Sβi|+ti〉 if ti
points to a trap returned and measured by Alice (ti > N−n′′).
• Q′ti is |bti〉〈bti| if ti points to a trap measured by Bob, and is |bti〉〈bti|HtiS
†βti
ti if ti is
part of the returned system.
3.2.4 Detection of the Pauli Attacks
The strategy will be to split the sum over the attack operators Pu in Equation 3.20 into
the operators which are perfectly correctable during the FT procedure or do not have
any effect on the output and the rest, the latter having a significant footprint to be caught
by the trapification procedure with high probability.
Let us split ρout in Equation 3.20 into a sum of two terms: σ1 and σ2. The first term,
σ1 contains all terms u which correspond to attacks correctable or having no effect at all
(Pauli Z attacks on Pauli Z measured qubits). Specifically, u ∈ S1 is the set of indices
which correspond to attacks Pu with the following property:
We map the overall attack operator Pu to an operator that contains the maximum
number of independently detectable errors (see Section 3.1.2). Then, the latter attack
operator must have altogether ≤ p′ Pauli tensor elements Pu|i that corrupt the computa-
tion: for i≤ n′′ Pauli X or Y and for i > n′′ non-identity (therefore Pauli X or Y or Z).
Then, we have term:




















= p′|ψc〉〈ψc|⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|+ p′′|ψc〉〈ψc|⊗ |REJ〉〈REJ| (3.21)
where
• p′, p′′ are probabilities with p′+ p′′ = ∑k,u∈S1 |ak,u|
2 and they come from separat-
ing the attacks that leave all traps untouched and the rest.
• |ACC〉〈ACC| is the state where all trap qubits are |0〉〈0| and |REJ〉〈REJ| denotes
any state that at least one trap is |1〉〈1|.
• |ψc〉〈ψc| is the correct state for the output system O.
The second term of the sum, σ2, contains the remaining indices u, say u ∈ S2, which
correspond to attacks that can corrupt the computation even after the error correction.
These are attacks Pu of the following kind: when considering only the independently
detectable errors there are > p′ total elements in the tensor product which are Pauli X
or Y on measured qubits and Pauli X or Y or Z on returned qubits.
Let P⊥ be the projection to the orthogonal space to the correct output state:
P⊥ = I−|ψc〉〈ψc| (3.22)
where |ψc〉=U |+〉⊗n, U being the target unitary computation (the description of
which is given to Alice at the beginning of the protocol).
We calculate the ‘bad’ probability pbad (sub-normalized) that the state σ2 collapses





















Tracing out everything except the trap terms:
















Let us clarify a subtle point. Term ∑t means ∑t1 . . .∑t|t| , where ∑t1 is the summation
of each trap position ti over the set of possible positions which we have denoted by
Si. For the dotted-complete graph, it is not possible to get an independent uniform
distribution for ti’s simultaneously for all i (if we select one qubit to be a trap this will
affect the selection of the next trap). What we actually do is to consider only a subset
of vertices of the total graph that correspond to independently detectable errors in Pu
(therefore the subset we consider every time depends on u). For the rest of the vertices
we can set the attack operators to the identity without decreasing the total trace of the
expression above. For each qubit j where the independently detectable errors apply,
belonging to set Si, we have two desirable properties: (1) attack Pu| j will affect the trap if
it coincides with it and therefore reduce the trace of the above expression (will give trace
0 when it coincides with a non-output trap and trace 12 averaged over β when it coincides
with an output trap) and (2) for all possible selection of trap positions {tl : ∀l 6= i} that
(for the Sl’ that there are errors) coincide with independently detectable errors of u we
have p(ti = j|{tl})≥ c′, where c′ is independent of the particular selection and is equal
to 1maxi(|Si|) (in the case of dotted complete graph c
′ = 19 ). This comes as a consequence
of Definition 7.5 in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]. The second property means, in








ti that have trace < 1 in the
above summation have a lower bound in their probabilities (taking the marginal over
the trap positions in Sl’s that there are no independently detectable errors) and therefore
set an upper bound in the overall expression.










p({ti,βti : ti > N−n′′}|{ti : ti ≤ N−n′′})|〈+|tiS†βti Pu|tiS
βti |+〉ti|2 (3.25)
For each i where Si contains qubits of the measured by Bob system and each
attack with index u we denote by wu,i the number of positions in Si on which acts
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an independently detectable error element (Pauli X or Y ) of Pu. For each i where Si
contains returned qubits and each attack with index u we denote by wu,i the number of
positions in Si on which acts an independently detectable error element (Pauli X or Y or
Z) of Pu. By the above assumption for the lower bound in the probabilities of having


































From the fact that for every u ∈ S2 the total footprint ∑i(wu,i) of independently


















for some probability p and density matrix ρ. Or,
σ2 ≈(1− c′2 )p′
p1|ψc〉〈ψc|⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|+ p2ρ⊗|REJ〉〈REJ| (3.31)
where
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• p1 + p2 = ∑k,u∈S2 |ak,u|
2
• ρ is a density matrix.







Verifiable Blind Quantum Computing
with Localised Output
4.1 Localisation Gadget and Protocol
In this section we give an explicit description of the version of the FK protocol which
localises the position of the output on Bob’s side, called the localising verification
protocol. For any choice of random variables, including the positioning of the traps on
the graph that describes the resource state, the position of the qubits that contain the
output of the delegated computation becomes fixed and known to both Alice and Bob -
this is achieved by running blindly an extra output gadget graph. Blindness of the FK
protocol is retained, while for verifiability, since there are no traps on the output to be
tested, we have to relax the requirement for the output state to be ε close to the correct
output up to an arbitrary CPTP map. Crucially, for our composition in the composite
protocol, this CPTP map should be fixed for a choice of Bob’s deviation and should not
depend on the particular computation which is delegated.
In more technical terms, the main difference from the original FK protocol is the
modification of the graph state by appending on the output a certain number of gadget
states, one of which is depicted in Figure 4.1. Specifically, one gadget is attached on
each subset Sγ of the output of the FK protocol graph (system to be normally returned to
Alice). In the dotted-complete graph construction of the FK protocol, all output qubits
belong to the set of P(G) qubits and by construction they contain an equal number of
trap qubits, dummy qubits and qubits participating in the actual computation and are
in fact that outputs of this computation. Following the same construction of the FK
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Figure 4.1: Single gadget state attached to a subset Sγ (represented by dashed circles)
of the output of the normal graph used in the FK protocol. The number of branches
depends on |Sγ|. Only one of the qubits of the first row of the gadget is a non-dummy
state allowing to teleport blindly the actual output to the bottom qubit.
protocol we choose the sets Sγ such that each set contains one trap qubit, one dummy
qubit and one computational qubit (therefore the size of all output sets Sγ is 3). The
main idea is that if Bob learns the sets Sγ, which he does in our case because we place a
gadget on top of each Sγ, there is always a trap that can take any position in the set Sγ.
The scheme can generalize to other constructions with different sizes of Sγ by increasing
the size of the gadget.
The goal of the gadget system is to teleport only the computational qubit to the
fixed vertex at the bottom of each gadget. Therefore the first layer of the gadget qubits
(in Figure 4.1 the first row of solid circles, that are connected directly to the existing
graph of the FK protocol) contains |Sγ|−1 dummy qubits which isolate the trap and
the dummies of the output Sγ from the bottom qubit. The computational qubit and the
gadget qubit that is connected to it are both measured with φ = 0 so that the effective
computation is identity and the qubit is teleported to the bottom of the gadget. The
gadget structure is such (one gadget per Sγ and symmetric) that they can be added
without breaking the uniformity of the positioning of the traps in the FK protocol graph.
The steps of the localising protocol are given in Protocol 3.
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Protocol 3 Localising Verification Protocol (based on the FK protocol)
Alice’s input. Description of a computation in the MBQC model (or equivalent) using
a convenient underlying open graph state (G, I,O). The computation is represented, for
any qubit i ∈ G\O, as a measurement angle ϕi (together with the set of X-dependences
DXi and Z-dependences D
Z
i and a fixed partial order of measuring depending on the
graph structure). The input is set to be the Hadamard basis state of n qubits: |+〉⊗n.
Protocol can be extended to admit external quantum input by applying the techniques
described in the FK protocol.
Bob’s output. A quantum state that contains the encoded and one time padded quantum
output of the computation.
The protocol
1. Preprocessing 1. Alice translates the computation to a Fault Tolerant (FT) MBQC
pattern that can detect p errors. Let the updated open graph be (G′, I′,O′), where
|G|= m′ and |I′|= |O′|= n′.
2. Preprocessing 2. Alice embeds the encoded computation pattern into a suitable
graph G′′ which has the following property: There exists a fixed order of mea-
surement which respects the computational flow and each computational qubit
belongs to a constant size subset of qubits Sγ in which a trap can be at any position
with uniformly random probability. An example (up to the assumption that we
consider only independently detectable errors) is the dotted complete graph of
size O(m′2).
3. Preprocessing 3. Alice attaches a gadget graph (Figure 4.1) on each subset Sγ of
qubits of the output system of the previous step’s graph (G′′). Let the new graph,
that contains all gadgets, be denoted by G′′′. The effect of these extra graphs is
that they fix the position of system O′. Since we attach a constant number of
qubits for every qubit of the output system, the total number of qubits of G′′′ is
N = O(m′2).
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Protocol 3 Cont’d
4. Alice prepares the rotated qubits. For i = 1 to N:
(a) If qubit is a dummy: prepares |di〉, di←R {0,1} (where←R means chosen
uniformly at random from).
(b) If qubit is not dummy and not in O′: prepares ∏ j∈NG(i)∩D Z
d j |+θi〉, where
|+θi〉 ≡ 1√2(|0〉+ e
iθi|1〉), θi←R {0,π/4,2π/4, . . . ,7π/4}.
(c) If qubit is not a dummy and is in O′: Same as previous step but θ is fixed to
0 and an extra Zri rotation is applied where ri is a random bit.
(d) She sends the qubit to Bob.
5. Bob entangles the states according to the graph state by applying cZ gates.
6. Bob performs the rest of the computation using classical help from Alice. For i
which ranges over all qubits (respecting the flow) except system O′:
(a) Alice computes the actual measurement angle φ′i using the dependences and
the previous measurement results (φi = 0 for dummies and traps).
(b) Alice chooses a random bit ri and computes δi = φ′i +θi +πri.
(c) Alice transmits δi to Bob.
(d) Bob performs measurement Mδii on qubit i.
(e) Bob transmits the result to Alice.
(f) Alice flips the result if ri = 1, otherwise does nothing.
7. Alice sets her indicator bit to accept if all trap tests where successful.
8. Bob’s system will contain the output qubits O′ placed at a fixed position on the
graph.
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4.2 Verifiability of the Localisation Protocol
The following theorem is an alternative way to express verifiability and is indeed
equivalent to the standard definition using the projectors [Dunjko et al., 2014], up to the
final attack on the state (which is crucially independent on the computation). We prefer
this notation here as we are interested in the form of the state that will be later used in
the composite protocol.
Theorem 2. The output of Protocol 3 when decoded for the FT procedure and decrypted
for the quantum one-time-pad (assuming that these are done honestly by Bob or are








where ε = 1cp for some c > 1 and p parameter of FT, pacc is a probability, |ψc〉 is
the correct output of the computation, E is a CPTP-map where all Kraus operators are
Pauli operators and is independent of |ψc〉 and ρ′ is a normalized state.
The proof of Theorem 2, is given below. The proof is similar to the proof in Section
3.2 with some notable differences:
• As before, we decompose the attack operators into the Pauli basis, which are
tensor products of Pauli+identity operators on the overall state of Bob (tracing
out his private subsystem). We can split each tensor product into two smaller
tensor products, one that applies on the trapified system, which is the normal
graph G′′′, and one that applies on the non-trapified system, that is the gadgets
and measurement angles. Due to blindness on both G′′′ and the gadget we can
reduce both attacks to Pauli attacks, say Pu and Pv respectively.
• For Pu we do the standard analysis: errors with weight less than a certain bound
can be corrected and for the rest there is an exponentially high probability of
hitting at least one trap.
• For Pv we rewrite these attacks as attacks on the output qubits by commuting
with the gadget computation (which crucially does not depend on the actual
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computation). Moreover, since the gadget computation is Clifford the final attack
is still a Pauli attack. Therefore, the only attacks that remain on the output after
we do the trap analysis are these attacks that do not depend on the computation,
as we wanted.
Proof. Single index notation is followed to enumerate the qubits participating in the
graph where N is the total number of qubits and the last n′ qubits are the encoded output
qubits (system O′).
Extra notation has to be introduced first. Vector ν is used to represent all random
secret parameters chosen by Alice throughout the execution of protocol, including
r = {ri}, θ = {θi}, d = {di} and positions of traps t = {ti}. Parameter p(ν) gives the
probability of a particular choice of random secret parameters. Summing over a vector
(e.g. ∑r) means that we sum over all possible choices for the elements of that vector
(e.g. all possible bit-strings of size N for r).
For convenience we name the subsystems of the joint Alice-Bob system:
• System M is the union of all the non-dummy, non-trap qubits of G′′ (therefore
includes all the necessary bridge qubits introduced when embedding G′ in G′′) and
the non-dummy qubits of the first layer of each gadget (the ones that are measured
by Bob) introduced when embedding G′′ into G′′′. Therefore M contains all the
qubits of the graph state that are measured and participate in the computation. We
call them measured computational qubits.
• System D contains all dummy qubits.
• System T contains all trap qubits (here all of them are measured by Bob).
• System O′ is the encoded output system at fixed position. These are all the qubits
of the second layer of each gadget (the ones that are not measured by Bob).
• System ∆ is the system of the measurement angles send by Alice to Bob, where
each angle is represented by three qubits in the computational basis.
• System B is Bob’s private system, assumed to be initially in the blank state.
Each measurement performed at Step 6d of the protocol is analysed into a unitary
part and a Pauli Z measurement. Without loss of generality we can represent any
dishonest behaviour of Bob at any step as applying the correct unitary operators and
then an arbitrary unitary attack operator.
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In order to prove the theorem argument we need to consider the state of the protocol
after the extra steps of Alice receiving system O′ and applying the output Pauli cor-
rections CO′ and decoding map D for the FT QECC. The output that Alice holds after
these extra steps, averaged over random parameters and for all measurement outcomes






p(ν)D(C|bN−n′〉〈bN−n′|UN−n′HN−n′RN−n′(|δN−n′〉〈δN−n′|⊗ . . .
. . . |b1〉〈b1|U1H1R1(|δ1〉〈δ1|⊗EG|M〉〈M|⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗BEG)R†1H1U
†






• |M(θ,d, t)〉 is the state that Bob receives after Step 4 of the protocol (input,
auxiliary qubits, dummy qubits).
• EG is the global entangling operator that Bob applies at step 5 of the protocol.
• δ(θ,r,b) is the vector of δi(θ,r,b) which are measurement angles that Alice sends
to Bob at iteration i of step 6 of the protocol.
• Ri(δi) is a controlled unitary rotation of qubit i around z-axis by angle δi.
• Hi is a Hadamard gate applied on qubit i.
• Ui is the unitary attack of Bob with index i and applies on qubits ≥ i, private
Bob’s system and all measurement angles.
• C(r,b) includes the Pauli correction CO′ that Alice performs to the output system
O′ and the Zrti corrections on the trap measurement results.
• D is the map that Alice applies to decoding O′ for the QECC used in the fault
tolerant procedure.
By commuting all measurement angles (trivially) and all attack unitary operators
(by observing that they trivially commute with all measurements ≤ i) and merge them
into a new unitary U that applies on the whole of the system we get (see also Figure
3.4):
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p(ν)D(C|b〉〈b|U(HN−n′RN−n′(.) . . .H1R1(.)EG(
|M〉〈M|⊗ |δ〉〈δ|)EGR1(.)†H1 . . .RN−n′(.)†HN−n′⊗|0〉〈0|⊗B)U†|b〉〈b|C†)) (4.2)
where U is a unitary attack operator that is chosen by Bob and applies on all graph
G′′′ qubits, private Bob’s system and all measurement angles.
The trap system is not entangled with the rest when the honest computation is
applied. We can separate the terms that apply on the trap (remember that the trap is
placed among the measured qubits). Applying the entangling operators between the
traps and their neighbours, which are always dummy qubits does not have any effect
other than undoing the pre-rotation of the trap (for the case the dummy is selected to be
|1〉). Applying HtRt(δt) on each trap, where δt = θt + rtπ, results in getting state |rt〉.
Therefore, it holds that:





• P = HN−n′RN−n′(.) . . .HtiRti(.) . . .H1R1(.)EG is the correct unitary operation in
Figure 3.4.
• P ′ = HN−n′RN−n′(.) . . .H1R1(.)E ′G, which is produced from P by omitting all
operations applied on traps (E ′G is produced from EG by omitting all entangling
operators between traps and their neighbours)
• |M′〉 is produced from |M〉 by omitting the trap qubits.
In the next step we express the output state with Bob’s private system traced out and
his attack decomposed in the Pauli basis. We will use again the general property for
tracing out Bob’s private system and decomposing to the Pauli basis (all tensor products
of Pauli+identity operators) given in Equation 3.4.
Applying this property to the state in Equation 4.2, by tracing out system B, and at
the same time applying Equation 4.3 to separate the traps we get the following form.
Again, Pu|i is the i-th Pauli or identity element of Pu (tensor product of Pauli+identities
with index u).
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′〉〈b′|Pu|i:∀ j,i 6=t j ⊗Pv
(P ′(|M′〉〈M′|⊗ |δ〉〈δ|)P ′†)Pu′|i:∀ j,i6=t j ⊗Pv′|b
′〉〈b′|C†O′)⊗
i
|bti + rti〉〈bti|Pu|ti|rti〉〈rti|Pu′|ti|bti〉〈bti + rti|) (4.4)
where
• ak,u,v are complex numbers, with ∑k,u,v |ak,u,v|2 = 1.
• Pu (and Pu′) ranges over all tensor products of Pauli+identity operators and applies
on the system that is trapified: all qubits of graph G′′. Note that all these systems
are measured by Bob.
• Pv (and Pv′) ranges over all tensor products of Pauli+identity operators and applies
on the system that is not trapified: all qubits of the gadget systems, i.e. all systems
added when embedding G′′ to G′′′, and the measurement angle system ∆.
• b′ is the vector that is generated from b by removing elements {bti}.








′|Pu|i:∀ j,i6=t j ⊗Pv
(P ′(|M′〉〈M′|⊗ |δ〉〈δ|)P ′†)Pu′|i:∀ j,i6=t j ⊗Pv′|b
′〉C†O′)⊗
i
|bti + rti〉〈bti|Pu|ti|rti〉〈rti|Pu′|ti|bti〉〈bti + rti|) (4.5)
In the next part of the proof the attack of Bob will be reduced to a convex combina-
tion of Pauli+identity operators, consuming all random parameters except the random
position of the traps to cancel the cross Pauli+identity terms that are not the same (i.e.
where u 6= u′ and where v 6= v′). This follows exactly the same steps as in the proof of
normal VUBQC with quantum output except the following step:
Eliminating cross-terms on the trap system T : Since all trap qubits ti are measured
and in graph G′′ we have only one case:
∑
rti ,bti
|bti + rti〉〈bti|Pu|ti|rti〉〈rti|Pu′|ti|bti〉〈bti + rti| (4.6)
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= 0 if Pu|ti 6= Pu′|ti (4.7)
Thus, tackling each case separately, we have zeroed all terms where u 6= u′ and














• |M(4)〉 is the tensor product of |+〉 for all qubits of system M ×O′.
• P (3) is the unitary that contains E ′′G for M ×O′ and HiRi((−1)
b f−1(i)φi
+b f−1( j∼i, j 6= f (i))π) operators for all qubits of system M .
• C′ are the remaining Pauli corrections on the output system O′ (after eliminating
the r’s) and depend only on b.
We split the sum over the attack operators Pu (those applying on the trapified system)
in Equation 4.8 into two sums: a sum over the operators Pu which are perfectly corrected
by the FT QECC and the sum of the rest of the operators Pu (which are not corrected
but have a significant footprint to be caught by the trapification procedure with high
probability).
More formally, restricting the summation in Equation 4.8 to u ∈ S1 which have the
following property: if we map each attack Pu to the corresponding attack that contains
the maximum number of independently detectable errors, the latter will contain ≤ p′
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Let the tensor elements of each attack Pv|{i:i/∈∆,D} on the gadget system be separated
to those applying on set of measured gadget qubits G′′′ \ (O′∪G′′) (first layer of each
gadget), say Pv1 , and those who apply on the output system O
′ (second layer of each
gadget), say Pv2 .
Any single qubit Pauli operator can be analysed into a X and a Z component. For
each qubit i of the first layer of each gadget, the X-component of attack Pv1|i, denoted
by P′v1|i, can be replaced by a P
′
v1|i attack on output system O
′ (since its only effect is
to flip the Pauli X corrections of the output) while the Z-component of attack Pv1|i can
be ignored since it does not have any effect on the state. This way, every Pauli attack
Pv = Pv1 ⊗Pv2 on the gadgets can be reduced to a Pauli attack P′v1Pv2 applying only
on the output system O′, without catching any dependence on the actual computation
(independence of attack from the computation is a property of the theorem we want to
prove and will be useful in the composite construction later). This analysis was easy in
our case, where we have only one layer of measurements in the gadget, however one
might wonder what happens if there are more untrapified measurement layers (thus Pv
can potentially flip the outcomes of many layers of measurement). If these layers of
measurement correspond to Clifford computation (therefore angles from the restricted
set of {0,π/2,π,3π/2}), then the attack can indeed be rewritten as a Pauli operator on
the output system O′ but the new operator will potentially have a dependence on the
computation performed (i.e. the computational measurement angles). If the operation
performed by these layer, however, does not contain any secret, we can tolerate this
dependence and continue with the subsequent analysis (this property will be better
understood later in the analysis of the composite protocol and it variations).
Commuting the output Pauli attacks P′v1Pv2 with the decoding operator D (fixed
























Since Pu ∈ S1, attack Pu|{i:i/∈T,D} will be perfectly corrected by the FT QECC (which
means that calculations of b’s will be correct at each layer and the final decoding
procedure D will produce the correct output).
By separating the terms in which the attack leaves all traps untouched and the rest
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• Pi (Pj) range over all general Pauli operators on the output system O.
• p′i, p′′i are probabilities with ∑i(p′i + p′′i ) = ∑k,u∈S1,v |ak,u,v|
2 .
• |ACC〉〈ACC| is the state where all trap qubits are |0〉〈0| and |REJ〉〈REJ| denotes
any state that at least one trap is |1〉〈1|.
• |ψc〉〈ψc| is the correct state for the output system O, which crucially is placed on
a fixed position which does not depend on the selection of the trap positions (t)
(since the position of O′ was also fixed due to the structure of the gadget and the
decoding circuit is fixed).
We examine the rest of the u terms of the summation in Equation 4.8: for these
terms, denoted by u ∈ S2, it holds that the independently detectable errors of Pu are
> p′, where the corresponding tensor elements are Pauli X or Pauli Y .
Let P⊥ be the projection to the orthogonal space to the correct output state:
P⊥ = I−|ψc〉〈ψc| (4.12)
We calculate the ‘bad’ (sub-normalized) probability pbad the state collapses to the







































Each ti takes values from set Si and let its maximum size (∀i) be 1c′ . For each attack
indexed by u, let us denote by wu,i the number of positions j in Si on which acts an
independently detectable element of Pu. Also, we have the fact that all positions in
G′′ can be trapified and the fact that for each j ∈ Si with an independently detectable
error and for all possible selections of trap positions {tl : ∀l 6= i} that coincide with
independently detectable errors of u we have p(ti = j|{tl}) ≥ c′. Doing the same





















Since u ∈ S2, it follows that the total footprint ∑
|t|







Therefore (sub-normalized) state can be written as:





• p1 + p2 = ∑k,u∈S2,v |ak,u,v|
2
• ρ is a density matrix.






Here we adapt Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computing (FK) protocol, which is a
protocol for qubit systems, to odd prime d-level systems. The benefits are twofold. First,
this construction can be easily composed with the ABE Protocol, which requires systems
of dimension d ≥ 3 to be secure, and as we prove later, this is the only (deterministic)
way to compose the two protocols if the system is not returned to the verifier. Second,
the existence of efficient fault tolerant schemes in the d-level systems [Watson et al.,
2015] is a reason to consider d-level systems for computation and therefore verification.
In the following Sections we present the d-level version of the FK protocol, based on
d-level Blind QC, both using a d-level formalism of MBQC analogous to the qubit
MBQC. The main difference from 2-level verification is the different bound we acquire
for verifiability: depending on the levels d of the system and for protocol parameters
p





, as opposed to
ε = (1− c′2 )
p
′
in the 2-level. This small improvement is due to the availability of more
stabilizer states to choose for the type of the output trap, so when averaging over the
types of the trap any Pauli attack is more likely to anti-commute with the trap stabilizer
and get caught.
5.1 d-level Measurement-Based Quantum Computing
Measurement-based Quantum Computing (MBQC) on d-level systems has been studied
in [Zhou et al., 2003] and [Hall, 2005]. Here we present a formalism for d-level MBQC
that is the d-level analogue of the formalism presented in Section 1.1.3 and used in
blind protocols such as in [Broadbent et al., 2009]. Based on this formalism, in Section
5.1.1 we provide the d-level analogue of the brickwork states (universal MBQC using
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only XY-plane measurements), while in Section 5.3 we give the methods to ‘carve’
any graph out of a generic one by using the d-level analogues of the bridge and break
operators.
The resource state can again be represented by an undirected graph (G, I,O), with
qudits placed on the vertices and entangling operators (generalized cZ) applied whenever
the two vertices are connected by an edge. Not that in the d-level case there is not only
one but a family of entangling operators cZk,k ∈ {1, . . .d−1}, where k defines what we
call here the level of entanglement. All qudits /∈ I are prepared in the |+0〉 ≡ 1√d ∑
d−1
j | j〉
state. All qudits /∈ O are measured in basis {Rz(a)F†|k〉}k ({|k〉}k represents the
standard computational basis, where k ∈ {0, . . . ,q− 1}), which we will denote by
Ma. To implement a unitary on an arbitrary input, placed on I, space-time dependent
generalized measurements and Pauli corrections are applied on qudits according to a
given measurement pattern. One can specify the dependent generalized measurements
and corrections in many different ways (e.g. [Zhou et al., 2003] and [Hall, 2005]). Here,
we use the idea of the flow (see Section 1.1.3 for 2-level case).
In particular, together with graph (G, I,O) and a specific set of measurements {ai},
we define a partial order and dependency functions Dx which is a partial function from
OC to IC and Dz which is a partial function from OC to P IC , where P denotes the power
set. Then, j ∈ Dxi means that j gets a Pauli X correction raised to the power of the
measurement outcome of i. The choice of Dxi is restricted such that the level of the
entanglement operator between i and Dxi is 1. Also, j ∈ D
z
i means that j gets a Pauli Z
correction raised to the power of the measurement outcome of i times the level of the
entanglement operator that has been applied between j and Dxi in the construction of
the graph. The definition of the flow, which is sufficient condition for a graph to be used
for unitary computation (up to global phase) and helps to define Dx and Dz, is the same
as in the 2-level case (see Definition 2) with the extra property that i and f (i) have level
of entanglement 1. One can easily generalize by allowing for X corrections that depend
on the level between i and f (i) and thus make the flow depend only on the connectivity
of the graph, but this is beyond the scope of our construction. The d-level version of a
basic theorem (Theorem 1 in [Danos and Kashefi, 2006]) will be:
Theorem 7. Let us have a measurement pattern on an open graph state (G, I,O) with






X sif (i) ∏
{k:k∼ f (i),k 6=i}
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where e(k, f (i)) is the level of the entanglement operator applied between k and









where EG and NIc represent the global entangling operator and global preparation
respectively.
Proof. Deriving the first equation from the second and using the idea of anachronical
patterns, i.e. that mathematically we can write each projector as a measurement and a

























X sif (i) ∏
{k:k∼ f (i),k 6=i}





which is easy to check that is runnable as it was in the 2-level case.
5.1.1 d-level Universal Graph States
First we show that a patterns of the form given in Theorem 7 can perform universal
unitary computation. Let us define generalized gate J as:
J(a) = FRz(a)





In Figure 5.1 it is shown how we can implement a J gate using two qudits. The
following property was used:
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Figure 5.1: Starting from the dit teleportation circuit in (a) we show how to derive the
measurement pattern for the J gate.
Lemma 3. It holds that:

































The term inside parentheses is equal to 1 when a−b+d = 0⇔ d = b−a and equal




Gate J together with cZ operators we can implement gates of a universal set as it
was the case in the 2-level MBQC.
In the original UBQC protocol all computations are performed on the brickwork
state. This state has the property that we can implement any universal computation
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by performing only XY -plane measurements. We give the steps to construct the graph
that corresponds to one possible generalization of the brickwork state, also depicted in
Figure 5.2:
Definition 10 (d-level Brickwork State Graph). The d-level Brickwork State Graph
is a special graph that is composed of two different sets of edges: the grey edges and
the black edges. These edges will represent different entanglement operators during
the construction of the d-level brickwork state. In particular grey edges represent
entanglement operator cZ, while black edges represent entanglement operator cZd−2.
To construct the graph:
1. Assign to each vertex an index (i, j), where 1≤ i≤ n is the row and 1≤ j ≤ m is
the column.
2. For each row i and for all 1≤ j ≤m−1 connect vertices (i, j) and (i, j+1) with
an edge.
3. For each column j ≡ (5 mod 25) and each odd row i connect vertices (i, j) and
(i+1, j) with a grey edge, vertices (i, j+4) and (i+1, j+4) with a gray edge
and also vertices (i, j+8) and (i+1, j+8) with a black edge.
4. For each column j≡ (17 mod 25) and each even row i connect vertices (i, j) and
(i+1, j) with a grey edge, vertices (i, j+4) and (i+1, j+4) with a grey edge
and also vertices (i, j+8) and (i+1, j+8) with a black edge.
An interesting property of d-level gates, that, as we will see later, is the basic
reason that the ’brick’ component in the d-level brickwork state does not scale with the
dimension d is the following:
Figure 5.2: Qudit brickwork state where the ‘brick’ component is identified by a grey
rectangle. Grey lines represent entanglement operator cZ, while black lines represent
entanglement operator cZd−2, where d is the level of the system
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Lemma 4. It holds that:

















































































We show the universality of the d-level brickwork graph by constructing the mea-
surement patterns of a universal set of gates, {Z,F,S,T,cX}, (see Section 2.2.1 for the
explanation of why they are universal). Another gate, which we denote by D, is used to







2 | j〉〈 j|,d > 2 (5.9)
A series of lemmas are needed to be able to arrive to our universal pattern construc-
tion.
Lemma 5. The following holds:
∃k : ωkDFDF†D = F (5.10)



























































































































































l j|l〉〈 j|= F (5.11)
Lemma 6. It also holds that:
∃k : ωkD†FD†F†D† = F† (5.12)
Lemma 7. Also:
cZ†(I⊗S†)cX(S†⊗S) = cX (5.13)

























In order to show how to implement all gates of this set we first represent the ‘brick’
element in the circuit model notation and then we find the proper J gates for each case.
The circuits used to construct each gate are given in Figure 5.3. All gates are in the form
of a diagonal followed by a Fourier gate thus can directly be implemented by J gates
with the appropriate parameters. An example for the parameters to use for a universal
set of qutrit gates is given in 5.4 where qutrit brickwork state is used, depicted in Figure
5.5.
Figure 5.3: Decomposition for the quantum gates (a) T (b) S (c) F (d) cX
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Figure 5.4: Decomposition in J(a) gates for qutrit gates: (a) T : a = (0,2π/9,16π/9)
(b) S: a = (0,6π/9,0) (c) F : a = (0,12π/9,12π/9) (d) cX : a = (0,12π/9,0),b =
(0,12π/9,6π/9),c = (0,6π/9,6π/9),d = (0,12π/9,12π/9),e = (0,6π/9,12π/9)
Figure 5.5: Example: brickwork state for d=3 (qutrit). The single ‘brick’ elements are
highlighted.
5.2 d-level Blind Protocol
The idea for constructing a blind protocol in d-level system delegated computation is
similar to 2-level systems. Again verifier has to provide isolated single system states that
have a secret quantum encryption, in this case states UE |+0〉, where |+0〉 ≡ 1√d ∑
d−1
j | j〉
and UE ≡ T γiSβiZαi is a unitary that depends on secret parameters α,β,γ∈Fd (exception
T gate for qutrits). This encryption does not correspond to all possible combinations
of rotations of the relative phases by multiples of a constant angle, as it was in the
case in 2-level blindness - this would have been unnecessary and too much to ask from
the verifier because we only need to implement (and thus hide) the particular set of
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universal gates (which are gates that belong to the 3-rd level of the Clifford hierarchy as
introduced in [Gottesman and Chuang, 1999]).
Prover entangles the received states by applying generalized cZ gates on the qudits
corresponding to the connected vertices in the graph representing the resource. This
entangled resource state must be universal so that we do not reveal anything about
the computation, except an upper bound on the size. One can use a cluster state and
simulate the Z measurement using dummy qudits, which are qudits prepared in the
computational basis, or use a resource that does not require Z measurements, such as
the brickwork state in the 2-level system. In Figure 5.5 we present the analogue of the
brickwork state for the qutrit (3-level) system.
Then, computation proceeds in rounds, where the verifier sends measurement vectors
to the prover who uses them to determine the measurement to apply on the qudits and
returns the result to the verifier to be used for the corrections of the next round of
measurements. This is analogous to the 2-level case: the measurement vectors play the
role of the measurement angles. Measurement vectors ϕ determine measurements in
the {UE |+i〉}i basis, which gives universality for odd prime dimensions (see previous
Section for more details):
A measurement in {0,0,0} implements an F gate. Diagonal gates Zα,Sβ,T γ can be
implemented by the corresponding measurement vector {α,β,γ}, followed by a F gate.
cX can be implemented by using cZ gates of the graph together with F gates.
The order of measurements and the corrections are dictated by the flow which
is exactly the same as in 2-level case. Corrections are implemented by updating the
measurement vectors: correction by Zz is {α,β,γ}← {α+ z,β,γ} and correction by Xx
is {α,β,γ}← {α+ xβ+3γx(x−1),β+6xγ,γ}. All operations are modulo d with the
exception being the qutrit as explained earlier. These corrections can be easily verified
by using the following commutation equations.
SβXx = XxZxβSβ T γXx = XxZ3γx(x−1)S6γxT γ (5.15)
Thus correctness of the protocol comes from the fact that gates UE commute with
generalized cZ and Z rotations on measurements are corrected by addition operation on
the result.
Theorem 8. Protocol 4 is perfectly blind, leaking only an upper bound on the size of
the computation.
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Protocol 4 Qudit Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC) Protocol (based on
qubit UBQC)
Alice’s input:
• Description of a computation in the MBQC model (or equivalent) using a con-
venient universal underlying open graph state (G, I,O). The computation is
represented, for any vertex i ∈ G\O, as a measurement vector ϕi (together with
the set of X-dependences DXi and Z-dependences D
Z
i and a fixed partial order of
measuring depending on the graph structure). The input is set to the state of n
qudits: |+0〉⊗n. Protocol can be extended to admit quantum input by applying
techniques described in the UBQC protocol.
Alice’s output:
• A quantum state that contains the quantum output of the computation.
The protocol
1. Alice prepares the rotated qudits. For i = 1 to N:
(a) She prepares |+θi〉 ≡ T γiSβiZαi 1√d (|0〉 + . . . + |d − 1〉), where θi =
(αi,βi,γi)
T ,αi,βi,γi←R Fd .
(b) If qubit is in O: Same as in previous step if we want to have a composable
with itself protocol (but will require Alice to undo the pre-rotation on the
output qubits by applying non-Clifford gates), or Alice prepares state |+0〉.
(c) She sends the qudit to Bob
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Protocol 4 Cont’d
2. Bob entangles the states according to the graph state by applying generalized cZ
gates.
3. Bob performs the rest of the computation using classical help from Alice. For i
which ranges over all qudits (respecting the order given by the flow), except the
qudits of the O system:








dependences and the previous measurement results.
(b) Alice chooses ri←R Fd and computes δi = φ′i +θi +(ri,0,0)T .
(c) Alice transmits δi to Bob.
(d) Bob performs measurement Mδii on qubit i. Measurements on measurement





T ∈ F3d correspond to generalized measurements on
basis {Z jT γ′′i Sβ′′i Zα′′i 1√
d
(|0〉+ . . .+ |d−1〉)}d−1j=0 .
(e) Bob transmits the result to Alice.
(f) Alice corrects the result by adding ri mod d.
4. Bob returns the output system O to Bob.
5. Alice applies the final Pauli corrections (and possibly undoes pre-rotations by
θi, i ∈ O) and outputs O.
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Proof. We write the state of Bob system at every stage of the computation:
Step 1: Alice sends to Bob the auxiliary qubits and the first measurement vector












Defining θ′1 = θ1 +(r1,0,0)









Summing first over r1 and then over θ′1 we get the maximally mixed state for qudit
1 and its corresponding measurement vector.
Step N: Alice has also sent all measurement vectors for qudits up to i and Bob has
applied an arbitrary CPTP-map attack and returned measurement result bi after each




p(θ1, . . . ,θN ,r1, . . . ,rN)EN |φ′N +θN +(rN ,0,0)T 〉〈φ′N +θN +(rN ,0,0)T |⊗ . . .
⊗E1(|φ1 +θ1 +(r1,0,0)T 〉〈φ1 +θ1 +(r1,0,0)T |⊗Ni=1 |+0,θi〉〈+0,θi|) . . .)




p(θ1, . . . ,θN ,r1, . . . ,rN)E(|φ′N +θN +(rN ,0,0)T 〉〈φ′N +θN +(rN ,0,0)T |⊗ . . .
⊗|φ1 +θ1 +(r1,0,0)T 〉〈φ1 +θ1 +(r1,0,0)T |⊗Ni=1 |+0,θi〉〈+0,θi|)
Changing variables: θ′i = θi +(ri,0,0)
T for all i and rearranging the terms:







p(θ′1, . . . ,θ
′
N ,r1, . . . ,rN)E(|φ′N +θ′N〉〈φ′N +θ′N |⊗ZrN |+0,θ′N 〉〈+0,θ′N |Z
rN ⊗ . . .
⊗|φ1 +θ′1〉〈φ1 +θ′1|⊗Zr1|+0,θ′1〉〈+0,θ′1|Z
r1)
Notice that each φ′i depends on some of {r j : j < i}. Thus, we can start by summing
over rN which appears only in the terms ZrN , thus taking the maximally mixed state
for qudit N. Then we can sum over θ′N to get the maximally mixed state for the
measurement vector of qudit N. Iteratively, following the inverse arithmetic order we
sum over all random parameters taking the maximally mixed state as output.
We can add Bob’s prior knowledge to the above proof as a probability distribution
over all secret measurement vectors φi,∀i and notice that there is the same distribution
at the end of the protocol (method described in [Dunjko, 2012].
Lemma 8. Protocol 4 where all measurement vectors have only Clifford elements
(∀i,ci = 0) requires no classical communication and the measurements can be performed
in one step.
Proof. It suffices to prove the following statement which means that all Pauli X cor-
rections can be written as Pauli Z corrections, which can all be performed on the final
output returned to Alice.
∀C : diagonal Clifford operator,∀ j ∈ Fq,∀m1 ∈ Fq,∃m2 ∈ Fq :
Xm1C|+ j〉= Zm2C|+ j〉
This is true because:



































This is true up to a global phase for some m′2 since C is a diagonal Clifford, thus
C†Zm2C maps always to a diagonal Pauli.
5.3 d-level Verification Protocol
The main idea of the d-level VUBQC is the same as in 2-level system VUBQC. We
hide the position of the traps by implementing a blind version of the computation
and randomize the dummy qudits (which in this case are states of the generalized
computational basis). Also, bridge qudits work in a similar way to bridge qubits. We list
the d-level VUBQC in Protocol 5 without mentioning the specific graph or FT encoding
used. Also we consider the version where we amplify the failure probability, to cover
the case of quantum output, as usual.
Correctness coming from correctness of d-level UBQC and the pre-corrections for
the neighbours of the d-level dummies.
The resources needed for Alice are to prepare and send single qudit states and
apply the d-level Clifford decoding circuit for the QECC used, together with Pauli
measurements. The communication requirement is Õ(n2)×O(log(1/ε)) separable
single qudit states sent from Alice to Bob off-line and Õ(n2)×O(log(1/ε)) dits (d-
level classical systems) of on-line classical communication between Alice to Bob, where
n is the size of the computation. The comparison with 2-level verification is that while
the number of rounds of communication remains the same, each round carries log2d
bits of information about the computation instead of one.
5.3.1 Verifiability Proof in d-level
Theorem 3. Protocol 5 is ε verifiable with ε = (1− (d−1)c
′
d )
p, for some c′ < 1 that
depends on the graph, p is a parameter of FT and d the levels of the system with d an
odd prime. Protocol 5 assumes the existence of the qudit version of the fault tolerant
QECC used in FK [Raussendorf et al., 2007] or equivalent.
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Protocol 5 Qudit Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computation (VUBQC) Protocol
with quantum output (based on FK)
Alice’s input:
• Description of a computation in the MBQC model (or equivalent) using a con-
venient underlying open graph state (G, I,O). The computation is represented,
for any vertex i ∈ G \O, as a measurement vector ϕi (together with the set of
X-dependences DXi and Z-dependences D
Z
i and a fixed partial order of measur-
ing depending on the graph structure). The input is set to the state of n qudits:
|+0〉⊗n. Protocol can be extended to admit quantum input by applying techniques
described in the FK protocol.
Alice’s output:
• A system that contains the quantum output of the computation and a bit to indicate
of Alice has accepted the output of the computation.
The protocol
1. Preprocessing 1: Alice translates the computation to a Fault Tolerant (FT) MBQC
pattern that can correct errors on p qudits. Let the updated open graph be
(G′, I′,O′), where |G|= m′ and |I|= |O|= n′.
2. Preprocessing 2: Alice embeds the encoded computation pattern into a suitable
graph which has the following property: There exists a fixed order of measurement
which respects the computational flow and each computational qudit belongs to
a constant size subset of qudits Sγ in which a trap can be at any position with
uniform random probability. The total number of qudits of the final graph is N.
An example is the dotted complete graph of size N = O(m′2).
3. Alice prepares the rotated qudits. For i = 1 to N:
(a) If qudit is a dummy: prepares |di〉, di←R Fd .
(b) If qudit is not dummy and not in O′: prepares ∏ j∈NG(i)∩D Z
d j |+θi〉, where
|+θi〉 ≡ T γiSβiZαi 1√2(|0〉+ . . .+ |d−1〉), θi = (αi,βi,γi)
T ,αi,βi,γi←R Fd .
(c) If qudit is not a dummy and is in O′ and is not a trap: Same as previous step
but with θ = (ri,0,0)T ,ri←R Fd .
(d) If qudit is not a dummy and is in O′ and is a trap: Same as previous step but
with θ = (ri,βi,0)T ,ri,βi←R Fd .
(e) She sends the qudit to Bob
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4. Bob entangles the states according to the graph state by applying generalized cZ
gates.
5. Bob performs the rest of the computation using classical help from Alice. For i
which ranges over all qudits (respecting the order given by the flow), except the
qudits belonging to sets Sγ which contain qudits of the O′ system:







T using the de-
pendences and the previous measurement results (φ′i = (0,0,0)
T for dummy
qudits).
(b) Alice chooses ri←R Fd and computes δi = φ′i +θi +(ri,0,0)T .
(c) Alice transmits δi to Bob.
(d) Bob performs measurement Mδii on qudit i. Measurements on measurement





T ∈ F3d correspond to generalized measurements on
basis {Z jT γ′′i Sβ′′i Zα′′i 1√
d
(|0〉+ . . .+ |d−1〉)}d−1j=0 .
(e) Bob transmits the result to Alice.
(f) Alice corrects the result by adding ri mod d.
6. Bob returns the qudits of all the sets Sγ that contain the output system O′ to Bob.
7. Alice applies the final Pauli corrections on qudits of O′.
8. Alice applies the decoding procedure of the FT encoding to produce actual output
O.
9. Alice sets her indicator bit to accept if all trap tests where positive including the
test on the traps of the returned system.
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p({ti,βti : ti > N−n′′}|{ti : ti ≤ N−n′′})
|〈+0|tiS†βti Pu|tiS
βti |+0〉ti|2) (5.16)
where βti take uniform random values from Fd and Pu are tensor products of gener-
alized Pauli+identity operators (generalized Pauli basis). Let us remind the reader that
indices u ∈ S2 denote attacks that cannot be corrected by the FT QECC procedure (but
will have an effect on the traps).
For attack with index u and each i where Si contains qudits of the measured by Bob
system, we denote by wu,i the number of positions in Si that the independently detectable
reduction of the attack Pu|ti has a non-zero generalized Pauli X component when written
in the X iZ j decomposition (i.e. i is non-zero in this decomposition). For attack u and i
where Si contains returned qudits we denote by wu,i the number of positions in Si that
the independently detectable reduction of the attack Pu|ti is non-identity or equivalently
has in the X iZ j decomposition either i or j (or both) are non-zero. For attacks with
indices u ∈ S2 by definition: ∑i(wu,i) > p′ where p′ is the number of independently
detectable errors of the qudit FT QECC. Also, for each j ∈ Si with an independently
detectable error and for all possible selections of trap positions {tl : ∀l 6= i} that (for the
Sl’ that there are errors) coincide with independently detectable errors of u we have
p(ti = j|{tl})≥ c′.
Also we use the following property, which is easy to verify:
∀ti,Pu|ti 6= I : ∑
βti
|〈+0|tiS†βti Pu|tiS
βti |+0〉ti|2 ≤ 1 (5.17)


















































Therefore state can be written as:
σ2 ≈ε p1|ψc〉〈ψc|⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|+ p2ρ⊗|REJ〉〈REJ| (5.19)
where





• p1 + p2 = ∑k,u∈S2 |ak,u|
2
• ρ is a density matrix.








An Efficient Verification Protocol
As mentioned before, the main idea for the composite protocol is that Bob uses the
FK protocol to secretly prepare the polynomial-QAS encoded state used in the ABE
protocol. Bob uses the localizing version of the FK protocol so he does not have to
return the state to Alice, but rather he applies the polynomial-code logical circuit to
implement the actual computation on the encoded state. In this composition of the
localizing protocol with the ABE protocol we had to resolve a few issues which prevent
a straightforward composition of the protocols.
Firstly, the state that Bob holds is encoded by the QECC used for the amplification
of the detection probability in the FK protocol. In order to apply the logical circuit of
the ABE protocol on this state, Alice needs to ask Bob to decode the first QECC, which
from a verifiability perspective may seem problematic. Fortunately, the QECC of the
FK protocol is based on a stabiliser code with a Clifford decoding circuit [Raussendorf
et al., 2007]. The decoding circuit is publicly known and there is no need for any
communication between Alice and Bob. An honest Bob performs the operators and
Alice simply updates her quantum one-time-padding secret keys accordingly. Hence, no
information is leaked on the secret keys, and also uniformity of the keys is preserved.
Secondly, the ABE protocol requires quantum states of prime dimension d where
d > 2, whereas the original FK protocol uses qubits. To resolve this, we use the
analogue of the localizing FK protocol which can use systems of any dimension while
preserving all the security properties. The resources requirement for Alice is the ability
of preparing random single qudit states and the overall communication complexity
remains the same as the original FK protocol. We also examine the possibility of using
the qubit version of the localizing FK protocol for Bob to prepare a state which can be
translated to d-levels by a direct mapping of the basis. At the same time, we need to
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investigate if the qubit one-time-pad that the output state always has on Bob’s side, with
a key hidden from Bob, can be translated to a qudit one-time-pad by local operations on
Alice’s side, without leaking any information to Bob. The no-go result, presented in 5.1
prevents any attempt to deterministically implement this translation of the one-time-pad.
Therefore, we revert to our original approach to use the d-level version of the localizing
FK protocol.
Thirdly, since the computation we use from the ABE protocol is based on gate
teleportation, there is a constant number of rounds of classical communication between
Alice and Bob per non-Clifford gate teleportation. We prove, however, that this commu-
nication does not leak any of the secret parameters of the trapification phase, crucial for
the security of the composite protocol.
Finally, we prove that, since the detection and decoding procedure that Alice applies
to the returned state of the ABE protocol is a CPTP map, the resulting state of the
overall protocol is ε-close to the final state of the ABE protocol. Thus this state is also
verifiable.
The above comprise tools sufficient to build a composite ε-verifiable protocol,
however, this protocol would not yet give any improvement in terms of complexity
over the existing protocols. To achieve this, we partition the underlying entangled state
necessary for the FK protocol phase of the composite protocol into smaller separable
sub-states, each used for the preparing of a polynomial-QECC encoded input state for
the ABE protocol. Since the quadratic round complexity of the FK protocol comes from
the complex structure of the overall required underlying resource state, simplifying the
state for the purposes of this composition (observing that the polynomial-QECC encoded
logical inputs are separable) succeeds in reducing the communication complexity. This
modification does not violate the verification properties of the FK protocol since the
fact that the states are separate is public knowledge and the detection and encoding
procedures for each of the separate states can be done locally.
The steps which are essential for the construction of this protocol can potentially be
used for constructing different composite schemes.
6.1 Impossibility of Qubit to Qudit Translation
Theorem 9. It is impossible to have a deterministic translation (isometry) from a qubit
system to a qudit system that spans all states of the qudit system and moreover translates
a known full qubit one-time-pad to a full qudit one-time-pad, when the dimension of
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the qudit system is an odd prime. (Impossibility of composing qubit and qudit security
protocols without returning the state to Alice to update the one-time-pad)
Proof. We require a basis translation of a qubit system of dimension 2n to a system
of dimension d, where 2n ≥ d. This basis translation is represented by function g :
{0, . . . ,2n−1}→ {0, . . . ,d−1}, which needs to be surjective to be able to prepare any
arbitrary state in the qudit space.
Moreover, the state in qubit space has a full quantum one-time-pad, which also
needs to be translated from the qubit description to the qudit description. For the rest
we consider only the Pauli X pad of the system, and we prove that it is impossible to
achieve this translation and still have a full Pauli X qudit one-time-pad, even before
considering the Pauli Z pad.
A Pauli X quantum one-time-pad on the qubit system is general Pauli Xx1 , where
x1 ∈ {0, . . . ,2n−1}, applied on the state. By definition of general qubit Pauli X :
For any basis state |b1〉, b1 ∈ {0, . . . ,2n−1}: Xx1|b1〉= |∑n−1i=0 2i(xi1⊕bi1)〉.
where xi1,b
i
1 are the i-th digits in the binary representation of x1,b1, and the addition
is modulo two. Let us define: h(x,b) ≡ ∑n−1i=0 2i(xi1⊕ bi1). For a fixed b1 it defines a
bijection h(·,b1) (in other words, for a fixed b1 there is always a unique x1 that gives
any value h(x,b)). It is trivial to see that the following property holds:
h(x1,h(x1,b1)) = b1 (6.1)
In the qudit system a Pauli X one-time-pad is a generalized Pauli Xx2 on the state,
where x2 ∈ {0, . . . ,d−1}. Generalized Pauli X is defined as:
∀|b2〉 where b2 ∈ {0, . . . ,d−1}: Xx2|b2〉= |b2 + x2 mod d〉.
Let f : {0, . . . ,2n−1}→ {0, . . . ,d−1} represent the function that translates the X
one-time-pad key from the qubit to the qudit representation.
To have a consistent one-time pad, for all basis b1 and all keys x1:
g(h(b1,x1)) = g(b1)+ f (x1) mod d
This can be rewritten as:
f (x1) = g(h(b1,x1))−g(b1) mod d (6.2)
This equation should hold for any b1 (the translation of the one-time-pad f should
be independent of b1) and thus it should hold also for b2 = h(x,b1), i.e.
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f (x) = [g(h(x,h(x,b1)))−g(h(x,b1))] mod d
= [g(h(x,b2))−g(b2)] mod d
f (x) = [g(b1)−g(h(x,b1))] mod d (6.3)
From Equations (6.2) and (6.3) we see that
2[g(h(x,b1))−g(b1)] mod d = 0 (6.4)
Given that d and 2 are coprimes by assumption (d,2) = 1 it follows that
g(b1) = g(h(x,b1))
f (x) = 0 (6.5)
Recall that g has range within d. Moreover, since for every b1,b2 there exists x such
that b2 = h(x,b1) it follows
g(b2)−g(b1) = 0 for every b1,b2
g(x) = constant function (6.6)
This means that neither f (x) nor g(x) are surjective, which was the requirement to
be able to prepare any arbitrary input.
6.2 Composite Protocol
The proposed FK-ABE composite protocol combines all the techniques discussed so
far, including the partitioning of the high complexity resource state of the FK protocol
to sub-graphs, each used for the preparation of a separate encoded state for the ABE
protocol, thus reducing the quantum and classical communication complexity.
The protocol, described here as Protocol 6, is based on a d-level version of Protocol
3, for d odd prime, which corresponds to the following changes (see also Chapter 5 for
more detail):
• The state is entangled by applying generalized cZ gates.
6.2. Composite Protocol 107
• Alice’s states |+θi〉 are replaced by states T ciSbiZai 1√d (|0〉+ . . .+ |d−1〉), where
T are generalized ‘π/8’ gates, S generalized phase gates, Z generalized Pauli Z
gates and ai,bi,ci←R Fd (except qutrits, where T gate is replaced by T3 gate and
ci←R F9).
• Dummy states are generalized computational basis states |di〉, di←R Fd
• Measurements on vector (a′i,b′i,c′i) ∈ F3d correspond to generalized measurements
on basis {Z jT c′iSb′iZa′i 1√
d
(|0〉+ . . .+ |d− 1〉)}d−1j=0 . Measurements vectors are
corrected to incorporate generalized Pauli X and Z corrections according to flow
dependencies.
• Alice cancels the pre-rotation by adding (ai,bi,ci) on her (corrected) measurement
vector. In the measurement vector she sends to Bob, extra term (ri,0,0)T , ri←R
Fd is added to randomize the output of Bob’s measurement. She corrects the
measurement result she receives from Bob by adding ri.
• The output gadget has the necessary number of layers to teleport the encoded
output at a fixed position. Since the computation in the gadget is Clifford and it
does not contain any part of the secret, the proof technique we have developed
goes through.
Correctness of the d-level version of the FK protocol follows the same argument
of the correctness of qubit case, applying d-level MBQC and noticing that the d-level
dummy qudits have the same effect as in the qubit case. Universality comes from
the fact that we are able to perform a universal set of gates for d-level computation:
{cX ,F,S,T,Z}, with the special case of qutrits where T becomes T3.
6.2.1 Verifiability of the Composite Protocol
Protocol 6 is ε-verifiable with the proof given later in this section.
Theorem 4. The composite protocol is correct and ε-verifiable, with ε≤ ε1 + ε2 where
ε1 =
1
cp1 , ε2 =
1
2p2 where p1 and p2 are the QECC distance parameters of the FK and
ABE phase and c > 1 is a parameter of the FK phase which depends on the structure of
the graph used.
108 Chapter 6. An Efficient Verification Protocol
Protocol 6 Composite Verifiable Quantum Computation
Alice’s input. Description of a computation in the Gate Teleportation model based
on generalized Toffoli states. The input is set to be the Fourier basis state of n qudits:
|+0〉⊗n, where |+0〉= 1√d ∑a |a〉. The total number of gates is denoted by t. The total
number of Toffoli gates is denoted by t ′. Protocol can be extended to admit arbitrary
quantum input using the same methods as in the FK protocol.
Alice’s output. The result of measurement of the quantum output of the circuit and a
bit indicating if the result is accepted or not.
The protocol
1. Alice chooses a single random sign key (of size equal to the size of a codeword)
that will be used to encode all inputs (including Toffoli states) according to the
signed-polynomial QECC.
2. A d-level fault tolerant QECC is selected for amplification of the detection
probability of the FK protocol.
3. Alice prepares for the delegation of the preparation of the necessary Toffoli states
and the encoding of both the inputs and the Toffoli states according to the ABE
protocol QECC, randomized by the selected sign key. For each encoded state
she selects a separate graph state that is the d-level version of the graph G′′′
(trapified graph+output gadget) described in Protocol 3. Therefore, the size of
each sub-graph depends only on the security parameters of the protocol and not
on the size of the computation t. Let the union of all these sub-graphs be denoted
by G(4) and its size N = O(n)×O(t ′).
4. Bob (interacting with Alice) encodes all inputs and Toffoli states by executing
Protocol 3 adapted for d-level systems. The output of Bob is encoded by the
QECC used for amplification of the FK protocol and the final quantum one time
pad, which depends on the secret parameters of the FK protocol and will referred
to as the Pauli key. Alice holds an indicator bit set on accept or reject depending
on the outcome of the traps.
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5. Bob applies the Clifford circuit for decoding the QECC used for amplification
of the FK protocol and Alice updates her Pauli keys accordingly. This requires
some extra randomized single qudits sent from Alice to Bob so that the output is
encrypted with a uniform key.
6. Alice and Bob perform the logical operators that correspond to the desired
computation on the encoded by polynomial QECC state as described in the ABE
protocol. For each application of logical Toffoli gate, Bob sends measurement
results to Alice and Alice calculates the actual correction to be performed on the
state and sends it to Bob who performs it (see Figure 2.2). No new randomness is
introduced at this stage.
7. Bob measures the output qudits in the computational basis and returns the mea-
surement results to Alice.
8. Alice applies the detection and decoding procedure of the signed polynomial
QECC and sets a second indicator bit accordingly.
9. Alice accepts if both indicator bits of the FK and ABE protocol phase of the
protocol are set to accept, otherwise she rejects.
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Finally, we consider the resources. In the FK-ABE composite protocol the quan-
tum requirement for Alice is to prepare single qudit states of the form T ciSbiZai|+0〉,
for ai,bi,ci ←R Fd , where d is an odd prime. The dimension d of each system is
O(1/log(ε)). Alice has to send to Bob, at the beginning of the protocol before getting
the computation description, O(nPolylog(1
ε
)) separable single qudit states, where n is
the size of the computation. After, Alice and Bob have to exchange only classical infor-
mation in O(nPolylog(1
ε
)) rounds, where each round includes a constant size message
sent from Bob to Alice and a constant size message from Alice to Bob.
The proof is similar to the proof of the localising protocol, modified for d-level
systems, except some notable differences:
• We analyse all the separate runs of FK (for the encoding of each ABE state) as
one run of FK on a graph that is partitioned into identical sub-graphs and we
prove that even if this structure is known to Bob, we get the same bound for
verifiability, which depends on the FT encoding parameters and graph properties
of a sub-graph.
• Since Bob has to perform an extra MBQC pattern to decode of the FT code used
in the FK phase, Alice will provide him an extra system of |+0〉’s rotated by a
random generalized Pauli Z, a rotation which is used in the proof to reduce the
attack on this extra system to a Pauli attack. Intuitively, these extra rotations are
effectively one-time-padding the state even after the decoding operations with an
independent pad on each qudit.
• In the ABE phase Alice has to provide to Bob a system of corrections for the
implementation of the Toffoli gates. We reduce this system to the maximally
mixed state, thus effectively providing no extra information of Bob (and again
reducing the attack on this system to a Pauli attack).
• Since the detection procedure of the ABE phase is contractive (it is a CPTP-map)
it cannot increase the failure probability of the first phase. Moreover, Alice has
a second indicator bit to detect any Pauli attack that comes from the first or
the second phase of the protocol applying on the correct encoded state by the
randomized polynomial code.
Proof. Single index notation is followed to enumerate the qubits participating in the
graph G(4) where N is the total number of qudits and the last n′ qudits are the encoded
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output qudits (system O′ consisting of the qudits of the output layer of all the gadgets
of all the sub-graphs).
Extra notation has to be introduced first. Vector ν is used to represent all random
secret parameters, except the random sign key, chosen by Alice throughout the execution
of protocol, including r = {ri} (there are also O(n′) extra r’s used to encrypt the qudits
sent for the decoding of the FK QECC), θ = {θi}, d = {di} and positions of traps
t = {ti}. Parameter p(ν) gives the probability of a particular choice of random secret
parameters. Summing over a vector (e.g. ∑r) means that we sum over all possible
choices for the elements of that vector (e.g. all possible dit-strings of size N+O(n′) for
r).
For convenience we denote the subsystems of the joint Alice-Bob system:
• System M is the union of all the non-dummy, non-trap qudits of G′′’s (therefore
includes all the necessary bridge qudits introduced when embedding G′ in G′′)
and the non-dummy qudits of the first layers of each gadget (the ones that are
used to teleport the state to the fixed position in the final layer of the gadget)
introduced when embedding G′′ into G′′′. Therefore M contains all the qudits of
the graph state G(4) that are measured and participate in the computation. We call
them measured computational qudits.
• System D contains all dummy qudits of G(4).
• System T contains all trap qudits of G(4) (here all of them are measured by Bob).
• System O′ is the encoded output system at fixed position in G(4). These are all the
qudits of the last layer of each gadget (the ones that are not measured by Bob).
• System ∆ is the system of the measurement angles send by Alice to Bob, where
each angle is represented by three qudits in the computational basis.
• System B is Bob’s private system, assumed to be initially in the blank state.
• System MA of auxiliary decoding qudits.
• System L contains all the corrections send from Alice to Bob during the ABE
phase.
Each measurement performed at Step 6d of the FK protocol component is analysed
into a unitary part and a generalized Pauli Z measurement. Without loss of generality
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we can represent any dishonest behaviour of Bob at any step as applying the correct
unitary operators and then an arbitrary unitary attack operator.
For any run of Protocol 6, for any choice of Alice’s input computation (therefore for
any choice of sign keys used in the ABE protocol phase), the output that Alice has at
the end of the protocol before applying the ABE detection procedure, averaged over all
random parameters except the sign key and for all measurement outcomes (b in graph
G(4)+decoding and b̃ in the ABE phase) with the corresponding probabilities, is:




p(ν)C′′(|b〉〈b|⊗ |b̃〉〈b̃|UC (D(FN−n′RN−n′(.) . . .
F1R1(.)EG(|M〉〈M|⊗ |δ〉〈δ|)EGR1(.)†F†1 . . .RN−n′(.)
†F†N−n′⊗|0〉〈0|
⊗B
⊗|MA〉〈MA|)D†⊗ |̃r〉〈̃r|)C †U†|b〉〈b|⊗ |b̃〉〈b̃|)C′′) (6.7)
where:
• Ri(δi) corresponds the diagonal generalized Clifford operation T ciSbiZai con-
trolled by the state of vector δi.




ri|+〉 is the auxiliary system sent from Alice to Bob for the
implementation of the decoding/detection procedure by means of a unitary D.
These are qubits chosen are random from the qudit Hadamard basis (mixed state
from Bob’s perspective) and Alice needs to update the Pauli key of the final
decoded output accordingly by using the commutation relations of Pauli operators
with the Clifford circuit D .
• D is the Clifford unitary used to decode the output O′ of the FK protocol phase
which is encoded by the QECC used by the FK protocol. The decoding is applied
by Bob (as opposed to Alice in the case of normal FK) and let the decoded state
be contained in system O which is a subsystem of systems O′ and the system of
qudits |MA〉.
• |b̃〉〈b̃| implement the measurements for the Toffoli gates at the ABE protocol
phase and apply on some of the qubits of system O (see Figure 2.2), which
depicts the implementation of Toffoli gate with Toffoli state, Clifford operators
and Pauli Z measurements and the corrections, which have to be performed by
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Bob depending on his communication with Alice, are the Clifford operators in
the dashed boxes).
• r̃(r, b̃) is the classical bit string (system L) that Alice sends to Bob for the
corrections of the Toffoli part of the ABE protocol.
• C (̃r) is the Clifford part of the ABE protocol phase that implements the public
polynomial-QECC logical circuit on system O.
• C′′(r,b) contains the Pauli correction C′′O′,MA that Alice performs to the final
returned system, that takes into account the updates of the keys due to the appli-
cation of circuits D and C . C′′ also contains the corrections to trap measurement
results.
• U represents global Bob’s attack that in this case applies also to system of qudits
|MA〉 and system L .
Alice’s output can be rewritten, by decomposing the attack to the Pauli basis, tracing
out system B and applying the honest computation on system T to separate it, as:









′〉〈b′|⊗ |b̃〉〈b̃|Pu|i:∀ j,i 6=t j




|bti + rti〉〈bti|Pu|ti|rti〉〈rti|Pu′|ti|bti〉〈bti + rti|))(6.8)
where
• ak,u,v are complex numbers, with ∑k,u,v |ak,u,v|2 = 1.
• Pu (and Pu′) ranges over all tensor products of d-level Pauli+identity operators
and applies on the system that is trapified (all G′′’s).
• Pv (and Pv′) ranges over all tensor products of d-level Pauli+identity operators
and applies on the system that is not trapified (gadget systems ×MA×∆×L).
• Pu|i is the i-th generalized tensor element of Pu (similarly for Pv).
• b′ is the vector that is generated from b by removing elements {bti}.
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The next step will be to eliminate all terms where u 6= u′ and v 6= v′. We notice that
we can extract a random logical Pauli Zr
′
1⊗Zr′2⊗Zr′3 from state |000〉 that is used to





in all systems except system L . Then, summing over (r′1,r′2,r′3) gives the maximally
mixed state for system L and thus taking the trace of it cancels all cross terms of the
corresponding attack. However, the dependence on r̃ remains on C .
For the system of auxiliary decoding qudits |MA〉, random rotations Zri can be used
to twirl the attacks on this system.
The rest of the arguments for the elimination of the cross attack terms follow the
corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 2. We only need to notice that when the r’s
in the measurement angles commute with D and C they cancel the dependence of C on
r’s and they can be used to twirl the attack on the output.


















• |M(4)〉 is the tensor product of |+0〉 for all qudits of system M ×O′.
• P (3) is the unitary that contains E ′G for M ×O′ and FiRi(φ′i(b f−1(i),b f−1( j ∼
i, j 6= f (i))) operators for all qudits of system M .
• |M′A〉 is the tensor product of |+0〉 for all qudits of system of auxiliary qudits used
in the decoding procedure.
• C ′(b̃) is the Clifford part of the ABE protocol phase that implements the public
polynomial-QECC logical circuit on system O and depends only on the measure-
ment outcomes b̃ of the ABE phase.
• C(3)O′ are the corrections on the output of the ABE protocol phase (after eliminating
the r’s) and depend on b′ and b̃.
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Restricting the summation to u ∈ S1 where S1 is the set of tensor products of d-level
Pauli+identity operators that when we map to the operator with maximum independently
detectable errors for the whole graph G(4) contain ≤ p1 tensor elements which have
a generalized Pauli X component when written in the X iZ j decomposition (where
p1 is the number of independent detectable errors of the code used in the FK phase)
and applying the same steps as in the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 2
(observing that the gadget again is a Clifford MBQC and thus we can rewrite the attack




























The fact that the graph is partitioned into sub-graphs, to encode the different logical
states to be used in the ABE protocol phase does not change the above statement
because a global attack with footprint ≤ p1 will necessarily have footprint ≤ p1 in each
sub-graph. We can also eliminate C(3)O′ by commuting with the Pauli attack operators.







• Pi (Pj) range over all tensor products of d-level Pauli+identity operators on the
final returned system.
• p′i , p′′i are probabilities with ∑i(p′i + p′′i ) = ∑k,u∈S1,v |ak,u,v|
2 .
• |ACC1〉〈ACC1| is the state where all trap qubits are |0〉〈0| and |REJ1〉〈REJ1|
denotes any state that at least one trap is |1〉〈1|.
• |ψ′c〉〈ψ′c| is the state, encoded by the signed polynomial QECC, after the correct
computation of the ABE protocol phase is performed and undoing the Pauli key.
The rest of the terms of the summation in the state ρout ( u ∈ S2 ) are considered.
Let P⊥ be the projection to the orthogonal space to the correct output state:
P⊥ = I−|ψ′c〉〈ψ′c| (6.12)
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We calculate the ‘bad’ probability pbad the state collapses to the ‘incorrect’ subspace






























The rest is the same to the corresponding part in the proof of Theorem 2 (having a
d-level system does not affect the result in the case of no output traps, as it is the case
here) giving the final state:
σ2 ≈√(1−c′)p1 p1|ψ
′
c〉〈ψ′c|⊗ |ACC1〉〈ACC1|+ p2ρ⊗|REJ1〉〈REJ1| (6.15)
where p1 + p2 = ∑k,u∈S2,v |ak,u,v|
2 and ρ is a density matrix.
By summing the states σ1 and σ2 and by contractivity of the ABE protocol detection
procedure that Alice applies to check if the state is in the valid space of the signed
polynomial QECC, Theorem 4 is satisfied with ε1 =
√
(1− c′)p1 and ε2 = (1/2)p2 .
6.2.2 Alternative Composition with Toffoli Inputs
An alternative version of the composite protocol could be considered if we modify the
restrictions imposed on the verifier. In particular the verifier must be a preparation-
only device (as before) that can generate single qudit states UE |+0〉 and encrypted
generalized Toffoli states of the form UE,1⊗UE,2⊗UE,3|Toffoli〉, where UE ,UE,i are
single qudit gates classically controlled by the random keys and will be given explicitly
later. This verifier is not yet capable of universal computation because she does not have
memory and quantum measurement capabilities. The important difference in using this
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verifier comes from the fact that the encoding phase, which prepares the verifiable states
on which the ABE Protocol applies on and has to be delegated to the prover, is now a
Clifford computation. The question is, do we still need the verifiable blind protocol
or the blind protocol in the preparation of the verifiable encoded states is enough to
get global verifiability. In the latter case we could simplify the graph, using a planar
graph used in the blind protocol such as the brickwork state. The intuitive reason that
this simplification might be possible is that in the case of the Clifford circuit, any Pauli
attack at any time step of the computation can be written as a Pauli attack on the output
of the computation, which is one the requirements for the protocol to work.
Unfortunately, there is a reason why this simplification does not work. When we
rewrite the Pauli attacks before any measurement as Pauli attacks on the quantum
output, the correction operators will depend in general on the underlying computation.
In the case of the composite protocol this computation is different for any choice of the
random sign key, therefore the attack at the output will, in general, depend on the secret
and verification of it is not possible.
We give the description of the protocol in Protocol 7, and a proof that this protocol
is correct and verifiable. The benefit of this protocol is that the MBQC part of the
delegated computation is Clifford and therefore can be run in one round. The Toffoli-
depth of the overall delegated computation gives us the total communication round
complexity. Toffoli-depth represents the depth of our computation in the circuit model
if we count only the Toffoli gates. Similarly, the more usual T -depth represents the
depth of the T or π/8 gates in the circuit representation.
Other directions to simplify the original composite protocol might take into con-
sideration the fact that the preparation of the verifiable states is a known computation
(varies only for the choices of the random key), therefore there might be a more efficient
way of placing the traps, simplifying the underlying graph used.
Theorem 5. Protocol 7 is ε-verifiable. The round complexity of Protocol 7 is the Toffoli-
depth n′ of the delegated computation which corresponds to cn′ T -gate depth, for some
small constant c.
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Protocol 7 Composite Verifiable Quantum Computation with Toffoli inputs
Alice’s input. Description of a computation in the Gate Teleportation model based
on generalized Toffoli states. The input is set to be the Fourier basis state of n qudits:
|+0〉⊗n, where |+0〉 = 1√d ∑a |a〉. The total number of gates is denoted by t and the
number of Toffoli gates within them is t ′. Protocol can be extended to admit arbitrary
quantum input using the same methods as in the FK protocol.
Alice’s output. The result of measurement of the quantum output of the circuit and a
bit indicating if the result is accepted or not.
The protocol
1. Alice chooses a single random sign key (of size equal to the size of a codeword)
that will be used to encode all inputs (including Toffoli states) according to the
signed-polynomial QECC.
2. Alice has to prepare a number of generalized Toffoli states, equal to the number
of Toffoli gates of the circuit and apply the following operation on them:
XxiZ(θi)⊗Xxi+1Z(θi+1)⊗Xxi+2Z(θi+2)|Toffoli〉 (6.16)
where xi,xi+1,xi+2←R {0,1}3 and i = [1,3t ′]. Also Alice adapts the computation
so that she corrects for the X pad, by adjusting for each i the measurement angle
of the first layer qudit to (−1)xiφ and of the second layer qudit to φ+ xiπ.
3. Alice prepares for the delegation of the encoding of both the inputs and the Toffoli
states. The encoding will be according to the ABE protocol QECC randomized
by the selected sign key. For each encoded state she selects a separate graph state
that is a dotted-complete state.
4. Bob (interacting with Alice) encodes all inputs (including Toffoli states) by
executing d-level VUBQC with localizing gadget. The output of Bob is encoded
only by the final quantum one time pad, which depends on the secret parameters
of the FK protocol and will referred to as the Pauli key.
5. Bob applies the Clifford circuit for decoding the QECC used for amplification of
the FK protocol and Alice updates her Pauli keys accordingly.
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Protocol 7 Cont’d
6. Alice and Bob perform the logical operators that correspond to the desired
computation on the encoded by polynomial QECC state as described in the ABE
protocol. For each application of logical Toffoli gate, Bob sends measurement
results to Alice and Alice calculates the actual correction to be performed on the
state and sends it to Bob who performs it.
7. Bob measures the output qudits in the computational basis and returns the mea-
surement results to Alice.
8. Alice applies the detection and decoding procedure of the signed polynomial
QECC and sets a second indicator bit accordingly.
9. Alice accepts if both indicator bits of the FK and ABE protocol phase of the
protocol are set to accept, otherwise she rejects.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5 follows the same steps of the proof of Theorem 4 with
the only difference being that some of the inputs for the FK phase sent from Alice to
Bob are encrypted generalized Toffoli states (as opposed to single qudit rotated states).
In particular the set of random parameters ν now includes extra random parameters
{xi} for i = [1,3t ′] used for the Pauli X random rotation of the Toffoli inputs. The total
quantum state |M〉〈M| sent by Alice to Bob will include the system of t ′ encrypted
Toffoli states. Finally, the measurement angles of system ∆ need to be modified so that
the first two layers of computation cancel the Pauli X rotation, and therefore ∆ depends
also on {xi}.
All the steps of the proof will be the same except the twirling of the input Toffoli
qudits which consumes the parameters {xi}. Therefore, when we want to cancel the
cross attack terms (u 6= u′) in the computational graph and in particular:
Qubit i ∈ I and part of a Toffoli state: We assume that E ′′G does not contain entangling
operators between the input qubits (e.g. brickwork graph). We can extract Xxi from
|M(4)〉 (〈M(4)|), having the remaining state represented by |M(5)〉 (〈M(5)|). Commuting,
on both sides, Xxi with E ′′G will give a Z
xi correction on qudit f (i) which will undo the
pre-existing xiπ correction on measurement angle φ f (i) of the f (i) system. On system i
again, commuting Xxi with Ri((−1)xiφi) (due to the pre-existing correction) will undo
the (−1)xi correction and then commuting with Hi will change it to Zxi . Now the only
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dependence on xi is on the random Z element we have commuted to the point before
the attack.








j∼ f (i), j 6=i for r
′
i ←R {0,1} from graph state E ′′G|M(5)〉 and
at the same time changing variable b̂i ← bi + r′i everywhere. The new terms cancel














i |bi〉= 0 if Pu|i 6= Pu′|i (6.17)
The rest is exactly the same (except for replacing all |M(4)〉 by |M(5)〉) as in the
proof of Theorem 4.
6.3 Noise and Abstract Security
Real implementations of any verification protocol should take into account the effect
of noise. We emphasise, once more, that the fault tolerance discussed so far in all
the trap-based protocols is not used to tackle the noise but to amplify the verification
probability, by forcing the adversary to attack more physical qub(d)its. But the noise
will be present in any implementation, in the form of a noisy quantum preparation
device of the verifier, a noisy quantum channel between the verifier and the prover and
the errors that are introduced by the prover’s devices at each step of the computation
(entangling, measurement). This will have an effect in both the correctness and the
verifiability probability of the protocol.
The existence of noise necessitates the use of an extra layer of fault tolerance in the
execution of the protocol. This can be achieved in the same way fault tolerance was
implemented for probability amplification and described in Section 3.1.1; a topological
code and an extra correction step after each T gate to deal with the adaptive measure-
ments. An alternative method to perform blindly the adaptive Z measurements can be
found in [Morimae and Fujii, 2012] where the authors use a modified - decorated by
extra vertices - RHG lattice on prover’s side. Note that in all cases the verifier is the
party who does the classical processing for the error correction, by using the prover’s
measurement results. In [Chien et al., 2013] the authors consider the capability of being
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able to correct the errors on qubits during transmission from verifier to prover (e.g.
useful when many repeaters mediate the transmission). This is achieved by having
the verifier use the Steane code to prepare the logical |+θ〉L states and the prover to
apply the corresponding logical circuit ∗. Note that these fault tolerant implementations
are provided for the blind-only protocols, but can be readily adapted for verification
protocols, up to the following implication discussed in [Gheorghiu et al., 2015].
Errors will inevitably affect the traps which are single qubits; this can be counter-
acted by two techniques, one can allow some threshold of acceptance of erroneous trap
measurements and therefore boost correctness of the protocol (but deteriorate verifiabil-
ity). A second technique will be to encode both the computation, the dummy qubits and
the traps (therefore the whole of the dotted-complete state) using the same topological
code and consequently boost both correctness and verifiability. These techniques can be
used in our composite protocol, in particular for the FK part of it. For the ABE part we
can use the fault tolerant implementation proposed for it in the original paper: the prover
adds his own encoding on the received states together with purification techniques that
assume extra classical communication complexity.
A crucial property of any security protocol is to be able to use it in a larger context
(e.g. in conjunction with other security protocols) and still trust its security properties
will remain intact. In this thesis we provided one such composition, in the form of the
Composite Verification protocol, and shown how the composite protocols retain their
properties. A more systematic way of dealing with the issue of composability is studied
in the context of abstract cryptography (AC) [Dunjko et al., 2014]. To demonstrate the
need of such a construction, imagine that at the end of the protocol prover learns whether
verifier has accepted or rejected the final output. Then, if the verification procedure
depends on the input, learning the indicator bit might reveal something about the input,
thus break the blindness property of the protocol. In [Dunjko et al., 2014] the notion of
independent verifiability is defined, which requires the ability to find a CPTP map for
the prover that can generate a state where, if we trace out verifier’s private system, this
state is ε-close to a state where the prover has learned the indicator bit. Therefore, if
prover can produce the indicator bit himself, clearly learning it does not add anything
new to his knowledge. Some protocols, such as FK, have been demonstrated to satisfy
this stronger notion of verifiability. Also, in [Dunjko et al., 2014] it is proven that if a
protocol is blind and independent verifiable, then it is (composable) blind-verifiable.
∗An alternative version assigns the task of preparing the logical qubits to prover who sends 8 of them
to verifier who has to chose one at random and send it back to prover, thus having a simpler verifier
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An alternative, but equivalent in power, composability framework is Universal
Composability (UC), introduced by [Unruh, 2010]. The QAS-based protocols are
proven to be composable [Broadbent et al., 2012] according to the UC framework.
Since all the protocols we use in our construction are proven to be composable in one
framework or the other, we believe that the same should hold for the composite protocol,







The physical realisation of quantum information processing requires the fulfilment of
the five criteria collated by DiVincenzo [DiVincenzo, 2000]. While enormous progress
had been made in realising them since, we are still some way from constructing a
universal quantum computer. This raises the question whether quantum advantages in
computation are possible without fulfilling one or more of DiVincenzo’s criteria. From
a more foundational perspective, the computational power of the intermediate models of
quantum computation are of great value and interest in understanding the computational
complexity of physical systems. Several such models are known, including fermionic
quantum computation [Bravyi and Kitaev, 2002], instantaneous quantum computation
[Bremner et al., 2010], permutational quantum computation [Jordan, 2010], and boson
sampling [Aaronson and Arkhipov, 2011].
These models of quantum intermediate computation are considered easier to imple-
ment, yet their verification problem has not attracted much attention. In approaches
such as [Aaronson and Arkhipov, 2014] or [Shepherd and Bremner, 2009], the issue
of distinguishing between the output of a boson sampling device or an instantaneous
quantum computer and a classical device has been tackled. In this thesis, however, we
are interested in verifying that the output produced by the device is the correct output.
As it was the case with the universal quantum computer, there exist some problems
solvable by quantum intermediate computers that are believed to be outside NP, and
therefore not efficiently verifiable using a witness. On the other hand, the correctness of
the output of Shor’s factoring algorithm [Shor, 1997] can be checked efficiently on a
classical machine. In this part of the thesis we consider a verifier close to classical and a
prover able to solve all problems in a quantum intermediate model A. We will therefore
employ general techniques to verify the result of any problem belonging in this class A.
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One of the earliest restricted models of quantum computation was proposed by Knill
and Laflamme, named ‘Deterministic Quantum Computation with One quantum bit
(DQC1)’, also referred to as the one pure qubit model [Knill and Laflamme, 1998]. It
addresses the challenge of DiVincenzo’s first criterion, that of preparing a pure quantum
input state, usually the state of n separate qubits in the computational basis state zero.
Instead, in the DQC1 model, only one qubit is prepared in a pure state (computational
basis zero state) and the rest of the input qubits exist in the maximally mixed state. This
model corresponds to a noisier, more feasible experimental setting and was initially
motivated by liquid-state NMR proposals for quantum computing. The DQC1 model
was shown to be capable of estimating the coefficients of the Pauli operator expansion
efficiently. Following this, Shepherd defined the complexity class ‘Bounded-error
Quantum 1-pure-qubit Polynomial-time (BQ1P)’, to capture the power of the DQC1
model [Shepherd, 2006], and proved that a special case of Pauli operator expansion, the
problem of estimating the normalised trace of a unitary matrix to be complete for this
class. This problem, and others that can be reduced to it, such as the estimation of the
value of the Jones polynomial, is interesting from a complexity theoretical point of view
since it has no known efficient classical algorithm. Moreover, they are not known to
belong to the class NP, therefore the problem of verifying the correctness of the result is
non-trivial. The estimation of fidelity decay in chaos, the estimation of the value of the
Jones and other knot-invariant polynomial at the fifth root of unity for the trace closure
of knots, partition functions of spin models, enumeration of quadratically signed weight
enumerators and other interesting problems can be reduced to the estimation of the
normalised trace of a unitary matrix. For more on such connections, see Ref. [Datta
and Shaji, 2011].
The approach of the Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computing [Fitzsimons
and Kashefi, 2012], already presented in this thesis, is based on a blind protocol where
the verifier is able to prepare single qubits. In this part, we take the same approach
towards verification by first adapting this existing protocol for blind computing to
the DQC1 model. Thus, the first goal is to define what it means to have a DQC1
computation in the MBQC setting. Fixing the input state to almost maximally mixed as
it is done in the circuit picture of the DQC1 model does not suffice since the required
auxiliary qubits for MBQC could potentially increase the number of pure qubits in the
system by more than a logarithmic amount ∗. This adaptation is necessary as currently
∗Increasing the number of pure qubits in the input to the order of logarithmic in the size of the
computation is shown not to add extra power to the one pure qubit complexity class [Shepherd, 2006].
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all the optimal schemes [Aharonov et al., 2010, Broadbent et al., 2009, Dunjko et al.,
2012, Morimae et al., 2015, Barz et al., 2012, Morimae and Fujii, 2012, Morimae, 2012,
Morimae and Fujii, 2013, Sueki et al., 2013, Mantri et al., 2013, Giovannetti et al.,
2013] for the blind computation exploit the possibility of adaptive computation based
on the measurement, a freedom not allowed in the original DQC1 model. The main
results presented in this Part are the following:
• We introduce a new definition of DQC1 computation within the MBQC frame-
work, called the DQC1-MBQC model †, which captures the essential property of
its original definition in the circuit model. Moreover, we show that the original
definition of complexity class BQ1P is contained in DQC1-MBQC, where the
latter is able to capture the process where new qubits are introduced or traced out
during the execution of the computation.
• We provide a sufficient condition for a graph state (underlying resource for an
MBQC computation [Hein et al., 2004]) to be usable within DQC1-MBQC. A
direct consequence of this is that the universal blind protocol, which satisfies
this condition, can be directly adapted to the setting where the server is a DQC1-
MBQC machine and the client is able to send one single qubits at a time.
• Building on the blind protocol and adapting the methods presented in [Fitzsimons
and Kashefi, 2012] (FK protocol), a verification protocol for the class DQC1-
MBQC is given, where the probability of the client being forced to accept an
incorrect result can be adjusted by setting the security parameter of the model.
Since the FK protocol does not satisfy the sufficient condition and hence not
runnable in the DQC1-MBQC, an alternative method is presented which also
leads to different complexity results.
7.1 Preliminaries
We define the class BQ1P formally as introduced by Shepherd [Shepherd, 2006], so
that we can later recast it into the MBQC framework.
Definition 11 (Bounded-error Quantum 1-pure-qubit Polynomial-time complexity class
). [Shepherd, 2006] BQ1P is defined using a bounded-error uniform family of quantum
†We use a different acronym than DQC1 to emphasis the structural distinction with the standard
DQC1 model.
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circuits – DQC1. A DQC1 circuit takes as input a classical string x, of size n, which
encodes a fixed choice of unitary operators applied on a standard input state |0〉〈0|⊗
Iw−1/2w−1. The width of the circuit w is polynomially bounded in n. Let Qn(x) be the
result of measuring the first qubit of the final state of a DQC1 circuit. A language in
BQ1P is defined by the following rule:













for some polynomially bounded q(n).
In the same paper a problem named Trace Estimation is given and proven to be
complete for this class (under classical logspace reductions). Trace Estimation it is a
decision problem which takes as input a unitary in a polynomial-size description in
the form of a circuit. Given the promise that the real part of the trace of a unitary is
polynomially bounded away from zero we need to decide whether the sign of the real
part of the trace of the matrix is positive. There is yet no known efficient classical
algorithm to solve this problem, which makes the one-pure-qubit computer a candidate
to demonstrate quantum supremacy.
7.2 Main Results
An essential physical property of DQC1 that we mean to preserve in DQC1-MBQC is
its limited purity. To capture this we introduce the purity parameter:
π(ρ) = log2 (Tr(ρ
2))+d, (7.3)
where d is the logarithm of the dimension of the state ρ. For a DQC1 circuit with k
pure qubits, at each state of the computation the value of purity parameter π for that
state remains constant equal to k. In fact, Shepherd showed that the class BQ1P is
not extended by increasing the number of pure input qubits logarithmically. Thus, a
purity that does not scale too rapidly with the problem size still remains in the same
complexity class.
A characterisation of MBQC patterns compatible with the idea of the DQC1 model
as introduced above is presented next. Any MBQC pattern is called DQC1-MBQC
when there exists a runnable rewriting of this pattern such that after every elementary
operation (for any possible branching of the pattern) the purity parameter π does not
7.2. Main Results 129
increase over a fixed constant. We assume that the system at the beginning has only the
input state and at the end has only the output state.
We define a new complexity class that captures the idea of one pure qubit computa-
tion in the MBQC model. This complexity class, that we name DQC1-MBQC, can be
based on any universal DQC1-MBQC resource pattern, which is defined analogously
to the DQC1 circuits [Shepherd, 2006] as a pattern that can be adapted to execute any
DQC1-MBQC pattern of polynomial size. A particular example of such a resource,
as we will present later, can be built using the brickwork state of [Broadbent et al.,
2009] designed for the purpose of universal blind quantum computing. The input to
a universal pattern is the description of a computation as a measurement angle vector
and is used to classically control the measurements of the MBQC pattern. The quantum
input of the open graph is always fixed to a state that has a constant number of pure
qubits and the rest of the state is the maximally mixed state, in correspondence to the
DQC1 model.
Definition 12. A language in DQC1-MBQC complexity class is defined based on a
universal DQC1-MBQC resource pattern Pα that takes as input an angle vector α of
size n and is applied on the quantum state |+〉〈+|⊗ Iw−1/2w−1, w ∈ O(n). A word α
belongs to the language depending of the probabilities of the measurement outcome
(Rn(α)) of the first output qubit of pattern Pα which are defined identically to Definition
11:













for some polynomially bounded r(n).
Corollary 2. BQ1P ⊆ DQC1-MQBC.
Proof. Any circuit description using a fixed set of gates can be efficiently translated
into a measurement pattern applicable on the brickwork state. A specific example
of translating each gate from the universal set {Hadamard, π/8, c-NOT} to a ‘brick’
element of the brickwork state is given in [Broadbent et al., 2009]. The quantum
input state in the resulting measurement pattern is in the almost-maximally-mixed state,
therefore the pattern is a valid DQC1-MBQC pattern.
Definition 13. An MBQC pattern is a DQC1-MBQC pattern if there is a runnable
sequence of commands where for every elementary command and measurement outcome,
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there exists a fixed constant value c such that the overall quantum state of the system
(ρi with dimension di) after the ith operation satisfies the following relation
π(ρi)< π(ρin)+ c, (7.6)
where ρin is the quantum input of the pattern with dimension din, which is fixed to be
the product of cin (constant) pure qubits in state |+〉 and a maximally mixed state of
din− cin qubits.
The above definition captures the essence of DQC1 in that it maintains a low purity,
high entropy state in MBQC, in contrast to DiVincenzo’s first criterion. Regarding
implementation, the difference from the original DQC1 is that in DQC1-MBQC you
need to be able to inject or trace out qubits during the execution of the computation. We
derive a sufficient condition (that is also constructive) for the open graph state leading to
DQC1-MBQC, capturing the universal blind quantum computing protocol as a special
case. However, a general characterisation and further structural link with determinism
in MBQC [Danos and Kashefi, 2006, Browne et al., 2007, Mhalla et al., 2014] is left as
an open question for future work.
Theorem 10. Any measurement pattern on an open graph state (G, I,O) with flow
( f ,) (as defined in Definition 2) and measurement angles α where either |I|= |O| or
the flow function is surjective and all auxiliary preparations are on the (X−Y ) plane
represents a DQC1-MBQC pattern.
The full details and the proof of this theorem is provided in Section 8.1.
A direct consequence of Theorem 10 is that the Universal Blind Computing Protocol
(UBQC) introduced in [Broadbent et al., 2009] can be easily adapted to fit within the
DQC1-MBQC class, since it is based on an MBQC pattern on a graph state with
surjective flow.
In the blind cryptographic setting a client (Alice) wants to delegate the execution
of an MBQC pattern to a more powerful server (Bob) and hide the information at the
same time. The UBQC protocol is based on the separation of the classical and quantum
operations when running an MBQC pattern. The client prepares some randomly rotated
quantum states and sends them to the server and from this point on the server executes
the quantum operations on them (entangling according to the graph and measuring) and
the client calculates the measurement angles for the server and corrects the measurement
outcomes she receives (to undo the randomness and get the correct result).
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To define blindness formally (see Definition 6) we allow Bob to deviate from the
normal execution in any possible way, and this is captured by modelling his behaviour
during the protocol by an arbitrary CPTP map. The main requirement for blindness is
that for any input and averaged over all possible choices of parameters by Alice, Bob’s
final state can always be written as a fixed CPTP map applied on his initial state, thus
not offering any new knowledge to him.
To adapt the original UBQC protocol into the DQC1-MBQC setting we change the
order of the operations so that the client does not send all the qubits to the server at the
beginning, but during the execution of the pattern, following a rewriting of the pattern
that is consistent with the purity requirement. The details are described in Section 8.1.1.
Alice is considered weak because, even though she can prepare a polynomial number of
pure qubits overall, she cannot store more than one pure qubit at any time, while Bob is
more powerful because he has also the capacity to perform unitary computation and
measurements.
Theorem 11. There exists a blind protocol for any DQC1-MBQC computation where
the client is restricted to BPP and the ability to prepare single qubits and the server is
within DQC1-MBQC.
In the verification cryptographic setting a client (Alice) wants to delegate a quantum
computation to a more powerful server (Bob) and accept if the result is correct or reject
if the result is incorrect (server is behaving dishonestly). The main idea of the original
protocol of [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] is to test Bob’s honesty by hiding a trap
qubit among the others in the resource state sent to him by Alice. Blindness means
that Bob cannot learn the position of the trap, nor its state. During the execution of
the pattern Bob is asked to measure this trap qubit and report the result to Alice. If
Bob is honest this measurement gives a deterministic result, which can be verified by
Alice. Bob being dishonest means that Alice will receive the wrong result with no-zero
probability. Depending on that result, Alice accepts or rejects the final output received
by Bob.
To define verifiability formally in the case of OPQ (building on Definition 7) we
need to establish an important difference with the original protocol [Fitzsimons and
Kashefi, 2012]: In a DQC1-MBQC pattern the quantum input is in a mixed state as
opposed to a pure state. Reverting to the original definition that was presented in
Section 1.2 we need to add an extra reference system R, that is used to purify the mixed
input that exists in Alice’s private system A. The assumption is that Bob does not learn
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anything about the reference system (ex. Alice is provided with the quantum input from
a third trusted party which also holds the purification). Bob is allowed to choose any
possible cheating strategy and our goal is to minimise the probability of Alice accepting
the incorrect output of the computation at the end of the protocol. Similarly to the
original definition:
Definition 14. A protocol for delegated computation is ε-verifiable (0≤ ε < 1) if for
any choice of Bob’s strategy j, it holds that for any input of Alice:
Tr(∑
ν
p(ν)PνincorrectB j(ν))≤ ε (7.7)
where B j(ν) is the state of Alice’s system A together with the purification system R at
the end of the run of the protocol, for choice of Alice’s random parameters ν and Bob’s
strategy j. If Bob is honest we denote this state by B0(ν). Let P⊥ be the projection onto






where |ηνct 〉 is a state that indicates if Alice accept or reject the result.
A verification protocol should also be correct, which means that in case Bob is
honest Alice’s state at the end of the run of the protocol is the correct output of the
computation and an extra qubit set in the accept state (this property is also referred to as
completeness).
In the FK protocol, in order to adjust the parameter ε to any arbitrary value between
0 and 1 (a technique called probability amplification), one needs to add polynomially
many trap qubits within the MBQC pattern. Specifically, adding polynomially many
traps and incorporating the pattern into a fault tolerance scheme that corrects d errors,
gives parameter ε exponentially small on d. Adding polynomially many traps, following
the same scheme as the FK protocol, creates a pattern that is not a DQC1-MBQC pattern.
This is because the trap positions need to be random and there is always a chance that
all the traps gather in the same layer of the MBQC computation (traps do not participate
in teleportation steps therefore do not preserve purity as we will see later). Therefore to
achieve an amplification of the error probability we need to develop a modified trapping
scheme.
In Section 8.2 we give a verification protocol for DQC1-MBQC problems where,
instead of running the pattern once, s computations of the same size are run in series,
one being the actual computation and the others being trap computations. A similar
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approach is also considered for the restricted setting of the photonic implementation
of the FK protocol [Barz et al., 2013] and a verification protocol of the entanglement
states [Pappa et al., 2012]. In our setting each trap computation contains an isolated
trap injected in a random position between the qubits of the pattern. We prove that in
this verification protocol the server is within DQC1-MBQC complexity class, while
the client is within BPP together with single qubit preparations (as in the original FK
protocol). Moreover in this verification protocol we achieve the goal of probability
amplification by choosing the appropriate value for parameter s.
Theorem 12. There exists a correct ε-verifiable protocol where the client is restricted
to BPP and the ability to prepare single qubits and the server is within DQC1-MBQC.






Therefore, in order to have constant failure probability ε one needs to run s = O(m)
trap+actual computations, meaning that the overall communication complexity will be
quadratic on the input size. This is worse than our linear complexity protocol of Chapter
6, but it comes as a result of not being able to keep a polynomial number of pure qubits




8.1 Secure Computation with Restricted Purity
In this section we give a constructive proof of our main theorem for DQC1-MBQC and
show how to construct a blind protocol as a consequence. The first step for proving
Theorem 10 is the following rewriting scheme for patterns with flow.
Lemma 9. Any measurement pattern on an open graph state (G, I,O) with flow ( f ,)
(as defined in Definition 2) and measurement angles a where either |I|= |O| or the flow























where Sxi = s f−1(i) for i ∈ Ic, else Sxi = 0 and S
z
i = ∑{k:k∈Ic,k∼i,i6= f−1(k)} s f−1(k) mod 2.









where EG and NIc represent the global entangling operator and global preparation
respectively.
Proof. First we need to prove that Pa is runnable (cf. Definition 1). For condition (R0)
we make the following observations: At step i, for i ∈ Ic, we need the result s f−1(i)
which is generated at step f−1(i), where f−1(i)≺ i from flow condition (F1). We also
need the results s f−1(k), for {k : k ∈ Ic,k ∼ i, i 6= f−1(k)}, which are generated at step
f−1(k), where f−1(k)≺ i from flow condition (F2). Thus, condition (R0) is satisfied
(see Figure 8.1 for a particular example). For condition (R1) we make the following
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observations: At step i, for i ∈ Oc, the entangling operator and measurement operator
act on qubit i which either belongs in the set of inputs I or is created at step f−1(i),
where f−1(i) ≺ i from flow condition (F1). Entangling operator acts also on qubits
{k : k∼ i,k i}. If k = f (i) then qubit k is created at the same step (i) by operator N f (i).
If k 6= f (i) then qubit k is either an input or it is created at step f−1(k), and we have
by flow condition (F2): i is a neighbour of k and i 6= f−1(k), thus f−1(k)≺ i (Figure
8.1). Final correction operators act on qubits that belong to the set of outputs O, which
either belong also to the set of inputs I or are created at steps { f−1(i) : i ∈ O}, where
∀i ∈ O \ I, f−1(i) ≺ i from flow condition (F1). In addition, they have not yet been
measured since i /∈ OC. Thus, condition (R1) is satisfied. It is easy to see that condition
(R2) is satisfied.
Figure 8.1: Qubit i gets an X correction from k2 and Z corrections from f−1(k2) and
f−1(k1). Qubits on the left of the dashed line are in the past of i. Qubit k1 is created at
timestep f−1(k1) which is before timestep i from flow condition (F2).
Next we prove that the pattern of Equation 8.1 is implementing the unitary operation
of Equation 8.2 when applied on an open graph with the properties described above.






















Each entangling operator commutes with all previous measurements since it is applied
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The above equation implements the unitary operation presented in the lemma (Equation
8.2) as proved in [Danos and Kashefi, 2006].
Next, we notice that there exist many universal families of open graph states sat-
isfying the requirements of the above lemma. One such example is the brickwork
graph state originally defined in [Broadbent et al., 2009] and already presented here
in Section 1.1.3. We remind the reader of its properties: In this graph state (Figure
1.3), the subset of vertices of the first column correspond to the input qubits I and
the subset of vertices of the final column correspond to the output qubits O. This
graph state has flow function f ((i, j)) = (i, j+1) and the following partial order for
measuring the qubits: {(1,1),(2,1), . . . ,(w,1)} ≺ {(1,2),(2,2), . . . ,(w,2)} ≺ . . . ≺
{(1,d− 1),(2,d− 1), . . . ,(w,d− 1)}, where w is the width and d is the depth of the
graph and hence from Lemma 9 we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Any computation over the brickwork open graph state G with qubit index
































where Sx(i, j) = s(i, j−1) for j > 1, else S
x
(i,1) = 0
and Sz(i, j) = ∑{k,l:(k,l)∼(i, j),l≤ j} s(k,l−1) mod 2 for j > 2, else S
z
(i, j) = 0.
We show that patterns defined in Lemma 9 are within the framework of Definition
13 hence obtaining a sufficient condition for DQC1-MBQC.
Lemma 10. Any measurement pattern that can be rewritten in the form of Equation 8.1
represents a DQC1-MBQC pattern.
Proof. A first general observation about the purity parameter π is that adding a new
pure qubit σ to state ρ means that π increases by unity
πρ⊗σ = log2 Tr((ρ⊗σ)2)+d +1 = log2 Tr(ρ2)Tr(σ2)+d +1 = πρ +1.
Additionally, applying any unitary U does not change the purity parameter π of the
system since Tr((UρU†)2) = Tr(ρ2) and dimension remains the same.
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Returning to Equation 8.1, we notice that for every step i ∈ Oc of the product the
total computation performed corresponds mathematically to the following: On the qubit
tagged with position i, a J(a′i) unitary gate is applied (where a
′
i is an angle that depends
on ai and previous measurement results) up to a specific Pauli correction (depending on
the known measurement result) and some specific Pauli corrections on its entangled
neighbours (again depending on the measurement result). At the end the qubit is tagged
with position f (i) (where f is the flow function). Since this mathematically equivalent
computation is a unitary and the dimension of the system remains the same (there is
only a change of position tags) we conclude that each step i ∈ Oc does not increase the
purity parameter of the system. To finish the proof, we need to ensure that the individual
operations within each step i ∈ Oc and for i ∈ O do not increase the purity parameter by
more than a constant (and since there is only a constant number of operations within
each step this does not increase the purity at any point more than constant). This is
true since all these operations apply on (or add or trace over) a constant number of
qubits.∗
From the above Theorem 10 follows directly.
8.1.1 Blind One-Pure-Qubit Computation
Building on this result, we can translate the UBQC protocol of [Broadbent et al.,
2009] (and in fact many other existing protocols) to allow the blind execution of any
DQC1-MBQC computation, where the server is restricted to DQC1-MBQC complexity
class. The UBQC protocol is based on the brickwork graph state described above.
Alice prepares all the qubits of the graph state, adding a random rotation around the
(X ,Y ) plane to each one of them: |+θi〉, where θi is chosen at random from the set
A = {0,π/4,π/2,3π/4,π,5π/5,3π/2,7π/4} and sends them to Bob, who entangles
them according to the graph. The protocol then follows the partial order given by the
flow: Alice calculates the corrected measurement angle α′i for each qubit using previous
measurement results according to the flow dependences. She sends to Bob measurement
angle δi = α′i +θi + riπ, using an extra random bit ri. Bob measures according to δi,
reports the result back to Alice who corrects it by XOR-ing with ri. In the case of
∗Assuming that the graph input has purity one, the purity parameter of the state of the system at
any point reaches a maximum of two, so DQC2-MBQC would have been a more accurate name for our
class. In terms of complexity this is not relevant since by [Shepherd, 2006] increasing the pure qubits
to logarithmic does not give more computational power. Two qubits seem necessary because MBQC is
based on teleportation using an auxiliary state.
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quantum output, the final layer is sent to Alice and is also corrected according to the
flow dependences by applying the corresponding Pauli operators.
Since the brickwork graph state satisfies the requirements of Theorem 10 we can
adapt the Universal Blind Quantum Computing protocol by making Alice and Bob
follow the order of Equation 8.3 and operate on input |+〉〈+|⊗ Iw−1/2w−1. A detailed
description is given in Protocol 8.
Theorem 13. Protocol 8 is correct.
Proof. Correctness comes from the fact that what Alice and Bob jointly compute is
mathematically equivalent to performing the pattern of Equation 8.3 on input |+〉〈+|⊗
Iw−1/2w−1. The argument is the same as in the original universal blind quantum
computing protocol [Broadbent et al., 2009] repeated here for completeness. Firstly,
since entangling operators commute with Rz operators, preparing the pure qubits in a
rotated state does not change the underlying graph state; only the phase of each qubit is
locally changed, and it is as if Bob had performed the Rz rotation after the entanglement.
Secondly, since a measurement in the |+a〉, |−a〉 basis on a state |φ〉 is the same as a
measurement in the |+a+θ〉, |−a+θ〉 basis on Rz(θ)|φ〉, and since δ = a′+ θ+πr , if
r = 0, Bob’s measurement has the same effect as Alice’s target measurement; if r = 1,
all Alice needs to do is flip the outcome.
Note that Protocol 8 can be trivially simplified by omitting all the measurements
that are applied on maximally mixed states (i.e. all measurements applied on qubits in
rows 2 to w from the beginning of the computation until each one is entangled with a
non-maximally mixed qubit). However, this does not give any substantial improvement
in the complexity of the protocol.
Theorem 14. Protocol 8 is blind.
(Proof Sketch). A detailed proof is provided in the next section. Intuitively, rotation by
angle θi, j serves the purpose of hiding the actual measurement angle, while rotation
by ri, jπ hides the result of measuring the quantum state. This proof is consistent with
definition of blindness based on the relation of Bob’s system to Alice’s system which
takes into account prior knowledge of the secret and is a good indicator that blindness
can be composable [Dunjko et al., 2014].
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Protocol 8 Blind BQ1P protocol
Alice’s input:
• A vector of angles a = (a1,1, . . . ,aw,d), where ai, j comes from the set A =
{0,π/4,2π/4, . . . ,7π/4}, that when plugged in the measurement pattern Pa of
Equation 8.3 applied on the brickwork state, implements the desired computation.
This computation is applied on a fixed input state |+〉〈+|⊗ Iw−1/2w−1.
Alice’s output:
• The top output qubit (qubit in position (1,d)).
The protocol
1. Alice picks a random angle θ1,1 ∈ A, prepares one pure qubit in state Rz(θ1,1)|+〉
and sends it to Bob who tags it as qubit (1,1).
2. Bob prepares the rest of input state (qubits (2,1), . . . ,(w,1)) in the maximally
mixed state Iw−1/2w−1.
3. Alice and Bob execute the rest of the computation in rounds. For j = 1 to d−1
and for i = 1 to w
(a) Alice’s preparation
i. Alice picks a random angle θi, j+1 ∈ A.
ii. Alice prepares one pure qubit in state Rz(θi, j+1)|+〉.
iii. Alice sends it to Bob. Bob tags it as qubit (i, j+1).
(b) Entanglement and measurement




ii. Bob performs the rest of the computation using classical help from
Alice:
A. Alice computes the corrected measurement angle a′i, j =
(−1)S
x
i, jai, j +Szi, jπ.
B. Alice chooses a random bit ri, j and computes δi, j = a′i, j + θi, j +
ri, jπ.
C. Alice transmits δi, j to Bob.
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Protocol 8 Cont’d
3. (b) ii. D. Bob performs operation Mδi, ji, j which measures and traces over the
qubit (i, j) and retrieves result bi, j.
E. Bob transmits bi, j to Alice.
F. Alice updates the result to si, j = bi, j + ri, j mod 2.
4. Bob sends to Alice the final layer of qubits, Alice performs the required correc-
tions and outputs the result.
Regarding the complexity of the protocol, Alice needs to pick a polynomially large
number of random bits and perform polynomially large number of modulo additions
that is to say Alice classical computation is restricted to the class BPP. Alice’s quantum
requirement is only to prepare single qubits, she has access to no quantum memory
or quantum operation. Therefore assuming BQ1P 6⊂ BPP suggests Alice’s quantum
power is more restricted than BQ1P and hence DQC1-MBQC. On the other hand, Bob
performs a pattern of the form given in Equation 8.3, with the difference that instead
of preparing the pure qubits himself, he receives the pure qubits through the quantum
channel that connects him with Alice. Also, the qubits are not prepared in state |+〉, but
in some state on the (X ,Y ) plane, but this doesn’t alter the reasoning in the complexity
proofs. Thus, Bob has computational power that is within the DQC1-MBQC complexity
class according to the Corollary 3 and Theorem 10.
8.1.2 Blindness Proof
In this proof of blindness for Protocol 8 we use techniques developed in [Dunjko, 2012].
The basic difference from the proof of [Dunjko, 2012] arises from the different order
in which Bob receives the states from Alice. Nevertheless, after commuting all CPTP
maps into a single operator at the end, the methodology for proving blindness is the
same as in the original proof. We give the full proof here for the sake of clarity.
To prove the property of blindness, we do not separate Alice’s system into a classical
and a quantum part but we consider the whole of Alice’s system as quantum. This is
a reasonable assumption since a classical system can be viewed as a special case of a
quantum system. Therefore, by proving blindness for the more general case we also
prove blindness for the special case.
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For the sake of clarity, we use single indexing for all the qubits of the resource state.
The total number of qubits is denoted by m and the number of qubits in a single column
of the brickwork state is denoted by n.
Our goal will be to explicitly write the state σB = TrA(σAB) that Bob holds at the
end of the execution of the protocol. To achieve this we express Bob’s behaviour at each
step i of the protocol as a collection of completely-positive trace-preserving (CPTP)
maps Ebii , each for every possible classical response bi from Bob to Alice.
At step 1 of the main loop of the protocol Bob has already been given the top
input qubit at position 1 (position (1,1) in the protocol notation) and the qubit at
position f (1) = 1+n (position (1,2) in the protocol notation) together with the angle
for measuring qubit 1 (angle can be represented as a quantum state composed of 3
qubits). State TrA(ρAB) represents Bob’s state before the protocol begins and can, in
general, be dependent on Alice’s secret measurement angles. The state of Bob averaged
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Note the all binary parameters in sums range over 0 and 1, ex. ∑b1 stands for ∑
1
b1=0
and all angles range over the 8 possible values in A.
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Notation b<m−n stands for all the elements of b with index less than m−n.
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Collecting all CPTP maps by commuting them with systems which they do not






















































































It is essential for the proof that each term with index i in the tensor products depends
only on parameters with index ≤ i. This allows to break the summations over r≤m−n
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This procedure will produce the state:







where E ′′ is some CPTP map. Therefore Definition 6 is satisfied.
8.2 Verification of One-Pure-Qubit
We remind the basic properties of the FK protocol. The FK protocol is based on
the ability to hide a trap qubit inside the graph state while not affecting the correct
execution of the pattern. Both the trap qubit and the qubits which participate in the
actual computation are prepared in the (X ,Y ) plane of the Bloch sphere. To keep
them disentangled, some qubits (called dummy) prepared in the computational basis
{|0〉, |1〉}, are injected between them. Being able to choose between the two states is
essential for blindness (Theorem 4 in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]). In particular, if a
dummy qubit is in state |0〉, applying the entangling operator cZ between this qubit and
a qubit prepared on the (X ,Y ) plane has no effect. If a dummy qubit is in state |1〉 then
applying cZ will introduce a Pauli Z rotation on the qubit prepared on the (X ,Y ) plane.
This effect can be cancelled by Alice in advance, by introducing a Pauli Z rotation on
all the neighbours of |1〉’s when preparing the initial state.
In the simplest version of the FK protocol, a single trap, prepared in state |+θt 〉,
where θ is chosen at random from the angles set A (defined above) and placed at
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position t, chosen at random between all the vertices of the open graph state (G, I,O).
During the execution of the pattern, if t /∈ O, Bob is asked to measure qubit t with angle
θt + rπ and return the classical result bt to Alice. If bt = rt Alice sets an indicator bit
to state acc (which means that this computation is accepted), otherwise she sets it to
re j (computation is rejected). If t ∈ O, Alice herself measures the trap qubit and sets
the indicator qubit accordingly. This version of the protocol is proven to be correct and
ε-verifiable, with ε = (m−1)/m, where m is the size of the computation.
A generalisation of this technique which allows for arbitrary selection of parameter
ε is also presented in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012]. By allowing for a polynomial
number of traps to be injected in the graph state and adapting the computation inside a
fault tolerant scheme with parameter d one can have ε inversely exponential to d. The
question is whether this amplification method can also be used to design a verification
protocol for DQC1-MBQC with arbitrary small ε. Unfortunately the underlying graph
state used by this protocol does not have flow and not all qubits are prepared in the
(X ,Y ) plane, so that one cannot apply Theorem 10 to get a compatible rewriting of
the pattern. Moreover, having the requirement that we should be able to place every
trap qubit (which is a pure qubit) at any position in the graph, means that there exist
patterns that will never be possible to be rewritten to satisfy the purity requirement.
This leads us to seek a different approach for probability amplification for verification
in the DQC1-MBQC model.
Instead of placing a polynomial number of isolated traps within the same graph,
which is also used to perform the actual computation, we utilise s isolated brickwork
subgraphs, one used for the computation and the rest being trap subgraphs (see Figure
8.2). Thus, at the beginning of the protocol, Alice chooses random parameter tg, which
denotes which graph will be the computational subgraph, and for each of the remaining
trap subgraphs i, she chooses a random position ti to hide one isolated trap. The rest
of each trap subgraph will be a trivial computation (all measurement angles set to 0)
on a totally mixed state, and a selected set of dummy qubits are placed to isolate this
computation from the trap. Computation subgraph and trap subgraphs are of the same
size, and by taking advantage of the blindness of the protocol, Bob cannot distinguish
between them. Therefore, to be able to cheat, he needs to deviate from the correct
operation only during the execution on the computational subgraph and never deviate
while operating on any of the traps. This gives the desirable ε parameter that will be
proved later. The full description of protocol is given in Protocol 9. Each isolated pattern
k is executed separately and according to the DCQ1-MBQC rewriting on the brickwork
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Figure 8.2: Let G′ be the graph which consists of s isolated brickwork graphs (each
denoted as G′i), each of the same dimensions required for the desired computation. An
example construction with s = 3 and one trap per graph together with a small brickwork
state for computation is given above. Black vertices correspond to auxiliary qubits
prepared on the (X−Y ) plane or mixed state when they are inputs (inside square), star
vertices correspond to trap qubits and white vertices to auxiliary qubits prepared in the
computational basis. Edges represent entangling operators, dashed where entangling
has no effect (except of local rotations).
state given in Equation 8.3 in the blind setting. Pre-rotations on the neighbours of
dummy qubits guarantee that the computation is not affected by the choice of dummies
as described before.
Protocol 9 Verifiable DQC1-MBQC protocol with s−1 trap computations
Alice’s input:
• An angle vector a = (a1,1, . . . ,aw,d−1), where ai, j comes from the set A =
{0,π/4,2π/4, . . . ,7π/4}, that, when plugged in the measurement pattern Pa of
Equation 8.3 on the brickwork open graph state G of dimension (w,d) and flow
( f ,), it implements the desired computation on fixed input |+〉〈+|⊗ Iw−1/2w−1.
Alice’s output:
• The top output qubit of G (qubit in position (1,d) in G) together with a 1-bit,
named acc, that indicates if the result is accepted or not.
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Protocol 9 (cont’d)
The protocol
• Preparation steps. Alice picks tg at random from {1, . . . ,s}. Let G′ be the
graph which consists of s isolated brickwork graphs, each of the dimension the
same as G. Then the tg-th isolated graph (named G′tg) will be the computational
subgraph for this run of the protocol.
• Alice maps the measurement angles of the computational subgraph G′tg to angles
of graph G: a′Gtg\Otg = a and appropriately set the dependency sets S
x and Sz for
all the vertices of G′tg (according to the standard flow), while for the rest of the
vertices (graph G′ \G′tg) the sets S
x and Sz are empty.
• For k = 1 to s except tg:
1. Alice chooses one random vertex tk = (tx, ty)k among all vertices of G′k for
placing the trap.
2. By G′k’s geometry, vertex (tx, ty) may be connected by a vertical edge to
vertex (t ′x, ty), where t
′
x represents either tx +1 or tx−1. We add in D (set of
dummies) all vertices of rows tx, t ′x (if it exists) of G
′
k, except the trap itself.
3. All elements of a′Gk are mapped to 0.
• Alice chooses random variables θG′\D, each uniformly at random from A.
• Alice chooses random variables rG′ and dD, each ∈R {0,1}.
• For k = 1 to s:
1. Initial step. If k = tg then: Let (1,1)k be the position of the top input qubit
in G′k. Alice prepares the following states and sends them to Bob:
{(1,1)k} |+θ(1,1)k 〉
∀(i,1)k /∈ {(1,1)k} I/2
Otherwise: Alice prepares the following states and sends them to Bob:
∀(i,1)k ∈ D |d(i,1)k〉
(i,1)k = tk ∏{m,l:(m,l)k∼(i,1)k,(m,l)k∈D}Z
d(m,l)k |+θ(i,1)k 〉
∀(i,1)k /∈ {D, tk} I/2
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Protocol 9 (cont’d)
2. Main Iteration. For j = 1 to d−1, for i = 1 to w:
(a) Alice’s preparation
i. Alice prepares one pure qubit in one of the following states, de-
pending on (i, j+1)k:
(i, j+1)k ∈ D |d(i, j+1)k〉
(i, j+1)k /∈ D ∏{m,l:(m,l)k∼(i, j+1)k,(m,l)k∈D}Z
d(m,l)k |+θ(i, j+1)k 〉
ii. Alice sends it to Bob. Bob labels it as qubit (i, j+1)k.
(b) Entanglement and measurement




ii. Bob performs the rest of the computation using classical help from
Alice:
A. Alice computes the corrected measurement angle a′′(i, j)k =
(−1)S
x








θ(i, j)k + r(i, j)kπ.
C. Alice transmits δ(i, j)k to Bob.
D. Bob performs operation M
δ(i, j)k
(i, j)k
which measures and traces over
the qubit (i, j)k and retrieves result b(i, j)k .
E. Bob transmits b(i, j)k to Alice.
F. Alice updates the result to s(i, j)k = b(i, j)k + r(i, j)k mod 2.
3. Bob sends the final layer to Alice and Alice applies the final corrections if
needed (only in round tg).
4. If the trap qubit is within the qubits received, Alice measures it with angle
δtk = θtk + rtkπ to obtain btk . Also, Alice discards all qubits received by Bob
in this round except qubit (1,d)tg .
• Alice outputs qubit in position (1,d)tg and sets bit acc to 1 if btk = rtk for all k.
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To prove the complexity of the protocol we need to notice that although the graph
used satisfies the conditions of Theorem 10, the existence of the dummy qubits prepared
in the computational basis creates the need of a new proof.
Theorem 15. The computational power of Bob in Protocol 9 is within DQC1-MBQC.
Proof. Note that the s patterns are executed in series and Bob does not keep any qubits
between executions. The inputs to these patterns are almost maximally mixed, in
accordance with the purity requirement and this ‘mixedness’ propagates through both
computational and trap subgraphs. For the computational subgraph (which is not
entangled with the rest) the reasoning of the proof of Theorem 10 applies, since this
subgraph satisfies the sufficient conditions and no dummy qubits are used. In the case
of a trap subgraph k consider first those operations that apply on the isolated trap and
dummy subgraph only. Then for each step (i, j)k of the main iteration of the protocol
(where (i, j)k is a trap or a dummy) a new pure qubit is sent to Bob, which increases
the purity parameter by 1. Entangling will not have any effect on the purity parameter.
While the measurement does not increase the purity of the qubit since it was already
pure (dummy or trap remain always pure through the computation), and tracing out the
resulting qubit will decrease the purity by 1. Thus, the whole step will not change the
purity. On the other hand, for the remaining operations the reasoning of the proof of
Theorem 10 goes through, since this subgraph satisfies the sufficient conditions. Also
operations that apply on both subgraphs are all unitary therefore they do not affect
purity.
Using the definition of verifiability given in Definition 14 we prove the main theorem
for the existence of a correct and verifiable DQC1-MBQC protocol (Theorem 12). The
full proof is given in the next section, while here we describe the main steps.
Proof of Theorem 12 (Sketch). Correctness of Protocol 9 comes from the fact that the
computational subgraph is disentangled from the rest of the computation and if Bob
performs the predefined operations, from the correctness of the blind protocol Alice will
receive the correct output. Also, in this case, (and since the traps are corrected to cancel
the effect of their entanglement with their neighbouring dummies) the measurement of
the traps will give the expected result and Alice will accept the computation.
The proof of verifiability follows the same general methodology of the proof of
the original FK protocol [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012], except the last part which
contains the counting arguments. For the rest we use single indexing for the qubits,
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where subgraph G′i consists of m qubits indexed (i−1)+1 to im. Consequently, the
total number of qubits in the protocol is sm. Parameter n represents the size of the input
of each subgraph (parameter w in the protocol).
Based on Definition 14 we need to bound the probability of the (purified) output
collapsing onto the wrong subspace and accepting that result. To explicitly write the
final state B j(ν) we need to define the following notations. Alice’s chosen random
parameters are denoted collectively by ν, a subset of those are related to the traps: νT
including tg, tk’s and θtk’s for k ∈ {1, . . . ,s} \ tg. Also νC = {ν \νT}. The projection
onto the correct state for each trap tk is denoted by |ηνTtk 〉, where |η
νT
tk 〉= |+θtk 〉 when
tk ∈ Ok and |ηνTtk 〉 = |rtk〉 otherwise (since the trap has been already measured). Cr
denotes the Pauli operators that map the output state of the computational subgraph
to the correct one. cr is used to compactly deal with the fact that in the protocol each
measured qubit i is decrypted by XOR-ing them with ri, except for the trap qubits
which remain uncorrected: ∀k : (cr)tk = 0. ρMνk denotes the density matrix representing
the total quantum state received by Bob from Alice for each round k of the protocol.
A special case is the tkth round where ρMνk represents the total state received by Bob
together with its purification (not known to Bob). The classical information received by
Bob at each elementary step i (measurement angles) are represented by |δi〉’s.
We allow Bob to have an arbitrary deviation strategy j, at each elementary step i
which is represented as CPTP map E ji , followed by a Pauli Z measurement of qubit
i (since Bob has to produce a classical bit at each step and return it to Alice), which
is represented by taking the sum over projectors on the computational basis |bi〉, for
bi ∈ {0,1}. All measurement operators can be commuted to the end of the computation
and all CPTP maps can be gathered to a single map E j after Bob has received everything
























Our strategy will be to rewrite this probability by introducing the correct execution of the
protocol before the attack, on each subgraph k: Pk =
⊗m−n
i=1 (H(k−1)m+iZ(k−1)m+i(δ(k−1)m+i))EG′k
and at the same time decomposing the attack to the Pauli basis, using general Paulis
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This way we can characterise which Pauli attacks give non-zero failure probability
when the final state is projected on the correct one. For convenience we introduce the
following sets for an arbitrary Pauli σi,k:
Ai,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = I and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
Bi,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = X and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
Ci,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = Y and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
Di,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = Z and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
We use the superscript O to denote subsets subject to the constraint km≥ γ≥ km−n+1.
For an arbitrary tg, the only attacks that give the corresponding term of the sum not
equal to zero: are those that (i) produce an incorrect measurement result for qubits
(tg− 1)m+ 1 ≤ γ ≤ tgm− n or (ii) operate non-trivially on qubits tgm− n < γ ≤ tgm.
We denote this condition by i ∈ Ei,tg and j ∈ E j,tg: |Bi,tg|+ |Ci,tg|+ |DOi,tg| ≥ 1 and
|B j,tg|+ |C j,tg|+ |DOj,tg| ≥ 1.
The next step will be to characterise which attacks of these subsets remain undetected
by the trap mechanism and try to find an upper bound on their contribution to the failure
probability. By applying blindness and observing that only the terms where σi,k = σ j,k

















The rest is based on a counting argument using ∀k, |Ai,k|+ |Bi,k|+ |Ci,k|+ |Di,k|= m.






























We also denote each set {E∗i,1∩E∗i,2∩ . . .∩E∗i,s}, where each term E∗i,w is either Ei,w or
its complement, ECi,w, depending on whether the w-th value of a binary vector y (size s)
















The condition i ∈Wi,y means that the following conditions hold together: {|Bi,w|+





























where ck = ∑{y:#y=k}∑i∈Wi,y,v |αvi|
2.






In this section we give the full proof of Theorem 12, the sketch of which proof was
given in the previous section. The same notation is followed.
The first step is to write the state of Alice’s system at the end of the execution of
the protocol for fixed Bob’s behaviour j and choices of Alice ν. We have utilised the
fact that all measurements can be moved to the end. Also, we have commuted all Bob’s
operations to the end (before the measurements) merging them to a single CPTP map.
The state of Alice is:
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|b〉〈b+cr|Cb,νC†⊗si=k |+θtk+btk π〉〈+θtk+btk π|
where |+θtk+btk π〉〈+θtk+btk π| are used to define Alice’s measurement of the traps
which are part of the output state of each round k (if they exist).
To bound the failure probability, observe that projectors orthogonal to |ηνTtk 〉’s vanish,
























We introduce the following unitary, which characterises the correct operation on
each subgraph k: Pk =
⊗m−n
i=1 (H(k−1)m+iZ(k−1)m+i(δ(k−1)m+i))EG′k .
We can rewrite the failure probability, introducing P †k Pk’s on both sides of the
quantum state of the system before the attack, and absorbing the outermost unitaries



























We decompose E ′ j using the following facts: There exist some matrices {χv}
of dimension s(4m− 3n)× s(4m− 3n), with ∑v χvχ†v = I such that for every density
operator ρ: E ′ j(ρ) = ∑v χvρχ†v . Also, each χv can be decomposed to the Pauli basis:
χv = ∑i αviσi, with ∑v,i αviα∗vi = 1. Setting σi,k to be the part of σi that applies on the
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Without loss of generality we can assume that σi, σ j do not change the δ’s.
















are those that (i) produce an incorrect measurement result for qubits (tg−1)m+1≤
γ ≤ tgm− n or (ii) operate non-trivially on qubits tgm− n < γ ≤ tgm. We denote this
condition by i ∈ Ei,tg and j ∈ E j,tg .
We can rewrite the probability by eliminating P⊥ (observing that it applies to a
positive operator) and Cb
′,νC (by the cyclical property of the trace):
pincorrect ≤ ∑
























We extract a trace over R from ρMνtg . And extract the sums over νC,k’s from the
general sum, where νC,k is the subset of random parameters νC that are used for the
computation of round r:
= ∑
νT ,v,i∈Ei,tg , j∈E j,tg
αviα
∗























To take advantage of the blindness property we use the following lemma where the
proof is given later.
















tk |⊗ |+θtk 〉〈+θtk |
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If k 6= tg, Itkk =
⊗





(k−1)m < tk ≤ km−n . And if k = tg, Itkk =
⊗
4m−3n I.
Lemma 11 allows us to simplify the big sum above based on the position of the
traps. We also sum over b′ since there are no longer any dependencies on it in the sum,
obtaining:
= ∑
























4m−3n−1 I when k 6= tg. And I =
⊗
4m−3n I when k = tg.
Note that ∑θtk Tr(|+θtk 〉〈+θtk |σi,k(
I
Tr(I ) ⊗ |+θtk 〉〈+θtk |)σ j,k) is zero if σi,k 6= σ j,k.
The same is true for ∑rtk Tr(|rtk〉〈rtk |σi,k(
I
Tr(I ) ⊗|rtk〉〈rtk |)σ j,k). Therefore we can only

















The rest of the proof is based on a counting argument. For convenience we introduce
the following sets for an arbitrary Pauli σi,k:
Ai,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = I and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
Bi,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = X and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
Ci,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = Y and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
Di,k = {γ s.t. σi|γ = Z and (k−1)m+1≤ γ≤ km}
and use the superscript O to denote subsets subject to the constraint km ≥ γ ≥
km−n+1.
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The conditions i ∈ Ei,tg that we obtained at the first part of the proof are translated
to |Bi,tg|+ |Ci,tg|+ |DOi,tg| ≥ 1. In order to be able to use these conditions we need to






























We also denote each set {E∗i,1∩E∗i,2∩ . . .∩E∗i,s}, where each term E∗i,w is either Ei,w or
its complement, ECi,w, depending on whether the w-th value of a binary vector y (size s)
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The condition i ∈Wi,y means that the following conditions hold together: {|Bi,w|+











































































































ck ≤ 1 (8.5)
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and
∀k : ck ≥ 0 (8.6)
Proof of Lemma 11. First we define state |qi〉 as:
i ∈ D |qi〉 ≡ |di〉
i /∈ D |qi〉 ≡ ( ∏
{ j: j∼i, j∈D}
Zd j)|+θi〉
By substituting ρMνk ’s and taking the trace over R:
































where |qνpi,k〉 denote the first layer pure qubits (a maximum of two) of the k-th
graph state, used as padding (dummies) or trap and their positions are defined as:
1+(k−1)m≤ {p1,k, p2,k} ≤ n+(k−1)m.


















⊗|δθu,ruu 〉〈δθu,ruu |⊗ |qθuu 〉〈qθuu |⊗ I4(w−1)/24(w−1))
where u = (tg−1)m+1 is the position of the single pure qubit of the input to the
DQC1-MBQC computation.
An implicit assumption was that all δ’s that are used to implement the measurements
of maximally mixed inputs are maximally mixed states themselves, without any loss of
generality.










{ j: j∼i, j∈Dk}
Zi(d j) (8.7)
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where Dk denotes the set of dummies of subgraph G′k.





















































⊗|δθu,ruu 〉〈δθu,ruu |⊗ |qθuu 〉〈qθuu |⊗ I4(w−1)/24(w−1))P ′
†P ′




































where state |q′i〉 is defined as:
i ∈ D |q′i〉 ≡ |di〉
i /∈ D,∀k : km≥ i≥ km−n+1 |q′i〉 ≡ |+θi〉
i /∈ D,∀k : km−n≥ i≥ (k−1)m+1 |q′i〉 ≡ |+−a′′ b′,r<ii −riπ
〉


























u |⊗ I4(w−1)/24(w−1))P ′
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It is essential for the proof that each term with index i in the tensor product depends
only on parameters with index ≤ i and the term with index (tg−1)m+1 (input qubit)
and the trap qubit and its measurement angle (if it is not an output) depend only on their
own parameters. This allows to break the summations and calculate them iteratively








































i +θi + riπ〉〈a
′′ b′,r<i






























n I. The last step was possible because each corrected computation
angle a′′i depends only on past r’s.
And finally (for u = (tg−1)m+1),
∑
θu,ru









u +θu + ruπ〉〈a
′






For k 6= tg, if km≥ tk ≥ km−n+1 the above procedure will eventually give:























tk |⊗ |+θtk 〉〈+θtk |
And for k = tg the result will be:
⊗
4m−3n I, which concludes the proof.

Part IV





Looking at the bigger picture, quantum verification can be seen as a member in the
family of quantum security primitives, i.e. primitives that intend to secure the commu-
nication and manipulation of quantum information (as opposed to quantum protocols
used to promote classical security). Starting with an insecure quantum channel, one
wants to encrypt a state before transmitting it so that no eavesdropper gains any new
information about the state. The next step, is to take measures against malleability, i.e.
the possibility of the adversary who controls the channel to change the encrypted state
so that it encodes a different message. This is achieved by quantum authentication,
where some extra elements added on top of encryption allow the receiver to decide if
it accepts or rejects the state it receives. Verification can be seen as the authentication
of a state that has gone through a transformation and the receiver has to decide if the
final output is the correct output of the computation. An extra property in the delegated
computation scenario, which does not necessarily assume verification, is the property
of blindness, where the prover does not learn anything about the transmitted state and
the computation to be performed - thus state and computation should be encrypted.
The goal of this part is to study the relations of these primitives, and use them to
derive new results or point to possibly helpful directions. In particular, taking the same
approach as in [Barnum et al., 2002], which studies the relation between encryption and
authentication, and in [Aharonov et al., 2010], which provides a verification protocol
based on authentication, we build the verification protocol of [Fitzsimons and Kashefi,
2012] out of the primitives of encryption (and blindness) and authentication. We pose
the question of what are the necessary ingredients to build the simplest verification
protocol and finally we try to make connections to the impossibility of classical verifier
question, which is still unanswered and central to the field.
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The main contributions of this part are:
• Providing a protocol that enables the authentication of a quantum state that is
transmitted through an untrusted quantum channel, given that the two end parties
share a secret classical key. This protocol is based on the idea of trapification,
as in [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012], and quantum encoding. Note that these
results where proven independently in [Broadbent et al., 2012] but with a different
motivation.
• Drawing the roadmap on the sufficient and the necessary steps for building a
verification protocol and relate to the classical verifier (im)possibility question
which is our motivation.
9.1 Preliminaries and Related Work
Before studying their relations, we need to provide the formal definitions of the security
primitives we consider in this part.
Quantum encryption and quantum blindness are two security primitives that relate to
the secrecy or confidentiality of information in the presence of an adversary. A quantum
encryption scheme is defined in the context of insecure quantum channels, where one
party (Alice) wants to communicate a quantum state to another party (Bob) and needs
to keep the transmitted state hidden from any possible eavesdropper (Eve) [Barnum
et al., 2002].
Definition 15. An encryption scheme with error ε for quantum states hides information
so that if ρ0 and ρ1 are any two distinct encrypted states, then the trace distance
D(ρ0−ρ1) = 12Tr|ρ0−ρ1| ≤ ε
Notice that this definition considers approximate encryption, with perfect secrecy
(perfect encryption) being the case when ε = 0.
Quantum blindness is defined in the context of insecure delegated quantum comput-
ing. We already gave the definition of perfect blindness in Section 1.2, and discussed it
extensively in the previous parts. If we want to compare it with quantum encryption, we
can imagine that Alice sends to a channel an encrypted quantum state and an encrypted
description of a transformation. The untrusted channel (now Bob) is able to apply the
transformation to the state without learning anything about the original (decrypted) state
and the original (decrypted) transformation applied on it. Notice that such a protocol
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might require many rounds of interaction between Alice and Bob and the requirement
is that no round leaks any of the confidential information. Approximate blindness can
be defined similarly to the definition of perfect blindness:
Definition 16 (Approximate Blindness). Let P be a protocol for delegated computation:
Alice’s input is a description of a computation on a quantum input, which she needs to
perform with the aid of Bob and return the correct quantum output. Let ρAB denote the
joint initial state of Alice and Bob and σAB their joint state after the execution of the
protocol, when Bob is allowed to do any deviation from the correct operation during
the execution of P, averaged over all possible choices of random parameters by Alice.
The protocol P is ε-blind if
∀ρAB ∈ L(HAB),∃E : L(HB)→ L(HB), s.t. TrA(σAB)≈ε E(TrA(ρAB)) (9.1)
Quantum Authentication is defined using the following scheme [Barnum et al.,
2002]:
Definition 17. A quantum authentication scheme (QAS) is a pair of polynomial time
quantum algorithms A and B together with a set of classical keys K such that:
• A takes as input an m-qubit message system M and a classical key k ∈ K and
outputs a transmitted system T of m+ t qubits.
• B takes as input the (possibly altered) transmitted system T and the classical key
k and outputs two systems: an m-qubit message state M′, and a single qubit V
which indicates acceptance or rejection. The classical basis states of V are called
|ACC〉, |REJ〉 by convention.
For any fixed key k, we denote the corresponding super-operators by Ak and Bk.
A QAS should have the following property [Barnum et al., 2002]:
Definition 18. A QAS is secure with error ε for a state |ψ〉 if it satisfies:
Completeness: ∀k ∈K : Bk(Ak(|ψ〉〈ψ|)) = |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|








where Pgood is the projection into the desired (‘good’) subspace :
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Pgood = |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗ IV +(IM−|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗|REJ〉〈REJ|
A QAS is secure with error ε if it is secure with error ε for all states |ψ〉.
Equivalently we could define soundness using the ‘bad’ projector (Pbad = I−Pgood =
(IM−|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗|ACC〉〈ACC|) and demand it is small.
Also, it is important to clarify that if we ask the condition to be ‘the probability
of the state collapsing into the incorrect subspace when the state is accepted, is low’
(therefore making the probability conditional) this would make such a protocol much
harder to construct. The security of the existing protocols will always be broken by an
attacker who always replaces the state by a random state, i.e the state seen by Alice is
the maximally mixed state. Then - for the existing protocols that we study - there will
always be some probability that the state is accepted and, when it is accepted, the state
will collapse with a fixed (not bounded by ε) probability into the incorrect subspace. ∗
Verification, already defined in Section 1.2, can be seen as an extension of QAS in
the delegated computing scenario, were the untrusted ‘channel’ is also able to perform
a computation on the state transmitted, and the receiver (which could be the same as the
sender in this case, so that there is no need for classical secret key distribution) is able to
tell if the state received is the correct transformed one. It is important here to emphasise
the different ‘flavours’ of verification definitions, depending on whether the input is
quantum or classical and whether the output is quantum or classical. For example, the
question of a classical verifier protocol has no clear meaning if we consider a protocol
that admits an arbitrary quantum input, which is unknown to the verifier. In that case the
verifier will have to measure the state and therefore lose some of the information before
transmitting it to the prover. In the case of a classical input verification protocol, without
loss of generality we can assume that the unencrypted input to the computation is the
blank state |0〉⊗m. It is important to stress that when we speak about classical or quantum
input we speak only about the input to the computation that is to be delegated and not
about any auxiliary states send by Alice to Bob to accommodate this computation (e.g.
in MBQC the |+〉 states of the subgraph G\ I).
A known result, proved in [Barnum et al., 2002], is the relation between quantum
authentication and encryption. Quoting from this paper:
∗For example in the trap-based authentication scheme, when the attacker replaces the state by the
maximally mixed state and we condition on the traps being accepted the rest of the state is still in the
maximally mixed state therefore the conditional probability of failure cannot be bounded by an arbitrary
ε
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For classical information, authentication and encryption can be considered com-
pletely separately, but in this section we will show that quantum information is different.
While quantum states can be encrypted without any form of authentication, the converse
is not true: any scheme which guarantees authenticity must also encrypt the quantum
state almost perfectly.
More formally [Barnum et al., 2002]:
Theorem 16. A Quantum Authentication scheme with error ε is an encryption scheme
with error at most 4ε1/6.
Proof intuition for the above theorem comes from considering the following extreme
case. Let ρ|0〉 and ρ|1〉 be the density operators of the encodings of the computational
basis states of an input qubit according to the authentication scheme. Let ρ|0〉 and ρ|1〉 be
perfectly distinguishable quantum states which is the opposite end to perfect encryption.
Since, when proving soundness of a QAS, the prover is able to apply any possible
attack, he might apply the following attack unitary: the basis elements of the support
of ρ|1〉 get a −1 phase, while the orthogonal elements (which include the support of
ρ|0〉) remain unchanged. Due to linearity, this attack will transform the encoding of the
state |0〉+ |1〉 to the encoding of the state |0〉− |1〉, thus the detection will find no error
and the decoding will give an incorrect state. The analogous attack is not possible in
classical state authentication. After a series of lemmas, they prove that there are similar
attacks on states that are not perfectly distinguishable, but not totally indistinguishable,
and therefore prove the theorem.
Another interesting result that relates quantum blindness with a classical impossibil-
ity statement comes from [Morimae and Koshiba, 2014]:
Theorem 17. If a classical input delegated quantum computing protocol, which uses
affine encryption, can give perfect blindness then BQP⊆ BPP.
Notice that for a classical input blind protocol, since we assume the input to be
the blank state, we need to hide only the description of the transformation, which is a
classical state. The assumption is that this description is encrypted by a classical affine
encryption, e.g. a classical one-time-pad.
Finally, it is important to mention that all definitions of security seen in this chapter
(and in fact in the whole of this thesis) fall to the category of information theoretical
security. One can consider also computational theoretical security, where the security




From Quantum Encryption to
Verification
We start this chapter by building an authentication protocol that is inspired by the
FK protocol. We use the same trapification technique, i.e. placing a number of traps
between the normal qubits that contain the information to be transmitted. First we
present a protocol with a single trap and later we place more traps and employ a QECC
encoding for probability amplification.
10.1 An Authentication Protocol
In Protocol 10 the description of a QAS protocol based on traps is given. It applies
to the context of secure communication: Alice sends a state to Bob and if state was
unaltered Bob receives the correct state and if the state was altered (in any possible
way) Bob declares correct an incorrect state with low probability.
Protocol 10 Trap-based QAS
Alice’s input. A quantum state |ψ〉 of size n = m−1 qubits.
Bob’s output. A quantum state (which should be |ψ〉 for an honest protocol) and an
indicator bit for the acceptance or rejection of the output.
The protocol
1. Alice selects a random quantum one-time padding key (x,z) ∈R {0,1}2m.
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Protocol 10 Cont’d
2. Alice selects a random position 1≤ t ≤m for placing the trap and one random bit
to select the stabilizer of the trap between X or Y (or any pair of non-commuting
stabilizers ex. X and Z)
3. Alice produces the ‘logical’ state by adding the trap qubit |η〉〈η| and applying
the Pauli padding Px,z to the whole state of size m.
4. Alice sends state to Bob
5. We assume that Bob learns from Alice via a secure classical channel the following
parameters: quantum one-time padding key, random position and type of the trap.
6. Bob undoes the Pauli padding using the same key.
7. Bob does a stabilizer measurement on the trap (depending on the choice of
parameters) and if the result is 1 (or equivalently the error vector is zero) he
accepts otherwise he rejects.
Theorem 18. Protocol 10 is a QAS with ε = 2m−12m
Proof. Since the declaration of the correctness of the state depends only on the trap
measurement we can write the failure probability as the probability of the trap measure-
ment giving 1 (state declared correct) and the state being corrupted (collapsing to the





where E is an arbitrary CPTP-map modelling the channel. p(x,z, t,η) is the proba-
bility of choosing a particular set of parameters (all are drawn from uniform random
distribution).
Writing the channel operator in the Pauli basis Pm:











where Pi, P j take all possible values from Pm and each term has complex coefficient
αi, j.
We can use the Pauli twirling lemma given as Lemma 2, which states that a random
Pauli rotation converts the channel attack to a mixture of Pauli attacks (not a uniform











where Pi takes all possible values from Pm. Elements {αi} are real numbers which
depend on E and sum up to 1.
We can eliminate the all identity ‘attacks’ (say with index i = 0) from the sum





















Since any (non-identity) Pauli attack is possible we need to examine each possible
attack separately and find a common maximum. This will determine the upper bound
since the formula contains a convex combination of attack terms.
We observe that every (non-identity) Pauli attack will be caught by at least one
stabilizer measurement in the sum over t,η: A (non-identity) Pauli attack will have at
least one X , Y or Z at one position, say t ′. This will be ‘caught’ respectively by Y , X
or Y (and X)-stabilized traps when t = t ′ (ex. 〈+|Z|+〉2 = 0). Given that we have 2m
equiprobable elements in the sum, a maximum for any attack is always 2m−12m , which
gives the global upper bound for the failure probability.
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Therefore the single trap protocol is a valid QAS with completeness 1 and soundness
2m−1
2m . Of course, a practically useful QAS should have a better soundness bound.
From the above one can easily see that the random keys related to the position and
the choice of stabilizer for the trap are necessary for the protocol to work, since we
need to detect (at least) any Pauli attack at any position for the detection procedure to
work for any type of channel (thus giving a QAS). The use of Pauli key is justified by
the need to eliminate complex coefficients αi, j and the cross terms Pi, Pj so that we can
study the attack as a convex combination of unitary terms. By Theorem 16 it follows
that some level of encryption is indeed a necessary element of any QAS protocol.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the same bound is true even when the adversary
has some prior knowledge of the state, because the proof works for any possible attack
by the adversary that is independent of the secret keys.
Another version of the trap-based QAS is presented in Protocol 11, where the error
probability is amplified to exponential on a security parameter d.
Protocol 11 Amplified Trap-based QAS
Alice’s input. A quantum state |ψ〉 of size n qubits.
Bob’s output. A quantum state (which should be |ψ〉 for an honest protocol) and an
indicator bit for the acceptance or rejection of the output.
The protocol
1. The protocol is parametrized by a QECC that detects d errors.
2. Alice selects a random quantum one-time padding key (x,z) ∈R {0,1}2m.
3. Alice selects a set T of random positions 1≤ t ≤ m for placing the N traps and
one random bit for each trap to select the stabilizer the trap between Pauli X and
Y (or any pair of non-commuting stabilizers ex. X and Z)
4. Alice encodes the quantum input of size n using this particular QECC into a
codeword of size m′.
5. Alice produces the final state by adding the N trap qubits |η〉〈η|t at random
positions and applying the Pauli padding Px,z to whole state of size m = m′+N.
10.1. An Authentication Protocol 175
Protocol 11 Cont’d
6. Alice sends state to Bob
7. Bob undoes the Pauli padding using the same key (we assume that Bob knows all
keys from before).
8. Bob applies a syndrome measurement on the m′ qubits and aborts if an error is
detected. (or corrects the error)
9. Bob does stabilizer measurement on the traps (depending on the choice of param-
eters) and if the result is 1 (or equivalently the error vector is zero) he accepts
otherwise he rejects.
Theorem 19. Protocol 11 is a QAS with ε = (1− N2m)
d
Proof. Since the declaration of the correctness of the state depends only on the trap mea-
surement we can write the error probability as the probability of the trap measurement




Tr(⊗t∈T |η〉〈η|t⊗ (I−|ψ〉〈ψ|)D(Px,zE(Px,z(⊗t∈T |η〉〈η|t⊗|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Px,z)Px,z))(10.5)
where E is an arbitrary CPTP-map modelling the channel. Term p(x,z, t,η) is the
probability of choosing a particular set of parameters (all are drawn from a uniform
random distribution). State |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is the encoding of the state |ψ〉〈ψ| transmitted,
according to the specific QECC. Map D is a CPTP-map that represents the decoding
procedure for the QECC.













where Pi takes all possible values from Pm.
Analysis of attacks: Assuming that the decoding procedure D will reconstruct the
correct state |ψ〉〈ψ| unless the footprint of the Pauli error is bigger that d, we can
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eliminate all Pi’s that contain more or equal than m−d identities. We denote this set of










⊗t∈T |η〉〈η|t⊗ (I−|ψ〉〈ψ|)(Pi(⊗t∈T |η〉〈η|t⊗|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Pi)
))
(10.7)














We continue by breaking the whole state (of size m) into N partitions of the same














A common upper bound for the elements of the inner summation is 2m/N−wi,γ2m/N =






















































10.2 A Recipe for Quantum Authentication
By looking in the structure of the trap-based QAS and the polynomial QAS on which
the ABE verification protocol is based we trace some common properties. These might
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imply the existence of a more general methodology for constructing a QAS such as:
1. Encode the quantum message to enable a random channel error detection proce-
dure. In the trap-based QAS protocol we insert an extra trap subsystem which
is measured to detect an error. This is indeed an encoding of the state, since the
transmitted system contains the original system and some overhead (the trap) used
for error detection - e.g. a random phase flip channel will always be detected with
some fixed probability by a |+〉 trap qubit padded at the end of the message. In
polynomial QAS protocol we encode the message using the quantum polynomial
code.
2. Randomise the encoding to enable detection of arbitrary (adversarial) Pauli errors.
In the trap-based QAS protocol this corresponds to the random position and type
of the trap. In the polynomial QAS protocol it is the random sign key for the
values of the polynomial. One other example of such randomized families of
codes are the family of purity testing codes in [Barnum et al., 2002] which are
used to purify shared EPR pairs.
3. Encrypt the encoded state by a quantum one-time-padding to enable detection
of arbitrary (adversarial) errors. This is performed in both trap-based QAS and
polynomial QAS protocols. It emerges naturally in the QAS in [Barnum et al.,
2002] from the Pauli corrections that follow the teleportation of the state from
Alice to Bob using the EPR pairs.
It is worthwhile mentioning that in the field of quantum error correction it suffices to
be able to correct Pauli errors to correct any type of error (based on a linearity argument).
This is not the case here, since we always need the extra encryption to detect adversarial
non-Pauli errors by reducing them to Pauli errors by the encryption.
10.3 Authentication to Verification and Classical Impos-
sibility
We argue how we can go from the QAS to the verification protocol in the case of both
FK and ABE protocols.
In the FK protocol we add the extra element of blindness. This happens for the
following reason: Alice asks Bob to measure the qubits following the MBQC pattern,
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and since some of them are trap measurements, all the measurement angles need to be
hidden so that Bob cannot distinguish between the case of measuring a trap or a normal
qubit and cheat selectively (and also should not know what was the type of the trap).
Blindness of the measurement angles is achieved by rotating them by a random angle,
thus effectively applying a classical full one-time-pad on the bits that describe the angles.
Crucially, to cancel this rotation we need to pre-rotate all the quantum states (input
and auxiliary qubits) that Alice sends to Bob, thus the necessity of a quantum verifier.
Also, the quantum state that Bob holds at any step of the execution of the protocol is
encrypted with a quantum one-time-pad. This comes from the following facts: firstly,
in the case of quantum input, the input qubits are quantumly one-time-padded when
sent to Bob. Secondly, a quantum one-time-pad is kept at any step of the protocol by
the random Z rotations on the measurement angles (parameter ri) effectively creating a
random Pauli X rotation after the teleportation on the target qubit. Finally, in the case
of quantum output, the auxiliary |+〉 qubits that are sent to Bob are randomly Z rotated
which adds to the one-time pad of the final state. Alice needs always to keep track of
the current Pauli corrections that undo the quantum one-time-pad.
In the ABE protocol blindness of computation is not necessary, since the measure-
ment angles of Bob are always fixed. Crucially, the states that Bob receives, should
be already secretly encoded by the QAS so Alice has to have a constant size quantum
computer. The state remains quantumly one-time-padded at any step of the computation
since all the input and the auxiliary states used are quantumly one-time padded with
independent keys. However, the keys change after applying the logical operations, and
Alice needs to keep track of these changes, as it is also the case in the FK protocol.
In both FK and ABE protocols, the randomization of the encoding, type and position
of the trap in the FK protocol or sign key in the ABE protocol, are not affected by the
computation. Thus the state at any stage of the protocols can be seen as a QAS state
and Alice (being both the sender and the receiver of the state) can check if the state is
encoded in the correct code space.
Having seen a way of constructing a verification protocol, starting from the princi-
ples of encryption and, in the case of the FK protocol, blindness we turn our attention in
the backwards direction, i.e. what are the necessary elements in a verification protocol.
We start by the observation that a verification protocol with quantum input and
quantum output must necessarily ‘contain’ a QAS scheme and consequently a quantum
encryption scheme.
Lemma 12. Any quantum-input / quantum-output ε-verifiable protocol is also a Quan-
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tum Authentication scheme with error ε and a quantum encryption with error at most
4ε1/6.
Proof. The simulation is straightforward. Alice encodes the quantum input according to
the verification protocol and sends it through an untrusted quantum channel to another
trusted party say, Bob, with whom Alice has shared the secret key of the verification
(verification assumes the existence of secure classical channels). Bob applies the
decoding procedure for the verification protocol with the correct key and accepts or
rejects the output. The untrusted channel can apply any CPTP-map and by the properties
of any verification protocol where the delegated computation is the identity and the
attack of the untrusted prover is the attack of the channel, the probability of the state
sent from Alice to Bob to be corrupted and Bob accepting is bounded by ε. The second
implication follows from Theorem 16.
Is it true that any verification protocol contains a blind protocol? If it was the case
then by Theorem 17 we would make a big step towards the much sought result of
impossibility of classical verifier. However, this is not the case for some verification
protocols - we already have an example on a non-blind verification protocol, the ABE
protocol.
A short discussion follows for the possible next steps towards the classical verifier
impossibility result. A common element of all existing verification protocols with a
preparing verifier and BQP prover is that encryption is always a random Pauli rotation
(quantum one-time-pad) and that the computation is always based on a measurement-
based model (Clifford unitary operators and single qubit measurements, which allows
the Pauli encryption to ‘propagate’ until the end of the computation).
Let us assume that there is a verification protocol with a classical verifier and
with only classical interaction with the single prover. Also this verification protocol is
universal, i.e. can verify any problem in BQP with failure probability bounded by ε. The
computation of the prover can be written, as usual, as the honest computation, which
must be a poly-time quantum circuit or equivalent model of quantum computation since
BQP is believed not to be classically simulable, and any possible quantum deviation at
any computational step. Then, if the state is distinguishable at any step, Bob will be able
to apply an (−1) phase attack of the kind mentioned in the proof sketch of Theorem
16 and produce a different encoded state that can potentially lead to an incorrect, but
undetectable by the verification procedure, output. The question is whether classical
encryption, introduced by the restricted computationally devices of the verifier, is
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enough to make the internal state of Bob indistinguishable at any step, for any universal
quantum computation, and thus avert this kind of attack. We think that the study of
such encryption techniques, moving further from the standard Pauli rotations used
in all single prover protocols so far, can provide an insight in the existence or not of
classical verifier verification schemes. This, however, cannot preclude the existence
of verification techniques that do not use an error detection procedure as a final step.
Also, one needs to consider verification schemes with a weaker verifier, e.g. with the
ability to prepare a logarithmic number of qubits. We think that these questions may be
relevant to further exploration of this topic.
Part V





In this part we turn our attention from solving a quantum security task to solving a
classical security task by using quantum means. The principle of secure delegated
computation, where a remote device computes on encrypted data without decrypting
them first [Rivest et al., 1978], has been applied succesfully in the classical setting (e.g.
in secure multi party computation [Yao, 1982, Goldwasser, 1997] or fully homomorphic
encryption [Gentry, 2009]). However, one can envision that adapting the techniques
of quantum blind computation, by introducing some modest quantum enhancement on
the client-server system, may lead to improvement in the classical setting. The idea
of utilizing quantum means to achieve classical security has already proved successful
[Bennett, 1984]. The goal here is to provide a protocol, that demonstrates a novel usage
of quantum, and uses quantum devices already available in scientific or commercial
labs. Blindness can also be seen as a stepping stone for verifiability, and while the latter
will not be considered in this part of the thesis, this extension is left as an open question.
By restricting the task to classical computation only, we derive a family of protocols
for unconditionally secure delegation of any classical computation to a remote server
that has access to basic quantum devices. Concretely, we present how a client with
access to a non-universal classical gate (e.g. parity gate) could securely delegate the
computation of a universal gate (e.g. NAND gate) to an untrusted server with capability
of manipulating a single qubit. We note that, in this part, the security of the protocol
pertains to the privacy, or confidentiality, or blindness of the protocol - we require that
no information about the clients input leaks to the server.
The main contributions of this part are:
• A family of protocols (called Secure-NAND) to blindly calculate a NAND gate,
with the client classically restricted to XOR operations and random bit generation
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and quantumly restricted to manipulation of either a 3-qubit state (GHZ) or a
single qubit state. Also, a proof is given for the impossibility of achieving the
same task when the devices are purely classical.
• A no-go result for a quantum off-line version of the Secure-NAND. In fact, in
all Secure-NAND protocols the state of the qubits that the client sends to the
server depends on the inputs of the client, i.e. the classical bit that are the input to
NAND. This is in contrast to protocols for secure delegated quantum computation,
presented in the previous parts, where the quantum state is independent of the
input and description of the computation.
This part of the thesis was published in [Dunjko et al., 2016] as joint work with
Vedran Dunjko and Elham Kashefi and is contained here with the permission of the main
author of the paper Vedran Dunjko. All authors contributed equally in the construction
of the protocols and the classical impossibility result (Theorem 20), all presented in
Section 12.1 of this thesis. The optimality results for our protocols presented in Section
12.2 are predominantly work of Vedran Dunjko and the author of this thesis contributed
in providing feedback in the form of comments.
11.1 Main Results
The general idea behind our protocol for the secure computation of the universal NAND
gate is based on the following simple fact presented for the first time in [Anders and
Browne, 2009] which was further utilised for a multi-party cryptographic setting in
[Loukopoulos and Browne, 2010], the role of contextuality in computational speedup
in [Raussendorf, 2013b] and the relation of entangled quantum states and multi-party
computational games in [Hoban et al., 2011]. Let M0 to denote a Pauli-X measurement
and M1 a Pauli-Y , then the three qubit measurement Ma ⊗ Mb ⊗ Ma⊕b of the GHZ
state (denoted here as |Ψ〉= 1/
√
2(|001〉− |110〉)) computes NAND(a,b) (see more
details in Section 11.1). We then show how instead of switching the measurements
(based on the input a and b) one can simply apply the pre-rotation operation based on
a, b and a⊕b to the GHZ state and then the Pauli-X measurements of all three qubits
achieve the same task. This will allow us to achieve a client-server scenario where the
client effectively chooses the measurement basis by this pre-rotation while hiding his
secret input bits (a and b). The next step for obtaining the full security property is the
application of an additional random Z gates to hide the outcome computed by the server.
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These hiding steps leads to the necessity of quantum communication (as we prove next)
and as a result we can replace the requirement of GHZ state with sequential rotation
and one final measurement on a single qubit state as well. In other words, if we denote




encode the input of the client in the resource state, |+〉, while permitting the server to
perform the other operations required to compute the NAND gate. Here, for any unitary
U and bit x, with Ux we denote the identity 1 (for x = 0) and U (for x = 1). Since all
the information of the client is encoded in the phase of the states, additional randomly
chosen Z gates achieve a full one-time pad of the client’s information, which can easily
be decoded by the client by a bit-flip (for details see Section 12.1.4). Here we present
specific protocols based on various manipulations of the single qubit |+〉 and three
qubits entangled GHZ state, however one could easily adapt these protocols to cover
various encodings necessary for the specific noise model or available resources within
a particular implementation platform as we have recently done for an experimental
demonstration of our protocol in an optical setting [Barz et al., 2015].
The actual setting of our protocols (a restricted client with XOR gate only), on
its own, is not a realistic set up. The potential advantage of the employment of such
quantum scheme in a classical secure multi-party protocol for reducing the overall
overhead should be explored elsewhere. However, one could think of our protocols as a
game scenario that exhibits the power of quantum communication. It is straightforward
to prove that purely classical players (i.e. a classical protocol with classical client and
server) could not win deterministically the game of computing securely the NAND of
encoded input bits (Theorem 20). The proof is based on a reduction to the impossibility
of computing non-linear function (e.g NAND) with linear function (e.g Parity) given
a generic advice string∗. On the other hand to prove having pre-shared quantum
correlation or equivalently using offline quantum communication (quantum states
independent of classical inputs) will also not lead to a winning strategy, a completely
different proof technique had to to be developed (Theorems 21 and 22). Through a
series of lemmas we show any quantum offline protocol for secure delegated NAND
computing could be reduced to a simple protocol with one round only where the
classical communication will be necessarily dependent on the client’s secret inputs.
Then the correctness criteria for a deterministic secure NAND computation is proven
∗By a generic advice string we mean any string which does not depend on the input bits.
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to be equivalent to perfect discrimination of the classical encoded messages and hence
the leakage of client’s secret. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that a
security game manifests the structural difference between static pre-shared correlation
versus a dynamic quantum communication.†
†While obviously quantum communication could be achieved using shared entanglement and classical
communication, however the restricted client in our set up could not employ teleportation. This is in fact
chosen so that to highlight the differences.
Chapter 12
Secure-NAND
12.1 Secure NAND Protocols
There are three types of protocols that we introduce here, to address various implemen-
tation scenarios. These families achieve the same goal and differ only in the required
quantum gadgets of the client. Following the construction steps explained in the intro-
duction, in the first family of the protocols, it is assumed that client can create or have
secure access to some simple (few qubits) entangled states. On the other hand, in the
second family it is assumed that the client is able to measure the flying qubit that it
receives through an untrusted channel to perform its desired universal computation. In
the third setting, the client needs only to have the capacity to perform simple single
qubit rotations. Importantly, in all three scenarios the classical computation of the client
is restricted to XOR operations. For all of our SecureNAND protocols will always
assume that the client is honest, and behaves as specified by the protocols. In our setting,
the server is the untrusted party. However, we will require and that the protocols are
correct - yield correct outputs in the case of an honest server. This property corresponds
to completeness in the terminology of interactive proof systems, whereas we do not
require soundness (verifiability, in the context of delegated computing).
Aside from correctness, regarding the guarantees for the honest client, we require
the protocols are secure, specifically that they reveal no information about the client’s
input (aside from the input’s size) to the server. This property, also known as blindness,
is defined formally as follows.
Definition 19. We will say any SecureNAND protocol is secure (also referred as blind)
if the quantum states sent during the execution of the protocol from the client to the
server, once averaged over the client’s internal secret parameters, do not depend on the
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secret input bits to the client i.e. the inputs to the NAND gate which is to be computed
in a secure delegated fashion. In other words, the averaged states sent by the client are
the same for any choice of the inputs.
In other words, the system the server receives from the client could have been
generated by the server without receiving any information from the client.
We first prove that it is impossible to achieve the similar task of secure delegated
computing of our protocols by removing the quantum requirement.
Theorem 20. No classical protocol, in which the client is restricted to XOR computa-
tions can delegate deterministically computation of NAND to a server while keeping the
blindness.
Proof. We prove this result first for the case of two rounds of communication, and
no initial shared randomness. Any such protocol will have the following three stages:
client’s encoding, server’s computation, and client’s decoding.
client’s encoding. In this stage, the only thing the client can do is to compute C1(a,b,−→x ),
where a,b are the input bits, −→x is a random bit string (of any length) and C1 is a
computation which can be implemented using only XOR gates. However, the state
C1(a,b,−→x ) must be independent from a and b to maintain blindness when averaged
over all −→x .
server’s computation. The only thing the server can do is to apply some computable
function S on C1(a,b,−→x ), thus returning S(C1(a,b,−→x )).
client’s decoding. The only thing the client can do is to run some function C2, on all the
data he has, which is implementable using XOR gates only:
C2(a,b,−→x ,S(C1(a,b,−→x ))) = NAND(a,b) (correctness)
and the output must (deterministically) be the NAND of the inputs.
Let c = C1(a′,b′,
−→
x′ ) be some constant the client may send to the server. Then,
because of blindness it must hold that for all a,b there must exist −→x (a,b), which
depends on a,b such that
C1(a,b,−→x (a,b)) = c.
To see this, note that if the client could send c, but not for some inputs a′′ and b′′,
then upon receiving c the server learns something about the input, namely that it is not
a′′,b′′, which violates blindness. Note also that since all the computations the client
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can perform use only XOR gates (and without the loss of generality, reversible), the
client can compute −→x (a,b) given a,b using only XOR operations. But then, by the
correctness of the protocol we have that
C2(a,b,−→x (a,b),S(c)) = NAND(a,b) (correctness).
But S(c) is constant as well. This implies that given a fixed string S(c) the client can
compute the NAND of any input using just XOR gates, which is not possible.
This argument can be further generalized to a setting with shared randomness and
many rounds of communication. It is easy to see that the randomness cannot help as
the protocol must be deterministic (hence work for any sampling of the joint random
variable), whereas using multiple rounds (all of which must be independent of the
input, from the viewpoint of the server) just yields a longer constant string (analogous
to S(c)) using which the client can compute the NAND on her own, which is again
impossible.
We proceed now with constructing the family of quantum protocols for the same
task. While the simplest protocol is demonstrated last, we present the sequence of
adapting the GHZ game as shown in [Anders and Browne, 2009] to a security scenario
to present a simple security and correctness proof. Then with each new family we
reduce the client’s requirement while maintaining the same properties.
12.1.1 Preparing Client
In Protocol 12 the client generates a GHZ state of 3 qubits which are rotated depending
on the values of the inputs a,b, a⊕b and a random bit r. Qubits are sent through an
untrusted quantum channel from client to server who applies a Pauli-X measurement on
the qubits and sends the classical result to the client via an untrusted classical channel.
The client produces the final output by applying classical XOR gates between the
received classical bits and the random bit. In what follows we denote a random selection
of an element of a set by ∈R.
We will say any SecureNAND protocol is correct if for every run of the protocol
where both players are honest (adhere to the protocol) and for all inputs a,b we have
out = ¬(a∧b) = 1⊕ (ab)
This definition will be used for all the presented protocols in this chapter. Throughout
this chapter we will be using the notation for the logical and between two bits a,b as
a∧b and ab interchangeably.
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Protocol 12 Entangled-based Preparing client SecureNAND
• Input (to client): two bits a,b
• Output (from client): ¬(a∧b)
• The Protocol:
– client’s round











and sends it to the server.
– server’s round
1. server measures the qubits 1,2 and 3, with respect to the observables
X1,X2, and X3, obtaining outcomes b1,b2 and b3, respectively.
2. server sends b1,b2,b3 to client
– client’s round
1. client computes
out = b1⊕b2⊕b3⊕ r (12.1)
2. client outputs out.
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Lemma 13. Protocol 12 is correct.
Proof. First note that the protocol is correct if the following eigenstate equality is true
for all binary variables a,b,r
X1X2X3|Ψ′〉= (−1)1⊕ab⊕r|Ψ′〉 (12.2)
as this equality guarantees that the parity of the outcomes of stabiliser measurements of
server (in basis X1X2X3) equals 1⊕ab⊕ r which implies client will decode the correct










































































































In the derivation above we have simply used the trivial commutativity of operators
acting on disjoint subsystems. So the Lemma holds.
Next, we prove the blindness of this protocol
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In the remainder of this chapter we will use the following short-hand notation:
X := |X〉〈X |
for all labels X . This is a non-standard notation used here for the sake of brevity.
Lemma 14. Protocol 12 is blind.




























The operator S does not depend on the ri variables, and is diagonal in the computational


















(|001〉〈001|+ |110〉〈110|− |001〉〈110|− |110〉〈001|)+
1
2
(|001〉〈001|+ |110〉〈110|+ |001〉〈110|+ |110〉〈001|)
)






. Hence the operator is diagonal in














This state is independent from a and b and the lemma is proved.
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Protocol 13 Entangled-based Measuring client SecureNAND
• Input (to client): two bits a,b
• Output (from client): ¬(a∧b)
• The Protocol:
– server’s round
1. The server prepares the state |Ψ〉 and sends it to the client
– client’s round
1. The client computes c = a⊕ b, measures the qubits 1,2 and 3, with
respect to the observables Pa,Pb, and Pc, obtaining outcomes b1,b2
and b3, respectively.
2. client computes
out = b1⊕b2⊕b3 (12.4)
3. client outputs out.
12.1.2 Measuring Client
In Protocol 13 server generates a GHZ state of 3 qubits. The qubits are sent through an
untrusted quantum channel from the server to the client. The client applies a Pauli-X or
Pauli-Y measurement on the qubits depending on the classical inputs a and b and their
classical XOR and produces the final output by applying classical XOR gates between
the measurement outputs.
Lemma 15. Protocol 13 is blind and correct.
Proof. The correctness of this protocol follows directly from the result in [Anders
and Browne, 2009]. The blindness of the protocol trivially follows from the fact that
no information is sent from the client to the server, thus the protocol is blind in all
no-signalling theories (including standard Quantum Mechanics).
12.1.3 Bounce Protocol
In Protocol 14 we reduce the requirements on the client side, which no longer has to
measure or prepare states, but rather only modify locally the GHZ state of 3 qubits
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prepared by the server. The client applies single-qubit quantum operators depending
on the values of the inputs a,b, a⊕b and 3 classical random bits. The client sends the
rotated qubits to the server via an untrusted quantum channel. The server applies a
Pauli-X measurement on the qubits and sends the classical result to the client via an
untrusted classical channel. The client produces the final output by applying classical
XOR gates between the received classical bits and the random bits.
Protocol 14 Entangled-based Bounce SecureNAND
• Input (to client): two bits a,b
• Output (from client): ¬(a∧b)
• The Protocol:
– server’s round
1. The server prepares the state |Ψ〉 and sends it to the client
– client’s round
1. client receives the state |Ψ〉 from the server.
2. client generates r1,r2,r3 ∈R {0,1}














and sends it to the server.
– server’s round
1. server measures the qubits 1,2 and 3, with respect to the observables
X1,X2, and X3, obtaining outcomes b1,b2 and b3, respectively.
2. server sends b1,b2,b3 to client
– client’s round
1. client computes
out = b1⊕b2⊕b3⊕ r1⊕ r2⊕ r3. (12.5)
2. client outputs out.
Lemma 16. Protocol 14 is correct.
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Proof. The correctness is directly obtained from Lemma 13 on the correctness of
Protocol 12. To see this note that the states the server performs the measurements on
are identical in the two protocols, up to the existence of possible Zr22 and Z
r3
3 rotations
on the second and third qubit. Since we have
XZr = (−1)rZrX ,and
Y Zr = (−1)rZrY,
these rotations cause an additional (multiplicative) phase of (−1)r2⊕r3 . But this is
compensated for in the modified decoding of the client (see Equation 12.5 in Protocol
14) so the output is correct in this protocol as well.
Lemma 17. Protocol 14 is blind.








































where ρinitS is any state the malevolent server could have initially prepared. In the
expression above, we have made no assumptions on the dimensionality of the initial
state the server may have prepared, and we only assume that the local operations of the
client are correct, single qubit operations, acting on three distinct qubits.
Note further that the actions of the client are only on a subsystem of the whole
system in the state ρinitS , signifying that the server might have prepared an entangled
state, and sent only a subsystem to the client to be modified, while keeping the remainder
of the system. To simplify the state we could commute the Z operators with the phase
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The state ρinitS has two partitions - the partition corresponding to the subsystem the
server sends to the client, and the subsystem he keeps. Thus ρinitS can be written (in the
Pauli operator basis) as




where C denotes the subsystem sent to the client, and S′ the subsystem kept by the server,
and σi and σ j denote general Pauli operators acting on the two respective subsystems.










































































is non-zero only if all the single qubit operators making up σi are either Z or identity,
and in both cases diagonal in the computational basis. Thus, we can write the final
































= ∑i, j α
′









iSS†⊗σ j = ∑i, j α′i, jσ′i⊗σ j
Since α′i, j is independent from a and b, this state is independent from a and b and the
lemma is proved.
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Protocol 15 Single Qubit Bounce SecureNAND
• Input (to client): two bits a,b
• Output (from client): ¬(a∧b)
• The Protocol:
– server’s round
1. The server prepares the state |+〉 and sends it to the client
– client’s round
1. client receives the state |+〉 from the server.
2. client generates r ∈R {0,1}





and sends it to the server.
– server’s round
1. The server measures the qubit with respect to the X basis, obtaining the
outcome s
2. server sends s to client
– client’s round
1. client computes
out = s⊕ r⊕1 (12.6)
2. client outputs out.
12.1.4 Single Qubit Protocols
Here, we give variants of a new class of secure NAND protocols which only require
single qubit manipulations. Similarly to the variants we have given for the GHZ-based
protocols, the single qubit protocol can also be modified to a client preparation or a
measuring client protocol. In the former, it is the client which would prepare the initial
|+〉 state, whereas in the measuring client protocol, the client would perform the final
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measurements. Similar to the entangled-based scenario, all variations of protocols are
blind and correct as a simple consequence of the Single Qubit Bounce SecureNAND
protocol (that we describe next).
In Protocol 15, the server generates a single qubit state (|+〉) and sends it via an
untrusted quantum channel to the client who applies a series of single qubit rotation
operator depending on the values of the inputs a, b, a⊕ b, and a classical random
bit. The client sends the rotated qubit to the server via untrusted quantum channel.
Sever applies a Pauli-X measurement on the qubit and sends the classical result to
the client via an untrusted classical channel. The client produces the final output by
applying classical XOR gates between the received classical bit and the random bit and
constant bit 1. The correctness and blindness are directly obtained from the proof for
the entangled-based protocols. To see the correctness note that if the server was honest,
it is a straightforward calculation to see the state of the qubit the server receives is
ZrZa∧b|+〉
Then the result of the measurement performed by the server is s = r⊕a∧b, and the
decoding produces out = 1⊕a∧b as required. To see the security, note that the most
general strategy of the server is to prepare a bipartite state π1,2 and send the first
subsystem to the client. Then the state of the server system (up to a normalisation



















where r′ = r⊕ a∧ b. Since r is distributed uniformly at random, so is r′ so the state
above does not depend on a or b.
12.2 No-go Result
The main contribution of this chapter is to prove the optimality of the quantum protocols
of the last section. We prove that it is impossible to achieve the similar task of the secure
delegated NAND computing if one attempts to remove any quantum communication.
Next we show that the communicated quantum states must also depend on the classical
input of the client as it is done in our protocols. More precisely, we will show that any
quantum protocol where a XOR-restricted client computes NAND(a,b), by initially
sending a quantum state ρ to the server, followed by classical communication only, can
be perfectly blind and perfectly correct only if the state ρ depends on the input bits
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a,b of the client. The protocols without this dependence, so where all the quantum
communication can be done independently from the input of the client (hence can be
done before the client decides on her input bits), we call quantum off-line protocols.
Thus, we show that a blind quantum-offline protocol with a XOR-restricted client is
not possible ∗. We begin by addressing protocols with two rounds of communication
between the client and the server. By round we refer to an instance of either the client
sending a message to the server, or the server sending a message to the client. Since
the last message, for it to have any meaning, must come from the server, the order of
the two rounds is client→ server, followed by server→ client. The generic description
of a potential secure NAND quantum offline protocol with two rounds is given later
in Protocol 7. In order to prove the impossibility of obtaining such a protocol we
prove several lemmas proving first the impossibility of a particular class of somehow
‘minimal’ NAND quantum offline protocols (see Protocol 16 and 17 below). Following
this, we present the reduction between these protocols i.e. if a generic protocol of type
Protocol 18 is possible then so is the minimal protocol, hence proving the impossibility
of obtaining any offline quantum protocol. Finally, we extend our argument to the
multi-rounds scenario.
These types of protocols are intimately linked to the composability of secure NAND
computations in a larger computation †. Note that since, for the second layer of any
computation, the client does not know the inputs in advance (since she cannot compute
them herself) but knows the encryption of the outputs in advance, thus, quantum offline
protocols are necessary and probably sufficient for the composition of NANDs in a
larger computation, without requiring additional run-time the multi-round scenarios
communication. The case where run-time communication is allowed will be studied
presently. Note also that it does not matter what function, which in tandem with XOR
and NOT gates forms a universal set, we use. For simplicity, here we focus on AND. To
shorten our expressions, in this section we will be predominantly use ab to denote a∧b
the logical AND operator of two bits a and b.
The simple quantum offline secure AND computation with two rounds of commu-
nication (Simple AND QO2, Protocol 16) is the most natural first attempt, which is
inspired by information-theoretic considerations - since the client’s input is two bits a
∗Note, in contrast, that the blind quantum computing protocol in [Broadbent et al., 2009] is quantum-
offline, as the initial qubits the client sends are chosen uniformly at random. However, in this protocol,
the computing power of the client is beyond just XOR gates.
† We do not explicitly address the security issues of composability of our protocols. However, note
that our obtained lower bounds on what is possible implies also that the impossibility results will also
hold true in any composable security setting.
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and b, hence the quantum state encodes two bits of x and y. Therefore, to hide the two
bits in the quantum state, additional randomness of two bits r1 and r2 is needed.
Protocol 16 Simple SecureAND QO2
The functionality of the Small AND protocol:
• Input (to the client): two bits a,b
• Output (from the client): (a∧b)
• The Protocol:
– client’s round
1. client generates a quantum state ρx,yr1,r2 , characterized by random bits
x,y,r1,r2 and sends it to the server.
2. client receives her input bits a,b.
3. client computes mc = (x⊕a,y⊕b) and sends it to the server.
– Cerver’s round
1. server performs a (generalized) measurement of ρx,yr1,r2 , parametrized by
mc. He obtains the outcome ms and sends it to the client.
– client’s round
1. client computes out = ms⊕ r1⊕ r2.
2. client outputs out.
Recall that the correctness of these protocols are defined by requesting out = ab,
and blindness is defined by the equation
∑x m(a,b) ⊗ρx = η ∀a,b,
where a,b are the input bits, m(a,b) the classical message which may depend on the
input, ρx a quantum state which depends on some random parameters x (but may also
depend on a,b), and η is a positive-semidefinite operator, independent from a,b. For
simplicity, we are omitting any normalisation factors, so η may be of non-unit trace.
Lemma 18. No Simple SecureAND QO2 can be correct and blind.
Proof. As in any Simple SecureAND QO2 protocol the client sends two classical bits
of information to the server (here denoted a′,b′), without the loss of generality, we may
12.2. No-go Result 201
assume that the message the server returns to the client is a single bit measurement
outcome of one of four (generalised) measurements (one for each message (a′,b′))
which we denote Ma
′,b′(ρ
x,y





′⊕ x)(b′⊕ y)⊕ r1⊕ r2
For clarity we briefly comment on the equation above. Since, for message (a′,b′) the
server performs a generalised two-outcome measurement, this measurement can be




1 (which are positive operators summing







Then, by taking r = r1⊕ r2 and defining ρx,yr = 1/2(ρx,y0,r +ρ
x,y


















The two equations above immediately entail that ρx,yr and ρ
x,y
r⊕1 must be (mixtures of






But, more generally, the equations above imply that two states ρx,yr and ρ
x′,y′
r′ must be
in orthogonal subspaces, whenever any of the sub/superscripts differ. To see this, we
will consider the remaining cases separately. First, assume that r = r′, but x 6= x′ and/or









r ) = (a′⊕ x′)(b′⊕ y′)⊕ r = r
so the outcomes deterministically differ, meaning that the two states must be in orthog-
onal subspaces. We have already seen that the same conclusion follows if r 6= r′, and
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x = x′ and y = y′. The next case is when r 6= r′, and either x 6= x′ or y 6= y′ (but one is an











1 ) = (x⊕ x′)(b′⊕ y′)⊕1 = 1
Similarly, if r = 1 we get opposite results, and if x 6= x′ and y = y′ we get the same by
setting b′ = y = y′. Finally, we must consider the case when all the parameters differ.








1 ) = (x⊕ x′)(1⊕ y⊕ y′)⊕1 = 1
since y 6= y′, if r = 1 then the first equation above would yield 1, and the last would
yield 0, since 1⊕ y⊕ y′ = 0. Thus we can conclude that the states {ρx,yr }x,y,r are all in
orthogonal subspaces. But this means, in particular, that the states 1/4(∑r1,r2 ρ
x,y
r1,r2) are
in orthogonal subspaces for all x,y which implies that there exists a measurement which
perfectly reveals x and y given any ρx,yr1,r2 . Thus, the server can perfectly learn x and y
and, given the classical message of the client, the inputs of the client, and the protocol
is not blind.
In the above proof we have quickly concluded that the two bits r1,r2 are superfluous
and one will suffice (which is intuitive as only one random bit is needed to one-time pad
the one bit outcome). This gives us the definition of the next general family of protocols
(Small AND QO2, Protocol 17) as we describe below and will refer to later.
Lemma 19. No small SecureAND QO2 can be correct and blind.
Proof. Obvious from the proof of impossibility of simple AND QO2, where we have
actually reduced simple to small protocols.
12.2.1 Generalisation: QO2
In order to prove a reduction between the general case of Protocol 18 and the simple
scenario of Protocol 17 we start with a supposedly given blind and correct QO2 protocol
and iteratively construct a blind correct small QO2, using a sequence of claims which
define increasingly simpler protocols.
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Protocol 17 Small SecureAND QO2
The functionality of the Small AND protocol:
• Input (to the client): two bits a,b
• Output (from the client): (a∧b)
• The Protocol:
– client’s round
1. client generates a quantum state ρx,yr , characterized by random bits
x,y,r and sends it to the server.
2. client receives her input bits a,b.
3. client computes mc = (x⊕a,y⊕b) and sends it to the server.
– server’s round
1. server performs a (generalized) measurement of ρx,yr , parametrized by
mc. He obtains the outcome ms and sends it to the client
– client’s round
1. client computes out = ms⊕ r.
2. client outputs out.
Theorem 21. If there exists a blind, correct SecureAND QO2 then there exists a blind
correct Small SecureAND QO2.
The objects which appear in the protocol (which differ from the objects in the small
QO2) are as follows:
ρx, with x = (x1, . . . ,xn) − the quantum state parametrized by n bits
mc = XORE(a,b,x) − the m bit message from the client
ms, the k bit message from the server
ab = out = XORD(a,b,x,ms) − the calculation of the output
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Protocol 18 SecureAND QO2
The functionality of the AND protocol:
• Input (to the client): two bits a,b
• Output (from the client): (a∧b)
• The Protocol:
– client’s round
1. client generates a quantum state ρx, characterised by a sequence of
random parameters x = (x1, . . . ,xn), and sends it to the server.
2. client receives her input bits a,b (the client could have had her bits all
along. It is however the defining property of quantum-offline protocols
that the parameters x are independent from a,b).
3. client computes an XOR-computable function
mc = XORE(a,b,x)
(E for encryption) of the input and the random parameters. Note that
it would be superfluous for the client to generate additional random
values at this stage - they could be part of x, without influencing the
state the client generates.
4. client sends mc to the server.
– server’s round
1. server performs a (generalized) measurement of ρx, parametrized by
mc. He obtains the outcome ms and sends it to the client.
– client’s round
1. client computes an XOR-computable function
out = XORD(a,b,x,ms)
(D for decryption).
2. client outputs out.
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Lemma 20. Nothing is gained from using multi-bit ms.
Proof. Note that since the client is restricted to computing XOR operations, we can
dissect
XORD(a,b,x,ms)




where [ms] j is the jth bit of the k-bit message ms. That is, it is a mod 2 addition of
something which does not depend on the server’s message, and the mod 2 addition of
some of the bits of the message responded by the server. Since the form of the message
(i.e the explicitly description of the function XORD) is public, being in the protocol
description, the protocol remains secure and correct if the server himself computes the
bit
⊕
j∈I⊆[k][ms] j, and returns this to the client. Thus, for every correct, blind QO2 there
exists a correct blind QO21 where the server’s message comprises only one bit. The
remainder of the claims assumes we are dealing with a QO21 protocol.
Lemma 21. No random parameters which do not appear in the encryption or decryption
are needed.
Proof. Let S ⊂ [n] be a subset of indices of the random parameters which appear in
either encryption (as variables of XORE) or decryption (XORD), and let S′ = [n]\S be









in a QO21 protocol it is easy to see we again obtain a protocol (which we refer to as
QO22) which is correct and blind. In QO22 protocols, all the random parameters appear
either in the decryption or encryption. The remainder of the claims assumes we are
dealing with a QO22 protocol.
Lemma 22. No more than one random parameter which appears only in the decryption
is needed.
Proof. Let SD\E ⊂ [n] be the set of indices of random parameters which appear only
in the decryption, that is, as a variable of the function XORD. Without the loss of
generality, we will assume that the last k indices are such. Then XORD(a,b,x,ms) (due
to the restrictions on the client) can be written as:
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XORD(a,b,x,ms) = XOR′D(a,b,ms,x1 . . . ,xn−k)⊕ xn−k+1⊕·· ·⊕ xn,
Then, by exchanging the state ρx with the state






in a QO22 protocol we again obtain a protocol (which we refer to as QO23) which is
correct and blind. Blindness is trivial, as the sum over all the random parameters for the
state ρx yields the same density operator as the sum over all random parameters for the
state (ρ′)x1,...,xn−k,x (and no message correlated to the summed up random parameters
is sent from the client to the server). Correctness holds as the correctness of the
(original) QO22 protocol only depended on the parity of the k random parameters, and
the construction above preserves this.
In QO23 protocols, at most one random parameter appears in the decryption only.
The remainder of the claims assumes we are dealing with a QO23 protocol.
Lemma 23. The client’s input bits a and b do not need to appear in the decryption
function.








where SE∩D is the set of indices of random parameters which appear in both the
decryption and encryption function, and xn may appear only in the decryption function.
Here, we have assumed without the loss of generality that it is the last random parameter
that (possibly) appears only in the decryption function. First, we show that at least one
random parameter must appear in the decryption, meaning that either xn must appear or
SE∩D is non-empty (or both). Assume this is not the case. Then we have
XORD(a,b,x,ms) = XOR′D(a,b,ms)
and this must be equal to ab by the correctness of the protocol. But, due to the
restrictions of the client we have
XOR′D(a,b,ms) = XOR
′′
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The function XOR′′D(a,b) can only be one of six functions, which are such that
either a or b appear in the decryption:
XOR′′D(a,b) = a; XOR
′′
D(a,b) = 1⊕a
XOR′′D(a,b) = b; XOR
′′
D(a,b) = 1⊕b;
XOR′′D(a,b) = a⊕b; XOR′′D(a,b) = 1⊕a⊕b.
But, for all of these functions we have that ab⊕XOR′′D(a,b) is correlated to a,b, hence
not blind. For example a⊕b⊕ab = a∨b, so if the server obtains ms = 0 this means
a = b = 0. Thus, for the protocol to be blind, at least one random parameter must appear
in the decryption.
Let j be the index of this random parameter. Then x j either appears or does
not appear in the encryption. First assume x j appears in the encryption, and let
XOR′′D(a,b) = a. Then by modifying XORD in such a way that it no longer depends
on a (by substituting XOR′′D(a,b) with 0 in the definition of XORD) and by modify-
ing the encryption function in such a way that all instances of x j are substituted with
x j⊕XOR′′D(a,b), we obtain a new protocol, in which the inputs a,b no longer appear
in the decryption function. This protocol is correct, as the initial protocol was correct
for all possible inputs and random variables, and all we have done is a substitution of
variables. Since, from the perspective of the server, both x j⊕XOR′′D(a,b) and x j are
equally distributed (uniformly at random), the protocol is blind as well.
Consider now the case where x j does not appear in the encryption (thus no random
parameters appearing in the encryption appear in the decryption), and let XOR′′D(a,b)
be the function which appears in the evaluation of the decryption, and is not constant.
Then, we need to modify the messages the client sends, and the measurement the server
does. Let mc be the message the client sends in the original protocol. Then, in the
modified protocol, the client will send the message (mc,XOR′′D(a,b)⊕ y), where y is
a new random bit. The server will perform the same measurement as in the original
protocol, as defined by mc but will output mnews = m
original
s ⊕XOR′′D(a,b)⊕ y. Note
that this process can be viewed as a redefinition of the measurement the server does.
the client decrypts almost the same as in the original protocol, altered by substituting
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XOR′′D(a,b) with 0, and by XORing with y . So we have:
The original decryption in original protocol :
out = XOR′′D(a,b)⊕m
original
s ⊕ x j
The new decryption in new protocol :
0⊕mnews ⊕ x j⊕ y = m
original
s ⊕XOR′′D(a,b)⊕ y⊕ x j⊕ y = out.
Thus, the new protocol is also correct. To see that it is blind, note that the only piece
of additional information given to the server, relative to the original protocol is the bit
XOR′′D(a,b)⊕ y. However, since y is chosen uniformly at random, this reveals no extra
information so the protocol is blind as well.
Thus for every QO23 blind correct protocol, there exists a blind correct QO24
protocol where the inputs of the client do not appear in the decryption function.
To summarise, to this point we have shown that we only need to consider protocols
in which the server’s output is a single bit, at most one random parameter which appears
in the decryption (but not in encryption) is used, and the decryption function does not
take the inputs of the client as parameters. Additionally, we have shown that we only
need the random parameters which appear either in encryption or decryption. Next,
we deal with the size of the client’s messages, and the number of required random
parameters appearing in the encryption.
Consider the encryption, and the generated quantum state in the protocol:
mc = XORE(a,b,x) − the m bit message from the client
ρx, f or x = (x1, . . . ,xn) − the quantum state parametrized by n bits.
and let (mc) j denote the jth bit of the m bit message mc.
Lemma 24. No single isolated random variables are needed.
Proof. Assume that, for some j and k we have, (mc) j = xk. Then, the protocol reveals
xk. But this means that if we fix xk = 0 (that is, by dropping that random parameter from
the protocol) we yield again a blind correct protocol (with one less random parameter).
We get the same if the negation of xk appears. By repeating this, we obtain a protocol for
which no part of the message is equal to a single random parameter, or its negation.
Lemma 25. No arbitrary XOR functions of random variables are needed.
Proof. Next, assume that for some j and k, l we have, (mc) j = xk⊕ xl . Then, we can
introduce the variable xk,l = xk⊕ xl , and substitute all instances of xl in the protocol
with xk,l ⊕ xl . This again yields a correct blind protocol, with the same number of
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random parameters as the original protocol. However, the modified protocol has the new
variable xk,l appearing in (mc) j isolated, so it (by the argument in the last paragraph) be
dropped from the protocol.
We can perform analogous substitutions whenever arbitrary XOR functions of
random parameters appear in isolation: for a function b⊕ xk1⊕·· ·⊕ xkp we can define
the substituting variable xbk1,...,kp = b⊕ xk1⊕·· ·⊕ xkp , and substitute all instances of xk1
with xbk1,...,kp ⊕ b⊕ xk2 ⊕ ·· ·xkp . Thus we retain exactly the same number of random
parameters, but xbk1,...,kp now appears in isolation. So, this variable can be dropped.
Thus, for any QO24 protocol, there exists a protocol (blind and correct) where no
functions of random parameters appear in isolation in mc.
Thus, each entry of mc is of the form XOR(a,b,x1, . . .xn), where this function is
not constant in a or b (or both). However, it is clear that this function cannot be constant
in all the random parameters x as otherwise the protocol would not be blind.
We can now complete the main proof of the impossibility of quantum offline protocol
by showing how the redundancies could be removed.
Proof of Theorem 21. Define
(mc) j = XOR(a,b)⊕
⊕
k∈S j⊆[N] xk
(mc)k 6= j = XOR(a,b)⊕
⊕
k∈Sk⊆[N] xk
Then, the XOR of those two entries reveals the XOR of the random parameters with








Then the original protocol is equally blind as the protocol (we will call it MOD1 for
modification 1) in which the message element (mc)k is substituted with x̃ and the server,
upon the receipt of the message redefines (mc)k := (mc) j⊕ x.
For simplicity, assume that Sk ∩S j = {1,2, . . . l}. If we further modify MOD1 to
MOD2 by substituting all instances of x1 in this protocol with x̃⊕ x2 . . .xl we obtain a
protocol in which x̃ is a randomly chosen variable, and note that it appears isolated in
message element (mc)k. Thus, it can by the arguments we presented earlier, be dropped
from the protocol, by setting it to zero. Note that analogous transformations of the
protocol can be done if the XOR functions on two positions differ by a bit flip.
Hence, we only need to consider protocols where each function of a,b in the
message of the client appears only once, where functions which differ by a bit flip can
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be considered duplicates as well. There are only three XOR computable non-constant
functions of two binary parameters, up to a bit flip:
XOR(a,b) = a, XOR(a,b) = b, XOR(a,b) = a⊕b









Now, we can eliminate any single one of the three, and for our purposes of reduction to
the small QO2 protocol, we will eliminate the last one. Note that















by XORing the three bits of the client’s message. Thus, similarly to the approach we
used earlier, the protocol can be further modified in such a way that x̃ is given as the
third bit of the message. Furthermore, by substitution, the third bit can be eliminated
as well. Thus we obtain the third modification of the protocol, in which the client’s






with S1∪S2 = [n]. Note S1 6= S2 as otherwise the protocol would not be blind. Let SDE
be the subset of indices of the random parameters which appear in the decryption and
encryption. Then all the random parameters in S1 \ (S2∪ SDE) can be substituted by
only one random parameter x̃1 which is the mod 2 sum of random parameters indexed
in S1 \ (S2∪SDE). Additionally, the quantum state the client sends to the server needs
to be averaged over all states where the mod 2 sum of random parameters indexed in
S1 \ (S2∪SDE) is zero (for x̃1 = 0) and for the case it is one (for x̃1 = 1). The same can
be done for all the random parameters in S2 \ (S1∪SDE), generating the single random
parameter ỹ1 appearing only in (mc)2. The indices in SDE must appear either in S1 or in
S2. Let p1 . . . pq be the set which appears in both. Then we can substitute these random
parameters with one p̃ = p1⊕·· ·⊕ pq by again modifying the state the client sends to
the server, by averaging over those states for which p = 0 or p = 1. Similarly can be
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done for those indices in SDE which appear only in (mc)1 (same for (mc)2 ) resulting in
one random parameter x̃2 (ỹ2). Thus we obtain the protocol in which the client sends
mc = (a⊕ x̃1⊕ x̃2⊕ p,b⊕ ỹ1⊕ ỹ2⊕ p)
and the decryption is given with:
out = ms⊕ x̃2⊕ ỹ2⊕ p⊕ r
where r was the random parameter not appearing in the encryption, and the quantum
state is parametrized with:
ρx̃1,x̃2,ỹ1,ỹ2,p,r
We will refer to such protocols as QO25 protocols. Note that









′,r′) = (α⊕ x̃′1⊕ x̃′2⊕ p′)(β⊕ ỹ′1⊕ ỹ′2⊕ p′)⊕ x̃′2⊕ ỹ′2⊕ p′⊕ r′.











x̃1⊕ x̃2⊕ p = x̃′1⊕ x̃′2⊕ p′, and
ỹ1⊕ ỹ2⊕ p = ỹ′1⊕ ỹ′2⊕ p′ and
x̃2⊕ ỹ2⊕ p⊕ r = x̃′2⊕ ỹ′2⊕ p′⊕ r′.
Since the state ρ is parametrized by 6 independent parameters and we have three
independent equations, this implies that there are 8 differing equivalency classes (as
defined by the three equalities) over the set of all possible random parameters. The
equivalency classes can be represented by three bits c1,c2,c3 as follows:
(c1,c2,c3)≡ {(x̃1, x̃2, ỹ1, ỹ2, p,r)|x̃1⊕ x̃2⊕ p = c1
ỹ1⊕ ỹ2⊕ p = c2, x̃2⊕ ỹ2⊕ p⊕ r = c3}
We can then define the states ρ, averaged per equivalency class:
ρc1,c2,c3 = 1/8∑(x̃1,x̃2,ỹ1,ỹ2,p,r)∈(c1,c2,c3)ρ
x̃1,x̃2,ỹ1,ỹ2,p,r
Note that the first bit of the message the client sends to the server in QO25 is given
with (a⊕ x1⊕ x2⊕ p) which is equal to c1. Similarly, the second bit (b⊕ y1⊕ y2⊕ p)
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is equal to c2. The decryption is given with out = ms⊕ x2⊕ y2⊕ p⊕ r which is equal
to ms⊕ c3. This gives us a protocol in which the client sends
mc = (a⊕ c1,b⊕ c2)
and the decryption is given with:
out = ms⊕ c3
where c3 was the random parameter not appearing in the encryption, and the quantum
state is parametrized with:
ρc1,c2,c3
This protocol is correct by construction, and it is also blind as the classical messages
the client sends are the same as in the QO25 protocol, and the quantum state is averaged
over the degrees of freedom which do not appear in the abbreviated protocol - but then
the averaging over the remaining free parameters yields the same state on the server’s
side as in the QO25 protocol. Thus it is blind as well.
But this is also a small QO2 protocol. Thus, symbolically, we have shown:
∃QO2→∃QO21→∃QO22→∃QO23→∃QO24→∃QO25→∃ small QO2
which implies the proof of the main theorem since we have already proven no small
QO2 protocol exists.
12.2.2 Multi Rounds
In the definition of QO2 protocols, we have explicitly demanded that client and server
use only two rounds of classical communication to achieve the desired functionality.
That is, after the quantum offline preparation stage, client sends one classical message
to server, to which server responds. This offers the possibility that including multiple
rounds of classical communication may circumvent the no-go result of Theorem 21.
Now we show that this is not the case. To develop the proper intuition, first consider
the very first possible extension - that the protocol ends with client sending an extra
message to server. This trivially cannot help, as client’s output then cannot depend
on whatever server does. Next consider the case where client is allowed to send an
additional message to server, to which server responds. To clarify this case, we shall
use the notation of Protocol SecureAND QO2. Consider the client’s round in protocol
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SecureAND QO2 in which the client computes the output out. In the most general
setting of a 4 round, instead of computing an output, client stores server’s message
ms, computes some XORE2 function of ms a,b and perhaps new random parameters,
which she then forwards back to server. Denote this message m2c . Note that the function
XORE2 is specified by the protocol (that is, it is known to server), and that it can only
be a combination of XOR functions and negations of its arguments. It can also be a
multi-bit XOR function: if m2c = (y1, . . . ,yk) is a k− bit message, each bit yl is of the
form XORE2l(a,b,ms,x,r) (where r are random bits), where some of the arguments
may appear with a negation, or may not appear at all. Then each bit yl of m2c can be
written as
XORE2l(a,b,ms,x,r) = XORE2′l(a,b,x,r)⊕XORE2′′l (ms) (12.7)
where we have just separated the function into parts which depend on ms an which
do not. We can do this since all operations that client can do, commute. Now, since
the server knows all the component functions and ms, and since the protocol is by
assumption blind, the part XORE2′l(a,b,x,r) must be independent from a,b, when
averaged over x and r, otherwise it would reveal information to server. We emphasize
two properties of XORE2′l(a,b,x,r). First it does not depend on ms, and second it does
not reveal anything about the input. Hence, client could have sent XORE2′l(a,b,x,r) as
a part of mc, and the protocol would be extended by having server compute
XORE2l(a,b,ms,x,r) = XORE2′l(a,b,x,r)⊕XORE2′′l (ms) (12.8)
himself, after his measurement, without jeopardizing blindess or correctness. This
shows that any 4 round blind and correct quantum offline protocol can be reduced to
a two round protocol. However, this argument trivially generalizes: in an 2n round
protocol, at client’s kth interaction step, any computation client does on server’s prior
responses, the inputs and random parameters, can be split into parts which depend
on server’s input and those which do not. Since server knows his responses, and the
protocol is blind, the parts which do not depend on server’s input cannot reveal any
information about client’s inputs, and also (by definition) do not depend on server’s
responses. Hence, client could have sent all of them in the first round of communication,
and delegate the computations to server while maintaining security and correctness.
This shows that any blind and correct, quantum off-line, n−round SecureAND protocol
(denoted QOn) implies the existence of QO2. Since we have shown that the latter is
impossible, so are QOn protocols. This proves our ultimate no-go result.
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Efficient Universal Verification Two verification protocols have been built by com-
posing elements from existing protocols and achieve a reduction in the overall com-
plexity. After our work was published in [Kapourniotis et al., 2015] a few protocols
appeared ([Kashefi and Wallden, 2015], [Hayashi and Morimae, 2015], [Broadbent,
2015]) with comparable performance. In Table 12.1 we summarise the resources needed
for the protocols presented in this thesis: The first five protocols in the table are existing
ones and the last two are the new ones we introduced. Our approach offers classical
round complexity which scales linearly with the depth of the Toffoli gates and requires
single or three qudit preparation (having a universal or a Clifford prover respectively).
Most importantly it demonstrates the potential for the composition of existing protocols
into protocols that benefit from more than one approaches to verification. Compared to
[Kashefi and Wallden, 2015], which is also linear on the size of the computation, we
need qudits instead of qubits, but our scaling of communication rounds is with respect
to the Toffoli depth instead of the total depth of the computation. Compared to [Hayashi
and Morimae, 2015] we have different trust assumptions (trusted preparation instead of
measurement). Compared to [Broadbent, 2015] we have the extra feature of verifying
the quantum output instead of the classical output, with exponentially low ε, and also
our communication rounds scale with the Toffoli depth.
Further exploration could include the following topics:
• All approaches are based on the principle of adaptive measurement and injection
of auxiliary states. This results to protocols that require as many steps of interac-
tion between the verifier and the prover as the rounds of measurement, which in
turn depends on the non-Clifford elements, in the best case. Further reduction
of the round complexity is a desired property. Also, extension of verification to
models without adaptive quantum measurement will be a great advance in our
understanding.
• Verifiability has been presented in this thesis as a property unconditional to the
computational power of the prover. In fact, all the approaches presented are
secure against unbounded provers. Computationally secure soundness might be
an interesting property to investigate, especially in combination to post-quantum
cryptography, i.e. methods that are secure against computational bounded quan-




†not offering verification of quantum output with exponentially small ε
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Protocol Verifier Prover V↔ P
Poly-QAS
[Aharonov et al., 2010] Prep. O(log 1
ε
) ∗ Clifford ∗ O(N′) ∗
Trap-based (dot.-compl.)
[Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] Prep. Single Universal O(N2)
Trap-based (triple-dot.)
[Kashefi and Wallden, 2015] Prep. Single Universal O(N)
Auxiliary states
[Broadbent, 2015] Prep. Single Clifford O(N) †
Measuring verifier
[Hayashi and Morimae, 2015] Meas. Single Entangl. + Q. mem. O(N) †
Composite 1 (Protocol 6) Prep. Single ∗ Universal ∗ O(N′) ∗
Composite 2 (Protocol 7) |Toffoli > ∗ Clifford ∗ O(N′) ∗
Table 12.1: Resource comparison for single verifier / single prover protocols. We list
the resources for the verifier (size of systems to be prepared and sent), the resources
for the prover (universal computation, Clifford computation or just quantum memory)
and the number of classical (or quantum in the case of the measuring verifier) on-line
rounds between the verifier and the prover. Notice that the delegated computation is any
computation in BQP even in the case of a Clifford prover. The delegated computation
has depth N and Toffoli-depth N′
resources for verification.
• Instead of verifying the correctness of a quantum computation, one might want
to verify the existence of genuine quantum properties on the prover, such as
quantum entanglement. Our definitions of verification do not cover this need,
and it is possible that the existing protocols can already provide such properties
(e.g. [Aharonov et al., 2010] offers a method to verify if the prover has quantum
memory).
• The topic of fault tolerance of the verification protocols was not covered in much
detail and is indeed essential when it comes to implementability. Both the FK
protocols and the ABE protocols claim to have a fault tolerant implementation,
however further study is needed to understand the complexity of these approaches.
• In a more abstract sense, verification of a quantum information processing device
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by a nearly classical device is related to the falsifiability of quantum mechanics
in general [Aharonov and Vazirani, 2012]. Specifically, we are concerned with
the case that we have no information about the misbehaviour of a quantum object
other than it follows the laws of quantum mechanics and we want to be able to
verify or falsify our predictions. Since simulation of the outcome is not efficient,
verifiability in the sense presented here may be a possible way to avoid this
bottleneck.
Intermediate model verification We presented a verification scheme for a member
of the so-called intermediate quantum models, i.e. models of quantum computing
considered to have limited power compared to the full quantum computer but still
solve problems not known to have an efficient classical algorithm. In particular, we
adapted the approach of universal trap-based verification to a modified version of the
one-pure-qubit model, which preserves the same underlying principle of restricted
purity. As purity we have defined the number of pure qubits that one needs to use to
evolve unitarily the state to the particular one. The need for this modification was due to
the dependence of all existing approaches on adaptive measurement and state injection.
Such modifications can be applicable to other intermediate models, such as the model
of instantaneous quantum computation.
Further study would be beneficial in the following open questions:
1. Other models of intermediate quantum computation have been identified as strong
candidates to demonstrate experimentally quantum supremacy over classical
computation. An example is the boson sampling model, which is believed to
contain problems (up to plausible classical complexity assumptions) that are hard
classically [Aaronson and Arkhipov, 2011]. Moreover, these models exhibit the
potential to be used as quantum simulators [Huh et al., 2015] and therefore their
verification is crucial. The topic of boson sampling verification is considered
from the viewpoint of verifying quantum supremacy in [Aaronson and Arkhipov,
2014].
2. Further study in the implementability of different versions of the one-pure-qubit
model (e.g. [Liu et al., 2015]) and the application of the current verification
methods. These methods have been shown to strongly rely on properties of
quantum resource states and further characterization is needed.
220
Secure-NAND The problem of secure quantumly enhanced delegated classical compu-
tation was considered, in the setting of a client with minimal computational capabilities.
In particular, the client we consider is, on the classical side, restricted only to XOR
operations and random bit generation. This is arguably a minimal setting for the client
where security can be obtained - XOR gates and random bits suffice for a one-time pad
of the classical information of the client, and, at least for the simpler task of transmitting
of confidential information, both are necessary. We contributed towards the construction
of a family of such protocols that can enable such a client to compute the NAND gate
on two bits (which is necessary for universal classical computation), inspired by the
results in [Anders and Browne, 2009]. The simplest protocol only requires the client to
prepare a single qubit state - however, the state of the qubit depends on the inputs of the
client. That is, the required quantum state cannot be prepared before the input is known
to the client, and thus the protocol is not quantum-offline. The task, of computing a
classical NAND gate securely on a remote server by using only XOR computations was
proven to be impossible for purely classical devices.
Some other directions are of interest:
• Universal delegated computation over encrypted data is considered a difficult
problem. It is only recently that computationally secure solutions have been
found for this general problem (fully homomorphic encryption) [Gentry, 2009],
and thus far, the proposed protocols are still impractical. It is thus conceivable
that hybrid approaches to secure delegated computation may be possible, raising
the security (or reducing the complexity) of classical schemes, at the price of a
small amount of quantum capabilities.
• In our setting, the client takes advantage of the freedom of a single-qubit system to
be in a coherent superposition of two states (achieved in the temporal sequence of
gates the client applies), to obtain the outcome of the computation. Alternatively,
in the GHZ-based settings, it is the entanglement which helps achieve the required
input-output correlations obtained by measurements on three distinct qubits. This
opens up the question of what fundamental properties or resources of quantum
theory allow for the shown enhancement. Indeed, our demonstration of the
potential power of quantum communication in the setting with a limited-client
and untrusted-server seems to be closely related to the work of [Raussendorf,
2013a] on the power of contextuality. In the latter it was shown that a necessary
resource for a multi-party quantum computation of any non-linear function where
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each party could only perform classical linear gates (such as XOR) together with
local quantum operations is contextuality. Further work in [Hoban et al., 2011]
studies the optimality of non-local resources, e.g. generalized GHZ states, in
winning multi-party quantum computation games in a related setting.
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